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Named pipes have been in Windows for many years https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/n...
First thing I do with SQL Server setups - turn off named pipes :)
I don't know why I expected something more technical for the tray icon part. I mean using a third party library is not really anything .NET 6 specific.
NamedPipes are sweet for doing same-machine IPC on Windows, that is for sure, but the built-in API is full of footguns.
Named pipes have been in Windows for many years https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/n...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
First thing I do with SQL Server setups - turn off named pipes :)
Is there a reason you do this? Curious, I havent had to setup SQL Server myself in a while so I don't know what a reasonable reason would be.
Consider that if a user-mode application can send messages to a privileged process (like a Windows service).
What prevents any user-mode application from doing that? And if your Windows service is running as "NT_AUTHORITY/SYSTEM" and even executes privileged commands, well you might find you've got a simple privilege escalation vuln.
Remember, secure your named pipes...especially when the named pipe server runs as SYSTEM.
- https://stackoverflow.com/a/59983266
- https://versprite.com/blog/security-research/vulnerable-name...
Named pipes have been in Windows for many years https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/n...
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Pretty sure there isn't anything you can't do in Jetbrains Rider EAP. Edit: would like to know why I'm being downvoted.
Hot reload in Rider only works in debug mode on Windows (to be clear it also works in nondebug sessions on Windows). On Mac trying to use Hot Reload with Rider on a nondebug session errors out, so it’s not 100% yet.
Good article, but I wish the author would've addressed securing these named pipes. Consider that if a user-mode application can send messages to a privileged process (like a Windows service). What prevents any user-mode application from doing that? And if your Windows service is running as "NT_AUTHORITY/SYSTEM" and even executes privileged commands, well you might find you've got a simple privilege escalation vuln. R…