As other have commented, this is absolutely mind-bogglingly hard core. Kudos to the NSO group engineers who designed and built this (regardless of your allegiances and whether you like or dislike that they do this and whether it's objectively good or evil or somewhere in between, you have to admit that it's deeply technically impressive). Does anyone have a sense of who they sold this to and who used this particular…
A deep dive into an NSO zero-click iMessage exploit: Remote Code Execution
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Re: A deep dive into an NSO zero-click iMessage exploit: Remote Code Execution
#112Earlier quoted context omitted.
they definitely don’t do this, but in principle they could use homomorphic encryption to do the compression server-side with zero knowledge
Not an expert on this so i might be wrong, but pretty sure in homomorphic encryption, you can't run an algorithm that reduces the size of the encrypted payload. Like you could recompress and after decrypting the result is smaller, but that only happens after decrypting. Besides, its also totally impractical.
what you can't do is implement variable-size compression like Huffman trees. if you think about implementing Huffman as a circuit, you have a fixed length output - the worst-case length. you can't read the output any more than you can read the input, so you don't know how much padding you can throw away. therefore it's useless.
the same principle applies to running any algorithm that has a dynamic computational complexity. so you can run a Turing machine in FHE, but you won't know when it halts.
Re: A deep dive into an NSO zero-click iMessage exploit: Remote Code Execution
#113And NSO is the value option. Now imagine what nation states with an actual budget have at their disposal.
It came out in the recent trial that the FBI couldn't open Kyle Rittenhouse's iPhone, which was the latest generation at that time last year.
The NSA not to mention the entirety of the US defense industry could’ve easily found a way to break the encryption on a single device especially since they only had to break a relatively simple password / passcode it’s just a question of how much would it cost and how long would it take.
Re: A deep dive into an NSO zero-click iMessage exploit: Remote Code Execution
#114Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's still pretty expensive! NSO charged a flat $500,000 fee for installing Pegasus. It charged government agencies $650,000 to spy on 10 iPhones; $650,000 for 10 Android users; $500,000 for five BlackBerry users; or $300,000 for five Symbian users.
Feels weird that a private company can target individuals for a price. How was this legal? Isn’t it illegal to hack the phone of a private individual? Or do they simply say here’s the tool, here’s the manual, do what you want just don’t tell us?
Like with any complicated tech things are a bit more involved since their exports are controlled under the same regime as weapon exports do in Israel they likely have some oversight to ensure that their tech does not leak out and isn’t used outside of the bounds of what was agreed on at levels that go beyond NSO as a company itself.
These exports were very much part of the Israeli and quite likely the US foreign policy.
Some deals like the one with KSA probably should never been greenlit but many others unfortunately have had the outrage steered away from the main culprits.
Amongst their exports they’ve also exported it to European nations such as Poland.
Poland an EU and NATO member had used this software to have one of its government agencies spy on a prosecutor in charge of an investigation into some of the leading party’s members, however it didn’t seem to generate as much outrage and what little it had was directed as the NSO or Israel which is laughable.
Poland isn’t a state that normally could fall under any arms embargoes or export restrictions.
This software had likely very little to do with Khashoggi‘s fate, they didn’t use it to lure him into a trap or to track him for an assassination he was killed in an embassy after being invited to come in, and he came in out of his own free will.
I’m far more interested in how some of their western clients have used this software and unfortunately so far no one seems to want to pick or steer the story that way.
Re: A deep dive into an NSO zero-click iMessage exploit: Remote Code Execution
#115And NSO is the value option. Now imagine what nation states with an actual budget have at their disposal.
It came out in the recent trial that the FBI couldn't open Kyle Rittenhouse's iPhone, which was the latest generation at that time last year.
Re: A deep dive into an NSO zero-click iMessage exploit: Remote Code Execution
#116From the top of the article: > We want to thank Citizen Lab for sharing a sample of the FORCEDENTRY exploit with us, and Apple’s Security Engineering and Architecture (SEAR) group for collaborating with us on the technical analysis. This reminded me that NSO went after Citizen Lab on multiple fronts. They even tried to use a spy to talk to JSR ( https://www.johnscottrailton.com ) and make him say controversial things…
hopefully this company is on the way out...
Re: A deep dive into an NSO zero-click iMessage exploit: Remote Code Execution
#117> further demonstrating that the capabilities NSO provides rival those previously thought to be accessible to only a handful of nation states I mean the whole “nation state” or “nation state backed” hackers thing was always a liiiiitle (very) ambiguous right? Does the evidence really even move the goal post or mitigate the convenient scapegoating? Politicians and CEOs and certified IT professionals are all incentiviz…
The resources required to develop these exploits (and mitigate against them), were at least an order of magnitude above the next tier, because there was very little sharing and reuse (except among allies). Now, thanks to NSO, any backwater tinpot dictatorship that can't provide reliable electricity or offer a coherent policy for longer than a few months at a time qualifies as a "nation-state" (i.e. hack anyone in the world), if they can spare a 6 or 7 digit budget to hire exploits.
What NSO/HackingTeam and similar offensive security companies did was to lower the bar on nation-state capabilities by removing the need to develop a local program over many years, and allowing the reuse of infrastructure, personnel and exploits by countries that aren't allies. Call it a SpaceX for hacking as opposed to space launches.
Re: A deep dive into an NSO zero-click iMessage exploit: Remote Code Execution
#118Re: A deep dive into an NSO zero-click iMessage exploit: Remote Code Execution
#119This is mind boggling. NSO used a compression format's instructions to create logic gates and then from there "a small computer architecture with features such as registers and a full 64-bit adder and comparator which they use to search memory and perform arithmetic operations", all within a single pass of decompression. Combine this with a buffer overflow and you've got your sploit.
It seems we're now at the point where anything Turing complete can be a vector. Wow...
Re: A deep dive into an NSO zero-click iMessage exploit: Remote Code Execution
#120Earlier quoted context omitted.
Forgive my ignorance, but what would they be - the complete implosion of all forms of known security, or something else? This is a bit beyond my ken :)
Well for one, the safety of encryption rests on certain problems being intractable. (In a theoretical sense; there are always implementation bugs that destroy security). If P=NP, then those previously thought to be intractable problems, are actually tractable. And the foundation of a lot of security-related engineering collapses.