Earlier quoted context omitted.
No, it does not reduce to 1%. At worst, it will reduce to (1/p)% (with p However, it does chill the chilling effect - right now, e.g. Microsoft has ~20,000 patents, and they can sue anyone for anything. This way, they will actively have to choose strategically what they want to enforce. Finally, and I think I haven't made this clear enough, I don't think my proposal is a GOOD patent system in any way. It is bad. But…
Fine, so it's a (n/p) times 1% tax, where p is the average chance of victory and n is the average number of years in court for each suit. This doesn't seem to change the structure of the incentives at all; it's just a tax on patent infringement damages. I find the non-retroactive possibility much more interesting.
And, it is more than just a tax on patent infringement damages - because you have to pay the tax upfront, which makes a big difference in cashflow.
eolas's $600M verdict against Microsoft, and i4i's $400M verdict would both require posting $6M / $4M per year respectively in never-to-be-recouped taxes, which is a huge sum for the companies in question, and would probably have made them not sue.
Furthermore, it involves the IRS in valuations, which is a good thing (because it is much harder to mess with the IRS) - manipulation of the value of a patent would have to be explained, and not arbitrary to avoid taxes.
Anyway, we could all dream - it is the lobbyists that write the laws, and the patent holders have thousands of them in DC.