My favorite sentence: "Our networking clients have well tested request back-off behaviors that are designed to allow our systems to recover from these sorts of congestion events, but, a latent issue prevented these clients from adequately backing off during this event."
Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region
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Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region
#72My company uses AWS. We had significant degradation for many of their APIs for over six hours, having a substantive impact on our business. The entire time their outage board was solid green. We were in touch with their support people and knew it was bad but were under NDA not to discuss it with anyone. Of course problems and outages are going to happen, but saying they have five nines (99.999) uptime as measured by…
One of our auxiliary services that's basically a pass through to AWS was offline nearly the entire day. Yet, this communication doesn't even mention that fact. In fact, it almost tries to suggest the opposite.
Likewise, AWS is reporting S3 didn't have issues. Yet, for a period of time, S3 was erroring out frequently because it was responding so slowly.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region
#73Does anyone know how often an AZ experiences an issue as compared to an entire region? AWS sells the redundancy of AZs pretty heavily, but it seems like a lot of the issues that happen end up being region-wide. I'm struggling to understand whether I should be replicating our service across regions or whether the AZ redundancy within a region is sufficient.
I've been naively setting up our distributed databases in separate AZs for a couple years now, paying, sometimes, thousands of dollars per month in data replication bandwidth egress fees. As far as I can remember I've never never seen an AZ go down, and the only region that has gone down has been us-east-1.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region
#74Queue the armchair infrastructure engineers. The reality is that there’s a handful of people in the world that can operate systems at this sheer scale and complexity and I have mad respect for those in that camp.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region
#75My company uses AWS. We had significant degradation for many of their APIs for over six hours, having a substantive impact on our business. The entire time their outage board was solid green. We were in touch with their support people and knew it was bad but were under NDA not to discuss it with anyone. Of course problems and outages are going to happen, but saying they have five nines (99.999) uptime as measured by…
SLAs that refund only the cost of the individual service that was down is worthless.
SLAs that require separate proof and refund requests for each and every service that was affected are nearly worthless.
There needs to be an independent body set up by a large cloud customers to monitor availability and enforce refunds.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region
#76Earlier quoted context omitted.
Off the top of my head, this is the third time they've had a major outage where they've been unable to properly update the status page. First we had the S3 outage, where the yellow and red icons were hosted in S3 and unable to be accessed. Second we had the Kinesis outage, which snowballed into a Cognito outage, so they were unable to login into the status page CMS. Now this. They "own up to it" in their postmortems,…
Eh, the colored icons not loading is not really the same thing as incorrectly reporting that nothing’s wrong. Putting the status page on separate infra would be good practice, though.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region
#77My company uses AWS. We had significant degradation for many of their APIs for over six hours, having a substantive impact on our business. The entire time their outage board was solid green. We were in touch with their support people and knew it was bad but were under NDA not to discuss it with anyone. Of course problems and outages are going to happen, but saying they have five nines (99.999) uptime as measured by…
I worked at Amazon. While my boss was on vacation I took over for him in the "Launch readiness" meeting for our team's component of our project. Basically, you go to this meeting with the big decision makers and business people once a week and tell them what your status is on deliverables. You are supposed to sum up your status as "Green/Yellow/Red" and then write (or update last week's document) to explain your stat…
In organisations with 100s of in-flight projects, it’s understandable that red is reserved for projects that are causing extremely serious issues right now. Otherwise, so many projects would be red, that you’d need a new colour.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region
#78> Operators instead relied on logs to understand what was happening and initially identified elevated internal DNS errors. Because internal DNS is foundational for all services and this traffic was believed to be contributing to the congestion, the teams focused on moving the internal DNS traffic away from the congested network paths. At 9:28 AM PST, the team completed this work and DNS resolution errors fully recove…
The rule is that it’s always DNS.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region
#79My company uses AWS. We had significant degradation for many of their APIs for over six hours, having a substantive impact on our business. The entire time their outage board was solid green. We were in touch with their support people and knew it was bad but were under NDA not to discuss it with anyone. Of course problems and outages are going to happen, but saying they have five nines (99.999) uptime as measured by…
This to me is really bad. Even as a small company, we keep our support infrastructure separate. For a company of Amazon's size, this is a shitty excuse. If I cannot even reach you as a customer for almost 7 hours, that is just nuts. AWS must do better here.
Also, is it true that the outage/status pages are manually updated ? If yes, there is no excuse why it was green for that long. If you are manually updating it, please update asap.
Re: Summary of the AWS Service Event in the Northern Virginia (US-East-1) Region
#80Very detailed.