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Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

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Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#341
post #267

Earlier quoted context omitted.

True multi-cloud redundancy is hard to test - because it’s everything from DNS on up and it’s hard to ask AWS to go offline so you can verify Azure picks up the slack.

Sure you can. Firewall AWS off from whatever machine does the health checks in the redundancy implementation.

What happens when your health check system fails?

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#342
post #278

Complex systems are really really hard. I'm not a big fan of seeing all these folks bash AWS for this, and not really understanding the complexity or nastiness of situations like this. Running the kind of services they do for the kind of customers, this is a VERY hard problem. We ran into a very similar issue, but at the database layer in our company literally 2 weeks ago, where connections to our MySQL exploded and…

The problem isn't AWS per se. The problem is it's become too big to fail. Maybe in the past an outage might take down a few sites, or one hospital, or one government service. Now one outage takes out all the sites, all the hospitals and all the government services. Plus your coffee machine stops working.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#343

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I worked at Amazon. While my boss was on vacation I took over for him in the "Launch readiness" meeting for our team's component of our project. Basically, you go to this meeting with the big decision makers and business people once a week and tell them what your status is on deliverables. You are supposed to sum up your status as "Green/Yellow/Red" and then write (or update last week's document) to explain your stat…

I had a good chuckle reading your comment. This is not unique to Amazon. Unfortunately, status indicators are super political almost everywhere, precisely because they are what is being monitored as a proxy for the actual progress. I think your comment should be mandatory reading for any leader who is holding the kinds of meetings you describe and thinks they are getting an accurate picture of things.

no need for it to be mandatory, everyone is fully aware of the game and how to play it.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#344

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think most of the outrage is not because "it happened" but because AWS is saying things like "S3 was unaffected" when the anecdotal experience of many in this thread suggests the opposite. That and the apparent policy that a VP must sign off on changing status pages, which is... backwards to say the least.

> a VP must sign off on changing status pages, which is... backwards to say the least. I think most people's experience with "VP's" makes them not realize what AWS VP's do. VP's here are not sitting in an executive lounge wining and dining customers, chomping on cigars and telling minions to "Call me when the data center is back up and running again!" They are on the tech call, working with the engineers, evaluating…

> I wish we would just throw up a generic "Shit's Fucked Up. We Don't Know Why Yet, But We're Working On It" message.

I gotta say, the implication that you can't register an outage until you know why it happened is pretty damning. The status page is where we look to see if services are effected, if that information can't be shared there until you understand the cause, that's very broken.

The AWS status page has become kind of a joke to customers.

I was encouraged to see the announcement in OP say that there is "a new version of our Service Health Dashboard" coming. I hope it can provide actual capabilities to display, well, service health.

From how people talk about it, it kind of sounds like updates to the Service Health Dashboard are currently purely a manual process. Rather than automated monitoring automatically updating the Service Health Dashboard in any way at all. I find that a surprising implementation for an organization of Amazon's competence and power. That alarms me more than who it is that has the power to manually update it; I agree that I don't have enough knowledge of AWS internal org structures to have an opinion on if it's the "right" people or not.

I suspect AWS must have internal service health pages that are actually automatically updated in some way by monitoring, that is, that actually work to display service health. It seems like a business decision rather than a technical challenge if the public facing system has no inputs but manual human entry, but that's just how it seems from the outside, I may not have full information. We only have what Amazon shares with us of course.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#345
post #174

"Amazon Secure Token Service (STS) experienced elevated latencies" I was getting 503 "service unavailable" from STS during the outage most of the time I tried calling it. I guess by "elevated latency", they mean from anyone with retry logic that would keep trying after many consecutive attempts?

So many lessons in this article. When your service goes down but eventually gets back up, it's not an outage. It's "elevated latency". Of a few hours, maybe days.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#346

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I wish we would just throw up a generic "Shit's Fucked Up. We Don't Know Why Yet, But We're Working On It" message. I think that's the crux of the matter? AWS seems to now have a reputation for ignoring issues that are easily observable by customers, and by the time any update shows up, it's way too late. Whether VPs make this decision or not is irrelevant. If this becomes a known pattern (and I think it has), then…

Saying "S3 is down" can mean anything. Our S3 buckets that served static web content stayed up no problem. The API was down though. But for the purposes of whether my organization cares I'm gonna say it was "up".

