Earlier quoted context omitted.
Ulbricht was caught via poor OPSEC and not via a Firefox/Tor 0day afaik. Though there was/is speculation that a Firefox/Tor 0day was used to bring down some Tor markets and possibly to locate the Silk Road's server. Silk Road 2.0 was brought down in like a few months, which could indicate such a 0day existed. Or that it was ran by some former Silk Road staff members who got doxed when Silk Road 1.0 was shut down.
Ulbricht was caught because an FBI agent, who would read things slowly and twice, recognized these 4 letters : heyy . That's how Ulbricht sometimes spelled hey , and the agent had seen that particular spelling before in his investigation, in an email from Ulbrict’s student email address. Nick Bilton's book “American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind Behind the Silk Road” is a great read, highly recom…
FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
351–360 of 474 posts
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#352Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#353Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's (scarily) interesting that they react with actual personal attendance based purely on a very limited set of electronic information. From your further description: > We are not religious (at all). We do not attend church, synagogue or mosque. We are lower middle class white Americans born and raised in the USA and have never traveled outside the country. Would not the FBI have been able to any amount of backgroun…
I think what he experienced is another manifestation of the same phenomena as zero-tolerance policies in schools; institutions ask their enforcers to suspend common sense and strictly enforce the letter of the law/guideline/etc, even in situations where any reasonable person would decide it made no sense. They do this because such common sense and gut feelings is how bias and prejudice might creep into their oh-so-pe…
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#354Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think what he experienced is another manifestation of the same phenomena as zero-tolerance policies in schools; institutions ask their enforcers to suspend common sense and strictly enforce the letter of the law/guideline/etc, even in situations where any reasonable person would decide it made no sense. They do this because such common sense and gut feelings is how bias and prejudice might creep into their oh-so-pe…
> the teacher's perception of the incident might have bias and prejudice. I mean that's not entirely wrong either. Bullying was still a thing before zero tolerance policies. Not to say zero tolerance policies are the right solution, but personal bias _is_ a big problem when it comes to enforcement.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#355Earlier quoted context omitted.
Ulbricht was caught because an FBI agent, who would read things slowly and twice, recognized these 4 letters : heyy . That's how Ulbricht sometimes spelled hey , and the agent had seen that particular spelling before in his investigation, in an email from Ulbrict’s student email address. Nick Bilton's book “American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind Behind the Silk Road” is a great read, highly recom…
Wtf, who doesn’t add extra y’s to hey sometimes? That wasn’t evidence.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#356Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think what he experienced is another manifestation of the same phenomena as zero-tolerance policies in schools; institutions ask their enforcers to suspend common sense and strictly enforce the letter of the law/guideline/etc, even in situations where any reasonable person would decide it made no sense. They do this because such common sense and gut feelings is how bias and prejudice might creep into their oh-so-pe…
> the teacher's perception of the incident might have bias and prejudice. I mean that's not entirely wrong either. Bullying was still a thing before zero tolerance policies. Not to say zero tolerance policies are the right solution, but personal bias _is_ a big problem when it comes to enforcement.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#357Earlier quoted context omitted.
> from the government while fulfilling missions with extraordinary humanitarian benefits Ahh yes, the famed operation Condor, operation Gladio, operation iceberg and so many other famed "humanitarian" projects At the end of the day all that you mentioned goes back to a post-facto "it is good because *we* do it", I would go to say that most people here in HN are well aware of the start of Google when it was funded by…
I’m certainly not defending all US government actions. That’s exactly the point. Levine tries to lump all of this in with surveillance. The US government funds the NSA, that is true. It also funds food stamps. And torture. The trick is to untangle it.
USAID is specifically designed and called that so as to tangle it, tell me, how would your average joe understand that USAID is a intelligence agency spinoff designed to sound "good" while doing evil all over the world rather than what its name suggests? You know... Aid?
The NSA, CIA, Extraordinary Rendition and so many other things dont exist there by accident, if said """government""" wishes to spend such amounts of money and resources to enact such evil under the veil of security, then i dont know about you, but then that to me and several other people just reads as "US Gov being flat out evil"
Do remember that there was *wide* support and acceptance back on the Kennedy days to just dissolve the CIA
> Levine tries to lump all of this in with surveillance.
I am not particularly kind to the guy, but he's just merely looking at it on a holistic system design level, any programmer minded person would do the exact same thing when presented with a black box problem
But as far as the foodstamps go, wouldn't it be great if the system where set up in such a way as that foodstamps where not needed to begin with? And on the flipside, why would "the government" allow for such a societal structure where the maintenance of "foodstamps" is necessary for the organization of the nation? I see that last bit in particular if anything as a national security problem...
As Clintonites would say: "It is the economy stupid"
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#358Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's (scarily) interesting that they react with actual personal attendance based purely on a very limited set of electronic information. From your further description: > We are not religious (at all). We do not attend church, synagogue or mosque. We are lower middle class white Americans born and raised in the USA and have never traveled outside the country. Would not the FBI have been able to any amount of backgroun…
I think what he experienced is another manifestation of the same phenomena as zero-tolerance policies in schools; institutions ask their enforcers to suspend common sense and strictly enforce the letter of the law/guideline/etc, even in situations where any reasonable person would decide it made no sense. They do this because such common sense and gut feelings is how bias and prejudice might creep into their oh-so-pe…
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#359Earlier quoted context omitted.
How do they provide near-instant full text search on server side if the chats are "encrypted at rest"?
Encrypted at rest means the data is encrypted as stored on disk, not that they do not have access to the keys. That would be end-to-end encryption. What Telegram claims to have done is set this up in a way that makes it very hard for a single party/state to get these keys. It's not possible to make this completely impossible (if you have a server processing user data, it will have the keys loaded at some point, and t…
I just don't see why they would make life harder for themselves developing stuff, given how often Durov lies. He claimed that all Telegram developers are outside of Russia, but then it turned out that they were working next floor from his old VK company office, right in Saint Petersburg.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#360This seems like a good place to say that I strongly recommend Yasha Levine's Surveillance Valley book ( https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/34220713-surveillance-va... ) where he suggests that all of this is working as intended, going all the way back to the military counter-insurgency roots of the arpanet first in places like Vietnam, and then back home in anti-war and leftist movements. The contemporary themes that…
Signal isn't funded by the military, by OTF/BBG, or any branch of the USG government. People who claim otherwise are confused (deeply) about a program OTF ran that sponsored third-party security reviews and development projects (summer-of-code style), none of which was mediated through OTF --- it was just a bucket of money. You should be extremely skeptical about people who bring OTF/BBG up in these discussions. I ha…
Correct, it is not funded by "the military", but this is incorrect
> any branch of the USG government
Because Signal/TextSecure received considerable amounts of seed capital from Radio Free Asia which is a CIA spinoff with the explicit aim to fund the development of the cryptography at grass roots level, not per se to have full control of it like NSA would have done, but because having strong cryptography on such platforms (Telegram might be other) is highly effective against perceived US enemies like well... Iran, or Syria, and to allow their assets/agents to communicate more easily while abroad without bulky extra proprietary phones or software
All of that above is mentioned at length on Surveillance Valley btw