They left off one very popular messenger, SMS: * Message content: All * Subpoena: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * 18 U.S.C 2703(d): can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * Search warrant: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years * Vague suspicion plus a small fee to the carrier: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years
There's also: * Law enforcement simply asks nicely: can render all message content for the last 1-7 years
FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
251–260 of 474 posts
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#252Earlier quoted context omitted.
Where is any evidence of Tor being a military surveillance project? I find it hard to believe an open source project like this has been infiltrated. Yes, there is suspicion some ECC curves are compromised, but only the ones provided by NIST. I'd really like to see evidence of Tor.
The seed for that line of thinking is the fact that a US Navy lab built it.[0] Having said that, I believe that's the only basis and is a far cry from making the theory convincing or even probable. [0] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(network)
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#253This seems like a good place to say that I strongly recommend Yasha Levine's Surveillance Valley book ( https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/34220713-surveillance-va... ) where he suggests that all of this is working as intended, going all the way back to the military counter-insurgency roots of the arpanet first in places like Vietnam, and then back home in anti-war and leftist movements. The contemporary themes that…
Yasha Levine is a conspiracy theorist hack. There’s really no other way to say it. His narrative is attractive to a left leaning audience with shallow knowledge in this area, but the reality is that without publicly funded software like Tor, Signal, OTF, and my own Lantern, our world would be more fully saturated with corporate control of the internet. We need more public funding for open source software (with public…
Ahh yes, the famed operation Condor, operation Gladio, operation iceberg and so many other famed "humanitarian" projects
At the end of the day all that you mentioned goes back to a post-facto "it is good because *we* do it", I would go to say that most people here in HN are well aware of the start of Google when it was funded by us Intel as a way to parse Vietnam era datasets, or how US Intel uses Radio Free Asia to destabilize enemy countries abroad, but again, it is only good/not bad when "*we"* do it
Apologies for a rather low quality comment, but these types of persons handwaving the actual structure behind all of this really get on my nerves, specially when I have had family members be tortured as a consequence of these US activities
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#254Earlier quoted context omitted.
> if you have something to hide Most people don't realize that most people have something to hide. The USA has so many laws on its books. Many of which are outright bizarre[0] and some of which normal people might normally break[1]. And that's only counting current/past laws. It wasn't that long ago a US President was suggesting all Muslims should be forced to carry special IDs[2]. If you have a documented history be…
> “Certain things will be done that we never thought would happen in this country in terms of information and learning about the enemy,” he added. “We’re going to have to do things that were frankly unthinkable a year ago.” > “We’re going to have to look at a lot of things very closely,” Trump continued. “We’re going to have to look at the mosques. We’re going to have to look very, very carefully.” That's all he said…
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#255Earlier quoted context omitted.
> if you have something to hide Most people don't realize that most people have something to hide. The USA has so many laws on its books. Many of which are outright bizarre[0] and some of which normal people might normally break[1]. And that's only counting current/past laws. It wasn't that long ago a US President was suggesting all Muslims should be forced to carry special IDs[2]. If you have a documented history be…
> “Certain things will be done that we never thought would happen in this country in terms of information and learning about the enemy,” he added. “We’re going to have to do things that were frankly unthinkable a year ago.” > “We’re going to have to look at a lot of things very closely,” Trump continued. “We’re going to have to look at the mosques. We’re going to have to look very, very carefully.” That's all he said…
And then the next day, he clarified:
Reporter: "Should there be a database or system that tracks Muslims in this country?"
Trump: "There should be a lot of systems, beyond databases. I mean, we should have a lot of systems."
And then he tried to backpedal. Decided it was a watch list, not a database, etc. Basically the usual shtick of his where he tries to say everything and nothing at the same time.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#256This seems like a good place to say that I strongly recommend Yasha Levine's Surveillance Valley book ( https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/34220713-surveillance-va... ) where he suggests that all of this is working as intended, going all the way back to the military counter-insurgency roots of the arpanet first in places like Vietnam, and then back home in anti-war and leftist movements. The contemporary themes that…
Ulbricht was caught via poor OPSEC and not via a Firefox/Tor 0day afaik. Though there was/is speculation that a Firefox/Tor 0day was used to bring down some Tor markets and possibly to locate the Silk Road's server. Silk Road 2.0 was brought down in like a few months, which could indicate such a 0day existed. Or that it was ran by some former Silk Road staff members who got doxed when Silk Road 1.0 was shut down.
That's how Ulbricht sometimes spelled hey, and the agent had seen that particular spelling before in his investigation, in an email from Ulbrict’s student email address.
Nick Bilton's book “American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind Behind the Silk Road” is a great read, highly recommended.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#257WhatsApp. -> FBI Telegram. -> KGB Signal. -> The rest of us?
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#258Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's in beta, you can enable it in settings. It's still a pain to buy MOB in the US so it's not that usable in the states. It would have been interesting to me if they just used Zcash instead of rolling their own, but I'm not sure what's supposed to be special about MOB vs. Zcash. I also don't think it's that big of a deal.
I'd love Zcash (forced private transactions). But honestly I'd also like if we could use different currencies. My dream was that you could send cash and they would just use MOB as the intermediate transaction (so your bank would just see a transaction to/from Signal and not who you were sending/receiving to/from). But that also has technical challenges and legal issues so I understand why not. I think a multi-currenc…
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#259Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've had surprisingly good luck with strong-arming people into switching. The important part is having their trust, if they don't believe you they won't listen. The next part is to make simple, verifiable, and non-technical arguments for switching. Believe it or not, almost everybody is willing to take small steps if they're free. Instead of rambling on and on about "end to end encryption" or "double-ratchet cryptogr…
Also, a big one that works for me (especially iPhone users, which are the hardest to convert): "You can send full quality images and videos to Android users." The fact that Apple shots themselves in the foot is an advantage to Signal.
Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]
#260Earlier quoted context omitted.
Ulbricht was caught via poor OPSEC and not via a Firefox/Tor 0day afaik. Though there was/is speculation that a Firefox/Tor 0day was used to bring down some Tor markets and possibly to locate the Silk Road's server. Silk Road 2.0 was brought down in like a few months, which could indicate such a 0day existed. Or that it was ran by some former Silk Road staff members who got doxed when Silk Road 1.0 was shut down.
Ulbricht was caught because an FBI agent, who would read things slowly and twice, recognized these 4 letters : heyy . That's how Ulbricht sometimes spelled hey , and the agent had seen that particular spelling before in his investigation, in an email from Ulbrict’s student email address. Nick Bilton's book “American Kingpin: The Epic Hunt for the Criminal Mastermind Behind the Silk Road” is a great read, highly recom…