Most of what they actually said via the manual human-language status updates was "Service X is seeing elevated error rates".

While there are still decisions to be made in how you monitor errors and what sorts of elevated rates merit an alert -- I would bet that AWS has internally-facing systems that can display service health in this way based on automated monitoring of error rates (as well as other things). Because they know it means something.

They apparently choose to make their public-facing service health page only show alerts via a manual process that often results in an update only several hours after lots of customers have noticed problems. This seems like a choice.

What's the point of a status page? To me, the point of it is, when I encounter a problem (perhaps noticed because of my own automated monitoring), one of the first thing I want to do is distinguish between a problem that's out of my control on the platform, and a problem that is under my control and I can fix.

A status page that does not support me in doing that is not fulfilling it's purpose. the AWS status page fails to help customers do that, by regularly showing all green with no alerts hours after widespread problems occured.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#347
post #301

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I’m not all that angry over the situation but more disappointed that we’ve all collectively handed the keys over to AWS because “servers are hard”. Yeh they are but it’s not like locking ourselves into one vendor with flaky docs and a black box of bugs is any better, at least when your own servers go down it’s on you and you don’t take out half of North America.

Servers are not hard if you have a dedicated person (long time ago known as Systemadminstrator), and fun fact...it's sometimes even much cheaper and more reliable then having everything in the "cloud". Personally i am a believer in mixed environments, public webservers etc in the "cloud", locally used systems and backup "in house" with a second location (both in Data-centers or at least one), and no, i don't talk abo…

Not one person, at least four people to run stuff 24/7.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#348
post #278

Complex systems are really really hard. I'm not a big fan of seeing all these folks bash AWS for this, and not really understanding the complexity or nastiness of situations like this. Running the kind of services they do for the kind of customers, this is a VERY hard problem. We ran into a very similar issue, but at the database layer in our company literally 2 weeks ago, where connections to our MySQL exploded and…

> Outrage is the easy response. Empathy and learning is the valuable one. I'm outraged that AWS, as a company policy, continues to lie about the status of their systems during outages, making it hard for me to communicate to my stakeholders. Empathy? For AWS? AWS is part a mega corporation that is closing in on 2 TRILLION dollars in market cap. It's not a person. I can empathize with individuals who work for AWS but…

It seems obvious to me that they're specifically talking about having empathy for the people who work there, the people who designed and built these systems and yes, empathy even for the people who might not be sure what to put on their absolutely humongous status page until they're sure.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#349
post #278

Complex systems are really really hard. I'm not a big fan of seeing all these folks bash AWS for this, and not really understanding the complexity or nastiness of situations like this. Running the kind of services they do for the kind of customers, this is a VERY hard problem. We ran into a very similar issue, but at the database layer in our company literally 2 weeks ago, where connections to our MySQL exploded and…

> Outrage is the easy response. Empathy and learning is the valuable one. I'm outraged that AWS, as a company policy, continues to lie about the status of their systems during outages, making it hard for me to communicate to my stakeholders. Empathy? For AWS? AWS is part a mega corporation that is closing in on 2 TRILLION dollars in market cap. It's not a person. I can empathize with individuals who work for AWS but…

My reading of GP's comment is that the empathy should be directed towards AWS' team, the people who are building the system and handling the fallout, not AWS the corporate entity.

I may be wrong, but I try to apply the https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_charity

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#350

I wonder if they could've designed better circuit breakers for situations like this. They're very common in electrical engineering, but I don't think they're as common in software design. Something we should try to design and put in, actually for situations like this.

Netflix was talking alot about circuit breaks a few years ago, and had the Hystrix project. Looks like Hystrix is discontinued, so I'm not sure if there are good library solutions that are easy to adopt. Overall I don't see it getting talked about that frequently... beyond just exponential backoff inside a retry loop. - https://github.com/Netflix/Hystrix - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZ3wIuvmHeM I think talks abo…

In the JVM land resilience4j is the de facto successor of Hystrix:

https://github.com/resilience4j/resilience4j

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