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FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

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Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#201
post #162

This seems like a good place to say that I strongly recommend Yasha Levine's Surveillance Valley book ( https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/34220713-surveillance-va... ) where he suggests that all of this is working as intended, going all the way back to the military counter-insurgency roots of the arpanet first in places like Vietnam, and then back home in anti-war and leftist movements. The contemporary themes that…

"are the fact that current privacy movements like Tor, Signal, OTF, BBG are fundamentally military funded and survive on government contracts." Are those "facts" avaiable for investigating, without having to buy the book? (that Tor is partly US administration funded is known, but Signal? And what is OTF and BGG?)

https://www.opentech.fund/results/supported-projects/open-wh...

Funded by Open Technology Fund (OTF) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Technology_Fund

Which is funded by Radio Free Asia (RFA) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Free_Asia. It had a few reboots but was created as a CIA program in 1951 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Free_Asia_(Committee_for...) to blast shortwaves into China from Manilla to try to overthrow the Chinese government. Rebooted more recently since the advent of the great firewall of China.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#202

Earlier quoted context omitted.

My advice if you’re not on the level where three letter agencies are actively interested in your comings and goings: - Use a strong pass phrase - Enable biometrics so you don’t need to type that pass phrase 100 times per day - Learn the shortcut to have your phone disable biometrics and require the pass phrase so you can use it when police is coming for you, you’re entering the immigration line in the airport etc. -…

If you _are_ at the level where TLAs are interested in you they will not give you a chance to mash that button. You will have a loaded gun pointed at your head out of nowhere and you will freeze. From experience.

Is that a story you mind sharing?

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#203
post #6

It says Telegram has no message content. Isn't telegram not E2EE by default, instead required explicit steps to make a conversation encrypted? Either way looks like Signal wins by a lot. The size of it spot is so small, it seems almost squeezed in. But only because they have nothing to share.

This chart is showing what messaging providers are willing to give to law enforcement, not a reflection of the technical capabilities of the messaging provider. I assume what they're showing for Telegram (basically no data except IP/phone data if Telegram decides it's for a legit counter-terrorism activity) is a matter of Telegram business policy. Signal gives the limited information they do because I assume they are…

TLDR: Telegram depends on trusting Telegram. Signal is trustless.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#204
post #89

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I just tried this an it does not work for iPhone is it only on a certain iOS? I am a bit behind on updates. Thanks

Try: Hold "volume up" and "power" for 2 seconds You'll feel a vibration, and biometric login will be disabled until you enter your passcode.

That did the trick thanks. But ultimately I’m behind on updates so my phone could probably be broken into trivial with the forensic tools available to most law enforcement. I’m going to update soon.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#205

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Your statement on the 5th amendment is no longer accurate broadly, but the matter still has some cross-jurisdictional disagreement: https://americanlegalnews.com/biometrics-covered-by-fifth-am...

District courts don't make law. Magistrates working for those district courts even less so. The case this news article cites has no precedential value anywhere - not even within N.D.Cal. - and should not be relied upon. IAAL but IANYL

Agreed. That decision is unlikely to be repeated by any appellate court. IMO, all the rulings on biometrics not being testimonial are constitutionally correct, even if that sucks. A lot of constitutional rulings suck.

The real solution is for a federal statute to require warrants.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#206

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm just glad you're here to stick up for your friends without any corroboration or linking story. It's just a good thing to do.

Being charitable, let’s assume his friends work as homicide or theft detectives. If so, they need a high standard for admissible evidence to build their case. If on the other hand his friends are street cops tasked with clearing a corner of drug dealers because some neighbor complained to their council person who complained to the police chief then those cops don’t necessarily care about extrajudicial activities. Hav…

Cybercrime. Lots of scams and child abuse.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#207
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

The fifth amendment doesn't protect either speech or biometrics. Nor does it protect passwords.

You are wrong. It protects passwords as speech, as they are testimonial, per many court rulings. It does not protect biometrics based on law that basically says the police can force you to give up your fingerprints for their records, so they can sure as fuck force your finger onto a reader.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#209
post #162

This seems like a good place to say that I strongly recommend Yasha Levine's Surveillance Valley book ( https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/34220713-surveillance-va... ) where he suggests that all of this is working as intended, going all the way back to the military counter-insurgency roots of the arpanet first in places like Vietnam, and then back home in anti-war and leftist movements. The contemporary themes that…

Thank you. I never knew the source of the ridiculous theory that the internet sprang from spying attempts on the Vietnamese. I am always looking for keywords to filter conspiracy weirdos. Yasha Levine added

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#210

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm just glad you're here to stick up for your friends without any corroboration or linking story. It's just a good thing to do.

Being charitable, let’s assume his friends work as homicide or theft detectives. If so, they need a high standard for admissible evidence to build their case. If on the other hand his friends are street cops tasked with clearing a corner of drug dealers because some neighbor complained to their council person who complained to the police chief then those cops don’t necessarily care about extrajudicial activities. Hav…

They can also query these messages to see if there is something on the dealers they get paid from and then warn them if something comes up. It works both ways, no?
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