Earlier quoted context omitted.
> And the problem is centralization, which facilitates censorship and totalitarian control. This is a gross misunderstanding of both the current banking system (which is decentralized) and the degree to which using a slow database doesn’t prevent legal actions. Blockchains are very easy to monitor and censor: ideal for an authoritarian government to get a signed confession for every disapproved transaction you make,…
I think that's a bit disingenuine considering the US government couldn't even put up a healthcare signup website without it crashing. With such a track record, you really think they could just "tap in" or "modify" any given crypto protocol so they could audit every transaction? Give me a break.
Speaking of disingenuous, I feel compelled to note that the failure was built by the private sector (CGI Federal) and fixed by the government (Mikey Dickinson’s USDS team), and it’s certainly not like there aren’t plenty of failures in private industry. You can’t honestly say anything about an entire sector based on a single cherry-picked example. For example, should we look at the high level of skill shown by Stuxnet and similar government operations, compare it to Experian, and conclude that the private sector can’t operate computers securely?
> With such a track record, you really think they could just "tap in" or "modify" any given crypto protocol so they could audit every transaction?
A public transaction ledger means you’re giving them that with no work and there are blockchain analytics companies which already have government contracts even if you believe that civil servants can’t use computers.
Similarly, there’s a well documented history of governments monitoring network traffics, collecting forensics data from phones in police custody, installing malware on people’s phones or computers, etc. There’s a zero-percent chance that they would forget to check for cryptocurrency activity along with everything else.