Earlier quoted context omitted.
If they're smart enough to forge SSL certificates, they're certainly smart enough to know about XSS.
The people who carry out the orders are not the ones giving the orders. Just because they're being ordered to "hack into Gmail" doesn't mean they have to find creative ways to do so. This blog post, however, provides useful, practical, exact, almost step-by-step suggestions to the people giving the orders. I've not lived in a dictatorship, but my parents have, and from their stories, I gather that most of the smart p…
Iran forged the wrong SSL certificate
71–80 of 115 posts
Re: Iran forged the wrong SSL certificate
#72Earlier quoted context omitted.
The said chrome will only accept one particular CA when verifying the signature for google.com (which is one of the reason the fraudulent cert was detected).
This should be a feature they offer to all of the Alexa top 100 websites.
Re: Iran forged the wrong SSL certificate
#73Earlier quoted context omitted.
And how do you choose who to trust? Until this incident DigiNotar seemed trustworthy.
It relies on people to set up Notaries that you can specify you trust. There are many organizations I trust. The Tor Project, EFF, my university, the local hackerspace etc. If they ran notaries, I would specify that I trust them. If a SSL Authority/Notary is hacked, you remove them from the list that you trust. At the moment, trust is not agile. Browsers specify in advance which authorities are to be trusted or not.…
Re: Iran forged the wrong SSL certificate
#74Earlier quoted context omitted.
The people who carry out the orders are not the ones giving the orders. Just because they're being ordered to "hack into Gmail" doesn't mean they have to find creative ways to do so. This blog post, however, provides useful, practical, exact, almost step-by-step suggestions to the people giving the orders. I've not lived in a dictatorship, but my parents have, and from their stories, I gather that most of the smart p…
Your argument is like saying that we shouldn't discuss guns since any criminal could just realize that guns kill people and start killing people.
Or it's the difference between knowing the ingredients to Coke vs. the recipe.
Re: Iran forged the wrong SSL certificate
#75This is something I've been talking about for a while. Back in 2009 I gave a presentation at Virus Bulletin on JavaScript security problems and highlighted some statistics on remotely loaded JavaScript: 1. 47% of the top 1,000 web sites include google-analytics.com 2. 69% include a remotely loaded web analytics solution 3. 97% load something remotely If you can attack any of these you get access to a very large numbe…
Happily, my bank doesn't load Javascript from anywhere else.
Re: Iran forged the wrong SSL certificate
#76Paging tptacek, please come to the white courtesy phone and explain that SSL is the greatest thing since sliced bread. ;-)
I am not a fan of the HTTPS/TLS CA system. You know I'm not.
I am a "fan" of TLS, as much as anyone can be a fan of a protocol. Most if not all of the smartest crypto protocol people in the world have taken shots at TLS. Roughly once every 3-5 years, one of them finds a new vulnerability in TLS, which, when fixed, makes the protocol stronger. That's gone on for roughly 15 years now, making TLS the soundest cryptosystem available to developers on the whole Internet.
You don't like TLS. I get it. You think TLS is too complicated, that it has too much negotiation and too much statekeeping to reason about its security. I think that's a reasonable position to take.
You used to advocate that people write their own encrypted transports to avoid using TLS. You don't do that so much anymore. When you used to advocate that, I yelled about it, because you were wrong. Predictably, when people† write their own encrypted transports, they make grave errors that cause their cryptosystems to blow up.
Now you advocate that people use things like spiped, your new encrypted transport. That's fine too. I'm not recommending it, but wouldn't flag it if I found it on an engagement.
There you have the entirety of our engagement on the issue of SSL and TLS. Note how the Internet trust model doesn't factor into it? That's because we agree on that issue and there is no reason for us to argue about it.
† never mind.
Re: Iran forged the wrong SSL certificate
#77Earlier quoted context omitted.
As far as I can see this isn't a fundamental problem with SSL, but the fact that most environments come pre-installed with certificates for CAs that aren't really worthy of trust. [Edit: Certainly looking through the list of Trusted Root CA certs on this machine I have no idea who 95% of these organisations are - I also have a certificate installed by a proxy so it can intercept any SSL traffic and inspect the conten…
Unfortunately SSL's PKI is a fundamental part of how people use it. That said, I would agree with you if you were to say that there's nothing fundamentally wrong with the TLS protocol spec itself, aside from it being probably a bit more complex than we really really need.
The reason browsers have the crazy PKI model is that browser SSL/TLS has to scale to the entire Internet and allow new sites to come online with only days or hours or minutes of advanced warning.
Re: Iran forged the wrong SSL certificate
#78Earlier quoted context omitted.
As far as I can see this isn't a fundamental problem with SSL, but the fact that most environments come pre-installed with certificates for CAs that aren't really worthy of trust. [Edit: Certainly looking through the list of Trusted Root CA certs on this machine I have no idea who 95% of these organisations are - I also have a certificate installed by a proxy so it can intercept any SSL traffic and inspect the conten…
Then that is a fundamental problem with SSL. I am very partial to the Perspectives[1] solution. I wish it would gain more wide-spread support... [1]: http://perspectives-project.org/
Browsers won't run without the Verisign/Thawte CA system. That's not an SSL/TLS problem; that's a browser problem. Browsers exist in a complicated ecosystem involving banking and credit cards, cooperation between hostile software vendors, and the most massive installed base of users in the history of the world.
Don't conflate the problems that browsers have with the attributes of the SSL/TLS protocol. If you need to create an new kind of encrypted transport between two endpoints on the Internet and choose almost anything other than SSL/TLS, you might as well write your own block cipher while you're at it.
Re: Iran forged the wrong SSL certificate
#79Just by having a forged SSL Certificate for ssl.google-analytics.com how can they supply their javscript ? The request still goes to the google servers and not to any evil-democracy-suppressors.gov.ir So sure if they could reroute the request to their servers evil things could be done. But they can NOT. Or am i missing something ?
Of course they can reroute traffic. All they have to do is * Force every ISP/Telco within their borders to add fake google.com entries to their DNS servers. and/or * Force every ISP/Telco to transparently proxy all DNS traffic and provide fake replies for google.com queries You can even make it easier: Just hijack IP routing at the borders, such that IP traffic to 209.85.149.99 (and all other google networks) are not…
Re: Iran forged the wrong SSL certificate
#80How come it's just one CA that is needed to ensure the trust of a domain, especially one as important as *.google.com? It seems like it's only a matter of time before something like this happens again.
It doesn't have to be that way. SSL/TLS libraries, for the most part, only verify that the certificate chain is properly signed all the way to the root. That doesn't mean the browser trust system is limited to that! After certificates are verified, it should be straightforward to apply additional policies, such as "Colin Percival does not trust certificates from this CA with the exception of these three domains which unfortunately rely on it, but Colin and all his friends are also helpfully monitoring the fingerprints of the known good certs for those domains".
You don't need permission from the IETF, IANA, Mozilla, or Verisign to build this. You just have to build it and get people to use it.
Moxie Marlinspike is working on an idea similar to this at CONVERGENCE.IO.