221–230 of 339 posts
This great, just like the cord on my snowmobile!
* https://youtu.be/S3LtLyuaBvI?t=26
I didn't know snowmobiles had this too! I guess it's my bias since it never snows where I'm from :D
I remember seeing something likes this as a do it yourself a while back on hacker news.
DIY is great. The problem is that after I published that article, everyone on Hacker News went and bought-out all the USB-A magnetic breakways on Amazon. And they literally never re-stocked (I found out later it was EOL from the manufacture).
The reason I launched this crowdfunding campaign was to put these USB-A magnetic breakaway cables back on the market so people could build their own again (and to sell the whole kit, to lower the barrier of entry to non-techie journalists).
I’ve just been using a wristband made out of cheap headphones plugged into a 3.5mm jack, acpi event triggers the shutdown.
Would love to see a write-up with more info on how to do this :)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
The only problem is this is sort of obvious from a forensics perspective. Person is using truecrypt, they boot it up for you, and the partition is only half the size it should be.
No, like the other reply pointed out too - it's not obvious. The first password unlocks the entire partition, the hidden one is just within the "empty" area of the drive. If you write a sufficiently large file while running the OS you could just overwrite and destroy the hidden partition without knowing that you did so. It's also impossible to tell that the hidden parition is there because encrypted data is indisting…
Why not have a bluetooth/wifi/customised proximity device constantly connected to your laptop (and resides in your wallet/shoes/private parts) and if you suddenly are too far away from your laptop while it's unlocked it gets purged?
* https://www.crowdsupply.com/alt-shift/buskill
When I designed BusKill, I intentionally avoided wireless solutions.
BusKill is designed for situations where the risk is extremely high, and you'll find that the radio-based solutions aren't very secure. They're faulty and have huge surface areas of attack.
[1] List of canaries: https://www.buskill.in/tag/canary/ [2] https://www.buskill.in/canary-002/
Earlier quoted context omitted.
That’s why it needs to be destructive. You can’t beat access to something out of someone if it has been deleted.
While true, they may beat you anyway just to be sure.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's referred to as rubber hose cryptography.
That's also why Assange (and others) developed the Rubberhose file system[0]. It's based on the game theoretic idea that if your adversary has no way of knowing how many hidden partitions you have, then you have no way of proving to them that you've given them all your secrets. As such, there is no benefit to you revealing any secrets under torture, because the torture would continue even after you've told them every…
In reality they will torture you until you stop decrypting partitions, and then a bit more of special torture, just in case.
Should we be concerned that no new canary notice [1] has been posted after the second canary [2], which promised to post the next one in June 2021? [1] List of canaries: https://www.buskill.in/tag/canary/ [2] https://www.buskill.in/canary-002/
The canary-002 says:
Status: All good
Release: 2021-06-13
Period: 2021-06-01 to 2021-12-31
Expiry: 2022-01-31
Should we be concerned that no new canary notice [1] has been posted after the second canary [2], which promised to post the next one in June 2021? [1] List of canaries: https://www.buskill.in/tag/canary/ [2] https://www.buskill.in/canary-002/
No, you should not be concerned. The latest canary #002 literally says:
Period: 2021-06-01 to 2021-12-31
Expiry: 2022-01-31
What matters is what's cryptographically signed. Did I make a mistake somewhere else?
The next canary will be posted before 2022-01-31.