Earlier quoted context omitted.
How does them reading my messages keep me safe, though?
In that example it's keeping me safe from you
FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
441–450 of 474 posts
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#442Some FBI agents came to my house once and told me that my home Internet had been used to visit Islamic Extremist websites. They brought a local police office with them and a 'threat assessment' coordinator from my workplace. They asked me if my family was Muslim and wanted to know if we had been radicalized. We are not religious (at all). We do not attend church, synagogue or mosque. We are lower middle class white A…
"threat assessment' coordinator from my workplace" "I feared that I may lose my job." I understand that police/FBI have to conduct investigation. What dont understand is involvement of the employer , it's extremely disturbing - you have not been convincted, you have not been charged, you are not even a suspect or accused of anything at this point - how is your private life the business of your employer? Why is your p…
I'm reading a book where the main character receives a subpoena to go to a interview with the Portugal dictatorship political police. Nothing happens to him (till now) but everybody in the hotel where he is hosted starts to treat him differently.
Who will be the first in the line when a firing is necessary? Probably the guy that has problems with the FBI.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#443Earlier quoted context omitted.
Source is a few years old, but I suppose we can make another FOIA request to find out how long carriers store text messages these days - it was basically 0-5 days a decade ago: https://www.nbcnews.com/technolog/how-long-do-wireless-carri...
You’ll be lucky if it’s any longer than 24-hours now. There’s no business use case for building and maintaining the technological infrastructure to manage it for years. It’s private info and they can’t sell it to anyone without legal liability. If LE gave them the funds to build this infrastructure and use it for retention then the service provider is essentially an agent of the state at that point.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#444Earlier quoted context omitted.
You don't have to be found guilty to be punished, lookup "case load". That can keep you on probation and monitoring as long as they want to draw out the case and the whole time you are required to make monthly payments or risk going to jail.
One of the principle argument for the "speedy trial" clause of the US 6th Amendment, and similar rights in other jurisdictions. Note that the US law does not apply to noncriminal processes --- civil lawsuits or other elements of law.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#445Earlier quoted context omitted.
Imagine being a muslim in such case. Trying to convince them that this can be a mix-up ( which is possible easily) won't be successful.
Imagine being a muslim and e.g. having a kid visiting those sites. Or just going there out of intellectual curiosity, like how a leftie might read Main Kampf to check what that shit is. You can end up in a very bad position...
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#446Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#447Earlier quoted context omitted.
One of the principle argument for the "speedy trial" clause of the US 6th Amendment, and similar rights in other jurisdictions. Note that the US law does not apply to noncriminal processes --- civil lawsuits or other elements of law.
How about a State felony case that has taken nearly two years?
Without specifics, or some indication of who is triggering the delay (e.g., defendants may request delays), I couldn't possibly comment.
Given law and legal processes are not my baliwick, I'd probably not be able to comment intelligently regardless. But you've posed a null-content question.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#448Earlier quoted context omitted.
You’ll be lucky if it’s any longer than 24-hours now. There’s no business use case for building and maintaining the technological infrastructure to manage it for years. It’s private info and they can’t sell it to anyone without legal liability. If LE gave them the funds to build this infrastructure and use it for retention then the service provider is essentially an agent of the state at that point.
You're overstating the technical difficulty of archiving and retrieving text.
Not counting media and assuming they are all 160 byte messages, that's 4 terabytes per day, or about 200 wikipedia's per day. I guess that's not too bad in terms of storage requirements, certainly a management amount of data for a telecom to store. But assuming that you want those indexed and easily retrievable somehow, it could get very burdensome to manage and interact with, and that tends to balloon the size at least a little bit as well.
The liability and legal issues around it (both externally and internally - don't want employees spying on their exes, leaking data from celebs, in addition to the policing issues, etc) makes it pretty undesirable to store though.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#449Earlier quoted context omitted.
Employer might have been defense contractor. Most jobs without clearance don't even have "threat assessment coordinaror".
> Most jobs without clearance don't even have "threat assessment coordinaror" The title may vary from place to place but all companies have people filling this role, even if you've never met them. Normally falls somewhere under a team like Global Intelligence, Workplace Security, Business Continuity, etc.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#450Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're kind of quibbling over details. The below quote is already bad enough: > "We’re going to have to look at the mosques. We’re going to have to look very, very carefully." I already do not trust the person who has said that. Does it really matter if he proposed a full-fledged ID system? He still proposed monitoring mosques. He still proposed surveillance based on religious identity. The correct answer to that que…
Details are important. The media campaigns are claiming he wanted Muslim identification, a system THEY proposed in their hypothetical. When he didn't confirm they said "he wouldn't deny it" as their proof of support. > The below quote is already bad enough. He still proposed surveillance based on religious identity. He said nothing about citizens or monitoring them based on religious identity. He said look at mosques…
> "Certain things will be done that we never thought would happen in this country in terms of information and learning about the enemy," he added. "We’re going to have to do things that were frankly unthinkable a year ago."
> "We’re going to have to look at a lot of things very closely," Trump continued. "We’re going to have to look at the mosques. We’re going to have to look very, very carefully."
----
And once again, it kind of doesn't matter. An increased focus on monitoring places of worship is monitoring people based on their religious identity. I don't know a single Christian who would argue to me that monitoring churches isn't the same thing as monitoring Christians.
Mosques and churches are not abstract concepts that are divorced from the people inside of them. When you monitor an institution, you are necessarily monitoring the people inside of it, and it is reasonable for them to be concerned about the government taking an interest in their religious-identity. To argue otherwise requires someone to completely divorce religious identity from the practice of religion, and that's just not a reasonable argument to make.
----
> Details are important.
Not in the context of the original statement, "ordinary people often do have something to hide, and should care about privacy." Look, whatever, you trust Trump. You shouldn't, but you do. Fine.
Do you trust Biden? Do you trust the current government not to attempt to monitor you based on your vaccine status?
You're fighting over the idea that "your guy" wouldn't surveil ordinary people, but this also kind of doesn't matter because your guy isn't in the Whitehouse right now, and I can guarantee you that Republicans are never going to have permanent power over the government. No party wins forever. You have as much reason as anyone else to care about personal privacy, why are you fighting over who specifically is a threat? Does it change anything about the overall privacy debate?