31–40 of 87 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
No one can, but isn't that the case for all software? At least it is Free Software with reproducible builds, so you can audit the shit out of it.
I totally agree, but no one ever pays the money to have it properly audited
You can also audit it, if you have the skillset.
Do any of these "decentralized" and "end to end" encryption communication systems actually solve the fundamental problem which is that you have to trust the person you're communicating with to not give up the content of the messages they've sent and received. People's telegram and signal comms are always showing up in subpoenas because someone unlocks their phone for the feds. I guess what I'm thinking here is that t…
PGP emails doesn't even have forward secrecy. Emails are not messaging, it needs video/voice calls, stickers/gifs etc etc to have any hope of being adopted by non-techy folks.
The Signal blog has a number of articles on how they develop state-of-the-art privacy preserving features. [2][3][4][5][6].
Also the only info Signal has about you is "Unix timestamps for when each account was created and the date that each account last connected to the Signal service", which is what it provides to government requests [7].
[1] Disappearing messages
https://signal.org/blog/disappearing-by-default/
[2] How to build large-scale end-to-end encrypted group video calls:
https://signal.org/blog/how-to-build-encrypted-group-calls/
[3] Signal and GIFs
https://signal.org/blog/giphy-experiment/
https://signal.org/blog/signal-and-giphy-update/
[4] Signal groups,
https://signal.org/blog/signal-private-group-system/
[5] Sealed sender
https://signal.org/blog/sealed-sender/
[6] Private contact discovery
https://signal.org/blog/private-contact-discovery/
[7] Government requests
Do any of these "decentralized" and "end to end" encryption communication systems actually solve the fundamental problem which is that you have to trust the person you're communicating with to not give up the content of the messages they've sent and received. People's telegram and signal comms are always showing up in subpoenas because someone unlocks their phone for the feds. I guess what I'm thinking here is that t…
> People's telegram and signal comms are always showing up in subpoenas because someone unlocks their phone for the feds. If the counterpart can see something with their own eyes (or a screenshot) then how would you even expect to protect against this?
Do any of these "decentralized" and "end to end" encryption communication systems actually solve the fundamental problem which is that you have to trust the person you're communicating with to not give up the content of the messages they've sent and received. People's telegram and signal comms are always showing up in subpoenas because someone unlocks their phone for the feds. I guess what I'm thinking here is that t…
> that you have to trust the person you're communicating with to not give up the content of the messages they've sent and received This has always been the case for any form of communication, verbal or otherwise. You're always trusting that the people you're talking to don't share your conversation if you don't wish it to be shared. This is a inherent to communication, not anything technology can possibly fix.
Never heard of Briar. Title made me think it was some new cool desktop environment for linux. It took me longer than I care to admit before I realized Briar is just a messaging app.
In that regard, what are other apps like Briar?
The premise is:
> Briar is a messaging app designed for activists, journalists, and anyone else who needs a safe, easy and robust way to communicate. Unlike traditional messaging apps, Briar doesn’t rely on a central server - messages are synchronized directly between the users' devices. If the internet’s down, Briar can sync via Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, keeping the information flowing in a crisis. If the internet’s up, Briar can sync via the Tor network, protecting users and their relationships from surveillance
Since I needed brief intro myself, Wikipedia says: "The initial target audience for Briar includes "activists, journalists and civil society" with plans to make the system "simple enough to help anyone keep their data safe." As the ability to function in the absence of internet infrastructure may also make the project valuable to disaster response and aid organisations, the developers are working with the Open Humani…
Who can guarantee me that this isn't built by some national security agency with some tiny, hidden backdoors?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
No one can, but isn't that the case for all software? At least it is Free Software with reproducible builds, so you can audit the shit out of it.
I totally agree, but no one ever pays the money to have it properly audited
Since I needed brief intro myself, Wikipedia says: "The initial target audience for Briar includes "activists, journalists and civil society" with plans to make the system "simple enough to help anyone keep their data safe." As the ability to function in the absence of internet infrastructure may also make the project valuable to disaster response and aid organisations, the developers are working with the Open Humani…
Who can guarantee me that this isn't built by some national security agency with some tiny, hidden backdoors?
What does the YComb community think p2p apps like GNU Jami? I never hear much about it and think it's pretty decent unless someone has good reasons to think otherwise. Thanks
Do any of these "decentralized" and "end to end" encryption communication systems actually solve the fundamental problem which is that you have to trust the person you're communicating with to not give up the content of the messages they've sent and received. People's telegram and signal comms are always showing up in subpoenas because someone unlocks their phone for the feds. I guess what I'm thinking here is that t…
That's a biology problem, not a digital one.
These systems can't solve that problem, so yeah, you have to trust that person.