Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think an industry wide analysis of driver assist systems is likely warranted by NHTSA to form a framework for liability and communications/marketing capabilities to consumers. Think EPA emissions stickers for autos, but for driver assist. > I also think the generalized caveat that it's always the drivers fault is a dangerous one that can incentivize manufacturer's to take unnecessary risks (e.g., less testing/quali…
> If the driver is not paying attention, that is the driver's fault. No doubt. But by extension, if a safety feature did not work appropriately, that would be Tesla's fault, no? I deliberately put both root and proximate causes in my first post because there can be multiple contributors to the accident, and each may bear some responsibility. My main issue with the OP was that it lays the groundwork for absolving the…
Not necessarily. Automatic Emergency Braking systems across all automakers have serious constraints [1], and are still sold with broad legal disclaimers. They will attempt to stop you in the event an object is in the vehicle path, but importantly, there are no guarantees (and this is made clear in each vehicle's user manual). At the time of this accident, Tesla had no safety system for detecting red lights or stop signs, therefore no safety system to fail (when Autopilot is active, the vehicle has a "dead man switch" that commands you to torque the steering wheel and provide other input to ensure you're still alive and attentive every 10-30 seconds, depending on a variety of factors [speed, road curvature, visibility, path planning confidence, etc]).
This idea that these safety systems are foolproof and manufacturers are liable versus the driver are bizarre to say the least, but as I mention in another comment, it speaks to the broad lack of understanding and personal responsibility that has permeated society. People get in and drive, and it's someone else's problem if an adverse event occurs.
> I don't want a system where that professional standard is eroded because it's easier to push the risk down to the end user with a simple clause in a manual/contract that may never be read.
I agree with this position, and that engineering in general should be held to a high standard. If manufacturers have built what the industry has determined is industry standard, and regulators sign off (NHTSA has made no attempt to instruct Tesla to disable Autopilot fleet wide with an OTA software update), I'm unsure there's much more to do when the human pushes beyond system limits.
[1] https://www.caranddriver.com/features/a24511826/safety-featu...
> To understand the strengths and weaknesses of these systems and how they differ, we piloted a Cadillac CT6, a Subaru Impreza, a Tesla Model S, and a Toyota Camry through four tests at FT Techno of America's Fowlerville, Michigan, proving ground. The balloon car is built like a bounce house but with the radar reflectivity of a real car, along with a five-figure price and a Volkswagen wrapper. For the tests with a moving target, a heavy-duty pickup tows the balloon car on 42-foot rails, which allow it to slide forward after impact.
> The car companies don't hide the fact that today's AEB systems have blind spots. It's all there in the owner's manuals, typically covered by both an all-encompassing legal disclaimer and explicit examples of why the systems might fail to intervene. For instance, the Camry's AEB system may not work when you're driving on a hill. It might not spot vehicles with high ground clearance or those with low rear ends. It may not work if a wiper blade blocks the camera. Toyota says the system could also fail if the vehicle is wobbling, whatever that means. It may not function when the sun shines directly on the vehicle ahead or into the camera mounted near the rearview mirror.
> There's truth in these legal warnings. AEB isn't intended to address low-visibility conditions or a car that suddenly swerves into your path. These systems do their best work preventing the kind of crashes that are easily avoided by an attentive driver.