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The "overlearning the game" problem

andrewoneverything.com

11–20 of 144 posts

Re: The "overlearning the game" problem

#11
post #8
post #6

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I guess an example of hacking would be someone hacking the phone system to make free long distance calls. An example of overlearning would be someone learning the rules of society to such a degree that he gets free long distance calls (e.g. using lawsuits against phone companies). The former would get fined or imprisoned if caught, but the latter is fine under our legal system.

It's pretty bizarre that you're using the derogatory definition of "hack" given that you're posting on Hacker News . And it doesn't incline me to want to talk to you further.

Sorry, I was just using the colloquial meaning of hack. Did not at all mean to appear derogatory for the type of hacking exemplified by HN, of which I take part in.

In any case, I do see your point about similarities between hacking and overlearning, but I think there are some differences. If I can articulate those difference better, I'll reply a little later.

Re: The "overlearning the game" problem

#12
If you pay a man by the hour, he'll work a lot of hours. If you pay him by the brick, he'll lay a lot of bricks.

These "games" are basically the equivalent of counting lines of code or checkins. We're measuring poor proxies instead of the things we're actually interested in. The solution isn't an arms race to build bigger and better proxies, the solution is to measure real things instead of artificial ones.

Here's just one example of what I mean by "measure real things". Electing representatives every X years to decide the laws of the land was once upon a time the fairest and best way to have the voices of the masses heard. Today it is feasible to directly poll everybody about every issue, so we no longer need the proxy. If you say everyone cannot be educated about every issue, fine, I can "follow" PG's votes on wall street reform and grellas's votes on IP tort reform and Schneier's votes on TSA etc just by copying their votes on those issues into my ballot, a permission which I can revoke at any time or on a vote-by-vote basis, as easy as unfollowing them on VoteTwitter. This is better than the proxy of professional politicians deciding every issue with fixed terms.

Re: The "overlearning the game" problem

#13
post #10

It's related to Goodhart's Law: Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes. This is often the result of attempting to overoptimize a system. You can optimize a race car to a huge degree, because you know exactly what you want it to do. You can't optimize a schooling system, because you don't know exactly what you want it to do. A little noise is a go…

Do you have any links on this? I hadn't heard of it before and am quite interested in it now, but could not come up with anything after a quick Google search for "sortation". Thanks for sharing this!

Re: The "overlearning the game" problem

#15

If you pay a man by the hour, he'll work a lot of hours. If you pay him by the brick, he'll lay a lot of bricks. These "games" are basically the equivalent of counting lines of code or checkins. We're measuring poor proxies instead of the things we're actually interested in. The solution isn't an arms race to build bigger and better proxies, the solution is to measure real things instead of artificial ones. Here's ju…

I love the idea that electing representatives every X years to decide the laws of the land may not be the best way forward, and a new approach that takes into account modern technology may be a better way to go about this.

However, based on human nature, I think that given long enough time of your proposed system in place, some people will overlearn it and find a way to exploit it, e.g. to gather tons of votes for their favorite cause. We may even see 'vote consultants/strategists' that guarantee a huge increase in the votes for the cause you want to pursue.

Re: The "overlearning the game" problem

#16
post #14
post #2

[deleted]

The original purpose of Gerrymandering was not to enhance the voting power of minorities, it was to game elections. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrymandering Black majority electorates came decades after Gerrymandering. Not a bad article though.

Thanks for the heads-up. I didn't know that Gerrymandering had not-so-pure origins. Maybe I'll remove that example from the article.

EDIT: Removed Gerrymandering example.

Re: The "overlearning the game" problem

#17
post #14
post #2

[deleted]

The original purpose of Gerrymandering was not to enhance the voting power of minorities, it was to game elections. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerrymandering Black majority electorates came decades after Gerrymandering. Not a bad article though.

+1.

Also, while gerrymandering is indeed an abhorrent practice, its not clear it actually leads, in aggregate, to more extreme politicians. Gerrymandering is a delicate balance, and is often designed to create "just safe enough" seats (rule of thumb is 55% projected support), which, it turns out, are rarely safe at the margins in tumultuous times.

Indeed, its unclear that gerrymandering is hampering the ability of voters to change their minds. The last 3 elections have all led to historic upheaval, +30D, +23D, and -44R.

Re: The "overlearning the game" problem

#18
post #10

It's related to Goodhart's Law: Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes. This is often the result of attempting to overoptimize a system. You can optimize a race car to a huge degree, because you know exactly what you want it to do. You can't optimize a schooling system, because you don't know exactly what you want it to do. A little noise is a go…

Do you have any links on this? I hadn't heard of it before and am quite interested in it now, but could not come up with anything after a quick Google search for "sortation". Thanks for sharing this!

I've edited in a link now.

The main disadvantage with sortation seems to be that it killed Socrates. Randomly selected jurors did quite a few nasty and arbitrary things. But an elected tyrant (especially one who was willing to do anything to stay popular) might be worse. It's hard to say that sortation is bad because it allowed mistakes - every political system allows mistakes.

Also, systematic slavery, misogyny, the occasional genocide and other discrimination against non-male-citizens (non-voters) was a problem, but that's not really related to sortation. Any democracy can have those problems. Fortunately, we seem to have progressed a little in the last 2000 years (despite the occasional step back).

Re: The "overlearning the game" problem

#19
post #10

It's related to Goodhart's Law: Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes. This is often the result of attempting to overoptimize a system. You can optimize a race car to a huge degree, because you know exactly what you want it to do. You can't optimize a schooling system, because you don't know exactly what you want it to do. A little noise is a go…

Do you have any links on this? I hadn't heard of it before and am quite interested in it now, but could not come up with anything after a quick Google search for "sortation". Thanks for sharing this!

Apparently, the expression is 'sortition' not 'sortation'. wisty has a link to the relevant Wikipedia article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sortition, and a Google search for 'sortition' yields quite a few results.

Re: The "overlearning the game" problem

#20
Systems theorists say that "structure predicts behaviour". It's a bit trite, but also deep. Here's an example.

The US political system pretty much guarantees bad budgeting. Members of Congress are elected fairly independently. There is no party discipline, so each member will operate independently to maximise pork. This encourages horse-trading within and across party lines; nobody can be forced to give up something for a general good.

There's more: there's no incentive to balance the budget. The Executive's separation means that Congress does not need to concern itself with proper administration; it only doles out the cash. It has every incentive to ... maximise pork.

The dynamic behaviour of American government arises from the static structure. The drafters of the constitution drew on their knowledge of history and current affairs to try and avoid certain pitfalls. The US Constitution was state-of-the-art when it was written. It's less so now.

Countries where the Executive is formed out of the Legislative -- the Westminster system -- tend to have much stronger party discipline, because that discipline is required to pass budgets, enact legislation and to form the Executive. This tends to almost eliminate horse-trading, except between parties and independents. It's not perfect -- whole parties can engage in pork too -- but when policy emerges that benefits the many at the cost of a few, countries with party discipline will find it easier to adopt than those without.

Australia, which has the amongst the toughest party discipline in the democratic world, is also a reform leader. And I think a lot of that is explained by our constitutional arrangements.

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