Live data from Hacker News

AWS us-east-1 outage

status.aws.amazon.com

481–490 of 1001 posts

Re: AWS us-east-1 outage

#481
post #213

Not sure it helps, but got this update from someone inside AWS a few moments ago. "We have identified the root cause of the issues in the US-EAST-1 Region, which is a network issue with some network devices in that Region which is affecting multiple services, including the console but also services like S3. We are actively working towards recovery."

I love how they are sharing this stuff out to some clients, but its technically under NDA.

Re: AWS us-east-1 outage

#482

Earlier quoted context omitted.

From what I've heard it's mostly true. Not only the CEO but a few SVPs can approve it, but yes a human must approve the update and it must be a high level exec. Part of the reason is because their SLAs are based on that dashboard, and that dashboard going red has a financial cost to AWS, so like any financial cost, it needs approval.

Being dishonest about SLAs seems to bear zero cost in this case?

Zero directly-attributable, calculable-at-time-of-decision cost. Of course there's a cost in terms of customers who leave because of the dishonest practice, but, who knows how many people that'll be? Out of the customers who left after the outage, who knows whether they left due to not communicating status promptly and honestly or whether it was for some other reason?

Versus, if a company has X SLA contracts signed, that point to Y reimbursement for being out for Z minutes, so it's easily calculable.

Re: AWS us-east-1 outage

#483
post #217

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That sounds like the exact opposite of human-factors engineering. No one likes taking blame. But when things go sideways, people are extra spicy and defensive, which makes them clam up and often withhold useful information, which can extend the outage. No-blame analysis is a much better pattern. Everyone wins. It's about building the system that builds the system. Stuff broke; fix the stuff that broke, then fix the t…

I worked at Walmart Technology. I bravely wrote post mortem documents owning the fault of my team (100+ people), owning both technically and also culturally as their leader. I put together a plan to fix it and executed it. Thought that was the right thing to do. This happend two times in my 10 year career there. Both times I was called out as a failure in my performance eval. Second time, I resigned and told them to…

that's awful. You should have been promoted for that.

Re: AWS us-east-1 outage

#484
post #245

Looks like they've acknowledged it on the status page now. https://status.aws.amazon.com/ > 8:22 AM PST We are investigating increased error rates for the AWS Management Console. > 8:26 AM PST We are experiencing API and console issues in the US-EAST-1 Region. We have identified root cause and we are actively working towards recovery. This issue is affecting the global console landing page, which is also hosted in US…

> This issue is affecting the global console landing page, which is also hosted in US-EAST-1

Even this little tidbit is a bit of a wtf for me. Why do they consider it ok to have anything hosted in a single region?

At a different (unnamed) FAANG, we considered it unacceptable to have anything depend on a single region. Even the dinky little volunteer-run thing which ran https://internal.site.example/~someEngineer was expected to be multi-region, and was, because there was enough infrastructure for making things multi-region that it was usually pretty easy.

Re: AWS us-east-1 outage

#485

I worked at a company that hired an ex-Amazon engineer to work on some cloud projects. Whenever his projects went down, he fought tooth and nail against any suggestion to update the status page. When forced to update the status page, he'd follow up with an extremely long "post-mortem" document that was really just a long winded explanation about why the outage was someone else's fault. He later explained that in his…

It's popular to upvote this during outages, because it fits a narrative. The truth (as always) is more complex: * No, this isn't the broad culture. It's not even a blip. These are EXCEPTIONAL circumstances by extremely bad teams that - if and when found out - would be intervened dramatically. * The broad culture is blameless post-mortems. Not whose fault is it. But what was the problem and how to fix it. And one of t…

I haven't asked AWS employees specifically about blameless postmortems, but several of them have personally corroborated that the culture tends towards being adversarial and "performance focused." That's a tough environment for blameless debugging and postmoretems. Like if I heard that someone has a rain forest tree-frog living happily in their outdoor Arizona cactus garden, I have doubts.

Re: AWS us-east-1 outage

#487

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I firmly believe in the dictum "if you ship it you own it". That means you own all outages. It's not just an operator flubbing a command, or a bit of code that passed review when it shouldn't. It's all your dependencies that make your service work. You own ALL of them. People spend all this time threat modelling their stuff against malefactors, and yet so often people don't spend any time thinking about the threat mo…

Should I be penalized if an upstream dependency, owned by another team, fails? Did I lack due diligence in choosing to accept the risk that the other team couldn't deliver? These are real problems in the micro-services world, especially since I own UI and there are dozens of teams pumping out services, and I'm at the mercy of all of them. The best I can do is gracefully fail when services don't function in a healthy…

Not penalised no, but questioned as to how well your graceful failure worked in the end.

Remember: it may not be your fault, but it still is your problem.

Re: AWS us-east-1 outage

#488
post #458

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Thanks.. seems to be about as accurate as the regular AWS status board is..

They just added a banner. My guess is they don't know enough yet to update the respective service statuses.

I have basically zero faith in Amazon at this point.

We first noticed failures because a tester happened to be testing in an env that uses the Amazon Pay sandbox.

I checked the prod site, and it wouldn't even ask me to login.

When I tried to login to SellerCentral to file a ticket - it told me my password (from a pw manager) was wrong. When I tried to reset, the OTP was ridiculously slow. Clicking "resend OTP" gives a "the OTP is incorrect" error message. When I finally got an OTP and put it in, the resulting page was a generic Amazon "404 page not found".

A while later, my original SellerCentral password, still un-changed because I never got another OTP to reset it, worked.

What the fuck kind of failure mode is that "services are down, so password must be wrong".

Re: AWS us-east-1 outage

#489

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's popular to upvote this during outages, because it fits a narrative. The truth (as always) is more complex: * No, this isn't the broad culture. It's not even a blip. These are EXCEPTIONAL circumstances by extremely bad teams that - if and when found out - would be intervened dramatically. * The broad culture is blameless post-mortems. Not whose fault is it. But what was the problem and how to fix it. And one of t…

> ...you own your dependencies. You don't blame others. Agreed, teams should invest resources in architecting their systems in a way that can withstand broken dependencies. How does AWS teams account for "core" dependencies (e.g. auth) that may not have alternatives?

This is the irony of building a "reliable" system across multiple AZ's.

Re: AWS us-east-1 outage

#490

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Should I be penalized if an upstream dependency, owned by another team, fails? Did I lack due diligence in choosing to accept the risk that the other team couldn't deliver? These are real problems in the micro-services world, especially since I own UI and there are dozens of teams pumping out services, and I'm at the mercy of all of them. The best I can do is gracefully fail when services don't function in a healthy…

> Should I be penalized if an upstream dependency, owned by another team, fails? Yes > Did I lack due diligence in choosing to accept the risk that the other team couldn't deliver? Yes

Say during due diligence two options are uncovered: use an upstream dependency owned by another team, or use that plus a 3P vendor for redundancy. Implementing parallel systems costs 10x more than the former and takes 5x longer. You estimate a 0.01% chance of serious failure for the former, and 0.001% for the latter.

Now say you're a medium sized hyper-growth company in a competitive space. Does spending 10 times more and waiting 5 times longer for redundancy make business sense? You could argue that it'd be irresponsible to over-engineer the system in this case, since you delay getting your product out and potentially lose $ and ground to competitors.

I don't think a black and white "yes, you should be punished" view is productive here.

Post reply on HN