Earlier quoted context omitted.
> This kind of incompetence makes me seriously doubt that Google is doing anything to more substantially review apps for deeper security issues, either statically or at runtime. I actually know the team that does security vuln automation for Google Play. They've found millions of vulns in apps over the years. One of the challenges they face is precisely this sort of headline: how do you use static analysis to find vu…
Sounds to me like what you're saying is that the walled-garden approach of needing to approve every app that ever gets developed as a whole is what's infeasible without creating kafkaesque conditions dealing with their automation, and I fail to see how you've made a case for this automation being all that good in the first place, given that your main argument for it is that it's found "millions of vulns in apps over…
People definitely make that claim. I don't think I fully agree. From the reviews of this particular system I've seen, they are able to actually hit virtually zero false positives. The challenge is that this comes at a high cost of missed issues, which also generates complaints.
> I would suggest that it might be worthwhile to use OS-level features to stop apps from behaving maliciously in more general ways, but a lot of what I would consider malicious behavior (e.g. sending user analytics to third parties, feeding them misleading ads, messing with other processes, etc) is part of google's business model or claims of added value in many cases, so that seems unlikely to happen.
Unfortunately, people also get pissed when platform behaviors are locked down to prevent abuse. Heck, people demand to have access to rootkits despite also wanting it to be impossible for a malicious app to harm them.