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FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

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Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#391

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I've had surprisingly good luck with strong-arming people into switching. The important part is having their trust, if they don't believe you they won't listen. The next part is to make simple, verifiable, and non-technical arguments for switching. Believe it or not, almost everybody is willing to take small steps if they're free. Instead of rambling on and on about "end to end encryption" or "double-ratchet cryptogr…

Also, a big one that works for me (especially iPhone users, which are the hardest to convert): "You can send full quality images and videos to Android users." The fact that Apple shots themselves in the foot is an advantage to Signal.

That’s not Apples flaw, it’s a flaw with SMS. It can only handle file sizes up to a certain limit, and during periods of congestion they lower that limit.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#393

Some FBI agents came to my house once and told me that my home Internet had been used to visit Islamic Extremist websites. They brought a local police office with them and a 'threat assessment' coordinator from my workplace. They asked me if my family was Muslim and wanted to know if we had been radicalized. We are not religious (at all). We do not attend church, synagogue or mosque. We are lower middle class white A…

Is it prohibited to visit those websites? I once was interested to understand the way radicals think, to read about their arguments, so I spent some time hanging around some radical websites.

To quote a Dartmouth history professor who taught a class on the subject: "if you don't get randomly selected for a search on your next flight you aren't doing your homework"

It's not prohibited but they notice and subject you to harassment by the system at every action with every part of the system that is integrated with their database.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#394

Some FBI agents came to my house once and told me that my home Internet had been used to visit Islamic Extremist websites. They brought a local police office with them and a 'threat assessment' coordinator from my workplace. They asked me if my family was Muslim and wanted to know if we had been radicalized. We are not religious (at all). We do not attend church, synagogue or mosque. We are lower middle class white A…

It's (scarily) interesting that they react with actual personal attendance based purely on a very limited set of electronic information. From your further description: > We are not religious (at all). We do not attend church, synagogue or mosque. We are lower middle class white Americans born and raised in the USA and have never traveled outside the country. Would not the FBI have been able to any amount of backgroun…

>If such background checks were performed, then they either don't have much data or their threat weightings are set to red-scare levels of paranoia. Either way, it's scary.

They're not gonna have anything happen to them if they go tough on (and fuck over an) innocent guy.

They're gonna look bad if they miss a terrorist.

So they have no incentive to not have "red-scare levels of paranoia".

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#395
post #329

Some FBI agents came to my house once and told me that my home Internet had been used to visit Islamic Extremist websites. They brought a local police office with them and a 'threat assessment' coordinator from my workplace. They asked me if my family was Muslim and wanted to know if we had been radicalized. We are not religious (at all). We do not attend church, synagogue or mosque. We are lower middle class white A…

Imagine being a muslim in such case. Trying to convince them that this can be a mix-up ( which is possible easily) won't be successful.

Imagine being a muslim and e.g. having a kid visiting those sites.

Or just going there out of intellectual curiosity, like how a leftie might read Main Kampf to check what that shit is.

You can end up in a very bad position...

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#396

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There's also: * Law enforcement simply asks nicely: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years

The Stored Communications Act makes disclosing the contents of messages without a search warrant unlawful

Tell that to the FAANG companies that provide white glove access to authorities any time they ask.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#397
post #42
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That is correct. By default all messages sent over Telegram are stored permanently in their servers unencrypted.

Not exactly. Non-secret chats are stored encrypted on Telegram's servers, and separately from keys. The goal seems to be to require multiple jurisdictions to issue a court order before data can be decrypted. https://telegram.org/privacy#3-3-1-cloud-chats https://telegram.org/faq#q-do-you-process-data-requests

If you really think that kind of shit will float...

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#398

Some FBI agents came to my house once and told me that my home Internet had been used to visit Islamic Extremist websites. They brought a local police office with them and a 'threat assessment' coordinator from my workplace. They asked me if my family was Muslim and wanted to know if we had been radicalized. We are not religious (at all). We do not attend church, synagogue or mosque. We are lower middle class white A…

This is why you and everyone should use DNS over HTTPS (DoH). Next day they might visit you to ask you why you are visiting an opposition party web site.

Please disambiguate acronyms in the absence of context.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#399

They left off one very popular messenger, SMS: * Message content: All * Subpoena: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * 18 U.S.C 2703(d): can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * Search warrant: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * Vague suspicion plus a small fee to the carrier: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years

Major service providers do not maintain SMS history beyond 24 hours, let alone 1-7 years (last time I worked a case that is). They’re transparent about it as well. Look up the LE liaison contacts on their sites and they’ll clearly list what is available or not available. That’s why it’s crucial to get the actual devices themselves. Reason: the infrastructure to manage SMS content for every customer for 7 years with z…

> Major service providers do not maintain SMS history beyond 24 hours, let alone 1-7 years

Nobody should make decisions based on this comment.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#400

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You deserve to be always assumed innocent until proven guilty, and you will have to be proven guilty to be found guilty, and realistically speaking, those premises are extremely technical.

You don't have to be found guilty to be punished, lookup "case load". That can keep you on probation and monitoring as long as they want to draw out the case and the whole time you are required to make monthly payments or risk going to jail.

One of the principle argument for the "speedy trial" clause of the US 6th Amendment, and similar rights in other jurisdictions.

Note that the US law does not apply to noncriminal processes --- civil lawsuits or other elements of law.

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