It seems to me theres a difference between attacks that carefully craft an image that slips through the cracks, and an attack that basically exploits the fact that without context, it's hard to figure out what single item is important. If I took a picture of a conch shell on top of my keyboard and sent it to someone, no one would think I was just showing off my keyboard! They'd assume, correctly, that my desk was a m…
Adversarial image attacks are no joke
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Re: Adversarial image attacks are no joke
#22The really scary thing is that this could be used as an excuse to hide production ML models and even the tech used to generate them. Sounds like we can expect the state-of-the-art AI techniques to be jealously guarded eventually. I guess optimism on the ground is enough to have prevented that so far, but once the scales tip away from sharing and towards exploitation.. well, we know it's largely a one-way process on t…
> Sounds like we can expect the state-of-the-art AI techniques to be jealously guarded eventually. This isn’t an eventuality, it’s the current state of the industry.
Re: Adversarial image attacks are no joke
#23Earlier quoted context omitted.
> For example, consider the case of pasting a sticker on a speed limit sign that causes Teslas to swerve off the road. If your vision system can be caused to swerve off a road by a sticker then maybe it shouldn't be used?
I bet I could cause a significant fraction of human vision systems to get in a crash with a well placed sticker. I'd replace " ".
Re: Adversarial image attacks are no joke
#24Why does the existence of these attacks change the threat landscape at all? If people are already not doing "dumb" attacks like just changing/removing road signs why would they start doing them?
The risk of messing with road signs and throwing off autonomous vehicles really has less to do with adversarial image attacks and more to do with envisioning an impractically brittle system where the decision to stop is based purely on presence/absence of a stop sign and not on a system that has a more general sense of collision-avoidance and situational awareness (like humans do).|
Stepping back more generally, I have still never seen a case where the undetectability of adversarial attacks actually means there is a practical difference to security or safety. If you really think through the impact in the real world, usually the risk is already there: you can just change the input to the image and get bad results, it doesn't affect much that the image is imperceptibly changed. Because the whole point of using an automated vision system is usually that you want to avoid human eyes on the problem.
Re: Adversarial image attacks are no joke
#25Earlier quoted context omitted.
I bet I could cause a significant fraction of human vision systems to get in a crash with a well placed sticker. I'd replace " ".
But that is not a vision issue. That is providing people with incorrect information.
Re: Adversarial image attacks are no joke
#26Earlier quoted context omitted.
I bet I could cause a significant fraction of human vision systems to get in a crash with a well placed sticker. I'd replace " ".
This has always confused me as well. What would be the reason why some adversary would choose to craft an adversarial example and deploy it in the real world versus the much easier solution to just remove / obscure the sign?
But... around here at least, signs have stickers or graffiti on them often enough. Like adding the name of a politician under a stop sign: "Stop [Harper]". An appropriately made adversarial example won't stick out visually the same way that a wholesale sign swap will.
Re: Adversarial image attacks are no joke
#27Earlier quoted context omitted.
I bet I could cause a significant fraction of human vision systems to get in a crash with a well placed sticker. I'd replace " ".
This has always confused me as well. What would be the reason why some adversary would choose to craft an adversarial example and deploy it in the real world versus the much easier solution to just remove / obscure the sign?
Re: Adversarial image attacks are no joke
#28Earlier quoted context omitted.
Your proposed laws do not cut out any exemption for research and experimentation, either with existing systems or potential new ones. This level of regulation would create an impossibly high barrier to entry and ensure that only the established players would remain in the marketplace. The last thing that I want to see is yet more regulatory capture, particularly in an industry that has yet to establish a reasonable b…
None of the things I listed would affect research. Researchers shouldn't be posting these on public highways, and researchers shouldn't be distributing them with the intent to cause harm.
Look at drug research. There is plenty of red tape that hinders it. Although, here, the "harm to society" is defined by the nation state.
However, I agree with your proposals in the top-level comment.
Re: Adversarial image attacks are no joke
#29Re: Adversarial image attacks are no joke
#30The literature has pretty consistently shown that adversarial examples can be found with only black box access (even with truncated prediction vectors), robustness methods are primarily a cat-and-mouse game between attackers and defenders, and the existence of adversarial examples is likely inevitable ( https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.02104.pdf ). The big question that remains is - so what? There's exceedingly few use cas…
Self driving cars seem like a dangerous threat vector if an adversarial image can be deployed in such a way as to cause them to commit dangerous maneuvers on demand.
Like billboard with stop sign on it.