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Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

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Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#311
post #55

Queue the armchair infrastructure engineers. The reality is that there’s a handful of people in the world that can operate systems at this sheer scale and complexity and I have mad respect for those in that camp.

This outage report reads like a violation of the SRE 101 checklist for networking management though.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#312
post #278

Complex systems are really really hard. I'm not a big fan of seeing all these folks bash AWS for this, and not really understanding the complexity or nastiness of situations like this. Running the kind of services they do for the kind of customers, this is a VERY hard problem. We ran into a very similar issue, but at the database layer in our company literally 2 weeks ago, where connections to our MySQL exploded and…

I’m not all that angry over the situation but more disappointed that we’ve all collectively handed the keys over to AWS because “servers are hard”. Yeh they are but it’s not like locking ourselves into one vendor with flaky docs and a black box of bugs is any better, at least when your own servers go down it’s on you and you don’t take out half of North America.

You can either pay a dedicated team to manage your on prem solution, go multi cloud, or simply go multi region on aws.

My company was not affected by this outage because we are multi region. Cheapest and quickest option if you want to have at least some fault tolerance.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#313
post #257

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It was very clear from their post that they were criticising STS from the perspective of an engineer in AWS within a different team.

I assumed in good faith that this is someone knowing internals as a larger customer, not an AWS person shit-talking other AWS teams. Got curious only after a downvote hence late edit. My bad.

> ...an AWS person shit-talking other AWS teams [in public].

I remember a time when this would be an instant reprimand... Either amzn engs are bolder these days, or amzn hr is trying really hard for amzn to be "world's best employer", or both.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#314
Idea:. Network devices should be configured to automatically prioritize the same packet flows for the same clients as they served yesterday.

So many overload issues seem to be caused by a single client, in a case where the right prioritization or rate limit rule could have contained any outage, but such a rule either wasn't in place or wasn't the right one due to the difficulty of knowing how to prioritize hundreds of clients.

Using more bandwidth or requests than yesterday should then be handled as capacity allows, possibly with a manual configured priority list, cap, or ratio. But "what I used yesterday" should always be served first. That way, any outage is contained to clients acting differently to yesterday, even if the config isn't perfect.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#315
post #298

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> a VP must sign off on changing status pages, which is... backwards to say the least. I think most people's experience with "VP's" makes them not realize what AWS VP's do. VP's here are not sitting in an executive lounge wining and dining customers, chomping on cigars and telling minions to "Call me when the data center is back up and running again!" They are on the tech call, working with the engineers, evaluating…

I don't think the matter is whether or not VPs are involved, but the fact that human sign off is required. Ideally the dashboard would accurately show what's working or not, regardless if the engineers know what's going on.

That would be too much honesty for a corp.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#316

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Easy to say leave, the techinical lockin cloud service providers by design choose to have makes it impossible to leave . AWS (and others) make egress costs insanely expensive for any startup to consider leaving with their data, also there is constant push to either not support open protocols or extend /expand them in ways making it hard to migrate a code base easily. If the advise is to use only effectively use manag…

Lesson to build your services with Docker and Terraform. In this setup you can spin up a working clone of a decently sized stack in a different cloud provider in under an hour. Don't lock yourself in.

This is just not true for Terraform at all, they do not aim to be multi cloud and it is a much more usable product because of it. Resource parameters do not swap out directly across providers (rightly so, the abstractions they choose are different!).

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#317
post #274

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Or rent bare metal servers like old times and be responsible for your own s*t

Still plenty of networking issues that can knock you down hard.

... and be responsible for your own s*t

Don't miss the point of being able to do something about it instead of multi hours outage and being in the dark regarding what is going on.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#318
post #278

Complex systems are really really hard. I'm not a big fan of seeing all these folks bash AWS for this, and not really understanding the complexity or nastiness of situations like this. Running the kind of services they do for the kind of customers, this is a VERY hard problem. We ran into a very similar issue, but at the database layer in our company literally 2 weeks ago, where connections to our MySQL exploded and…

[deleted]

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#319
post #278

Complex systems are really really hard. I'm not a big fan of seeing all these folks bash AWS for this, and not really understanding the complexity or nastiness of situations like this. Running the kind of services they do for the kind of customers, this is a VERY hard problem. We ran into a very similar issue, but at the database layer in our company literally 2 weeks ago, where connections to our MySQL exploded and…

Very good summary of why small projects need to think real hard before jumping onto microservices bandwagon.

Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region

#320
post #278

Complex systems are really really hard. I'm not a big fan of seeing all these folks bash AWS for this, and not really understanding the complexity or nastiness of situations like this. Running the kind of services they do for the kind of customers, this is a VERY hard problem. We ran into a very similar issue, but at the database layer in our company literally 2 weeks ago, where connections to our MySQL exploded and…

Excuse me, do we need all that complexity? Telling that it is "hard" is justifiable?

It is naive to assume people bashing AWS are uncapable to running things better, cheaper, faster, across many other vendors, on-prem, colocation or what not.

> Outrage is the easy response.

That is what made AWS get the marketshare it has now in the first place, the easy responses.

The main selling point of AWS in the beginning was "how easy is to sping a virtual machine". After basically every layman started recommending AWS and we flocked there, AWS started making things more complex than it should. Was that to make harder to get out of it? IDK.

> Empathy and learning is the valuable one.

When you run your infrastructure and something fails and you are not transparent, your users will bash you, independently who you are.

And that was another "easy response" used to drive companies towards AWS. We developers were echoing that "having a infrastructure team or person is not necessary", etc.

Now we are stuck in this learned helplessness where every outage is a complete disaster in terms of transparency, multiple services failing, even for multi-region and multi-az customers, we saying "this service here is also not working" and AWS simple states that service was fine, not affected, up and running.

If it was a sysadmin doing that, people will be asking for his/her neck with pitchforks.

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