> unless everything is absolutely transparent including microcode and hardware it is not acceptable as freedom respecting solution.
Where do you draw the line?
Is it sufficient if all code executing on a Turing-complete CPU is open? Does the CPU itself need to be open RTL? What about the synthesis process to turn that into a netlist and then into a chip design, does that need to be open? What about the standard cell library from the chip foundry, does that need to be open? Then what about the actual foundry process - do you need documentation on how the chips are produced? What about all the raw materials? What about the machines used to make the chips?
You can keep going down the rabbit hole as deep as you want, but things will never be completely free. And you can't try to draw a random line, because the boundary between these steps isn't clear and that encourages cheating (which is what the FSF do).
Freedom isn't the answer. Freedom was a noble idea from the computing paradigm of the 80s that just doesn't work any more as an absolute goal.
The answer is to look beyond freedom and beyond meaningless absolutes, and towards what people get out of things being open. A device with more open source components is better because users have the freedom to modify them, and they are easier to audit to find security vulnerabilities. A device which sandboxes blobs - whether open or not - such that they cannot take over the system is better than one which does not. A device with proprietary firmware that you can modify and replace is better than one with signed firmware that you cannot. A device with signed firmware you can at least inspect is better than one with encrypted firmware you can't even see. A device with a firmware ROM you can't inspect or modify is worse than a device with signed and encrypted firmware blobs, because at least with the latter you can verify that the version you're running is what you expect, while you can't read the ROM at all. A device with encrypted firmware that only runs on boot and then is demonstrably out of the picture after that is better than one with privileged, resident blobs that continue running. A device with proprietary firmware that is at least redistributable to end-users of free OSes is better than one where it isn't. A device where it is reasonably easy to have end-users fetch said firmware even if it isn't redistributable is better than one where that is impractical. A device with mandatory user-controllable secure boot is better in some ways than a device with no secure boot at all, and worse in others.
Nuance matters. Absolutist positions don't work any more.