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FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

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Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#141
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

for signal users this means the messages of course do exist on your phone, which will be the first thing these agencies seek to abscond with once youre detained as its infinitely more crackable in their hands. as a casual reminder: The fifth amendment protects your speech, not your biometrics. do not use face or fingerprint to secure your phone. use a strong passphrase, and if in doubt, power down the phone (android)…

Signal recently added 'disappearing messages' which lets you specify how long a chat you initiate remains before being deleted.

Not "recently". Disappearing messages have been there for at least 5 or 5 years.

Almost _all_ my Signal chats are on 1 week or 1 day disappearing settings. It helps to remind everyone to grab useful info out of the chat (for example, stick dinner plan times/dates/locations into a calendar) rather than hoping everybody on the chat remembers to delete messages intended to be ephemeral.

The "$person set disappearing messages to 5 minutes" has become shorthand for "juicy tidbit that's not to be repeated" amongst quite a few of my circl3es of friends. Even in face to face discussion, someone will occasionally say something like "bigiain has set disappearing messages to five minutes" as a joke/gag way of saying what used to be expressed as "Don't tell anyone, but..."

(I just looked it up, https://signal.org/blog/disappearing-messages/ from Oct 2016.)

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#143
post #97

Now I just have to get my friends and family to use Signal.

I switched to signal and got few people to switch too, then they started their shit coin(MOB). IMO Signal Messenger is just a way for that company to reach their shit coin goals. Uninstalled and never recommending that again.

Are you sure you're not thinking of Telegram? They had a thing called Telegram Open Platform or something (TOP rings a bell for some reason)

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#144

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal recently added 'disappearing messages' which lets you specify how long a chat you initiate remains before being deleted.

And a screenshot, or another camera, or a rooted phone can easily defeat that. The analog hole ALWAYS exists. Pretending it doesnt is ridiculous.

Wickr has a "screenshot notification to sender" feature (which of course, can be worked around by taking a pic of the screen without Wickr knowing you've done it).

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#145

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Signal recently added 'disappearing messages' which lets you specify how long a chat you initiate remains before being deleted.

Not "recently". Disappearing messages have been there for at least 5 or 5 years. Almost _all_ my Signal chats are on 1 week or 1 day disappearing settings. It helps to remind everyone to grab useful info out of the chat (for example, stick dinner plan times/dates/locations into a calendar) rather than hoping everybody on the chat remembers to delete messages intended to be ephemeral. The "$person set disappearing mes…

Maybe it was only added recently on the desktop client.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#146

Check the difference between Telegram and WhatsApp. Add to this the fact that WhatsApp - uploads messages unencrypted to Google if you or someone you chat with enable backups - and send all your metadata to Facebook. Then remember how many people here have tried to tell us that Telegram is unusable abd WhatsApp is the bees knees. Then think twice before taking security advice from such people again. PS: as usual, if…

Telegram defaults to no encryption, does not do encrypted group chats, has a home-rolled encryption protocol which almost guarantees it's weak as nearly every home-rolled encryption system always is (if not also backdoored). Coupled with it being headquartered in Russia means it is completely untrustable.

The only reason Telegram comes out on top of Whatsapp in the document in question is because Telegram is a foreign company with little interest in cooperating with a US domestic police agency; the FBI has no leverage over Russian companies.

What that list doesn't show is what Telegram does when the FSB knocks. By all means, give your potentially embarassing message content to a hostile nation's intelligence service.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#147

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Stored Communications Act makes disclosing the contents of messages without a search warrant unlawful

The people responsible for investigating and prosecuting such crimes have some not so great incentives to avoid doing so and keep the whole thing secret though, don't they? And then when they get caught, they do this: https://cdt.org/insights/the-truth-about-telecom-immunity/

Sounds like an easy way to have your case tossed out in court.

It's funny how much this differs from my own personal experience with law enforcement. The friends I know are timid as hell and don't do anything without a warrant just to stay on the safe side- even if they probably don't need one.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#148

If this is what it takes to keep us safe, I and most americans are ok with it. We live in dangerous times. The US has a balanced criminal justice system -- as long as due process is preserved privacy from the state should not be a major issue

How does them reading my messages keep me safe, though?

In that example it's keeping me safe from you

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#149

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The people responsible for investigating and prosecuting such crimes have some not so great incentives to avoid doing so and keep the whole thing secret though, don't they? And then when they get caught, they do this: https://cdt.org/insights/the-truth-about-telecom-immunity/

Sounds like an easy way to have your case tossed out in court. It's funny how much this differs from my own personal experience with law enforcement. The friends I know are timid as hell and don't do anything without a warrant just to stay on the safe side- even if they probably don't need one.

The really smart cops get the tips using “less than legal” means, then walk back and reconstruct using legal evidence.

Re: FBI's ability to legally access secure messaging app content and metadata [pdf]

#150

Check the difference between Telegram and WhatsApp. Add to this the fact that WhatsApp - uploads messages unencrypted to Google if you or someone you chat with enable backups - and send all your metadata to Facebook. Then remember how many people here have tried to tell us that Telegram is unusable abd WhatsApp is the bees knees. Then think twice before taking security advice from such people again. PS: as usual, if…

This isn’t the case anymore with WhatsApp. Backups to iCloud and google drive are optionally fully encrypted. You have the choice of storing the decryption artifacts on facebooks servers (which are held on a Secure Enclave) or to backup the 64 character decryption code yourself.
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