There is a meaningful difference between this kind of miner intervention and the kind of intervention that might be problematic in a centralized context.
Provided there is sufficient decentralization within a blockchain network (i.e. enough independent miners participating) no individual miner will be able to pursue a MEV strategy beyond a single block. The next block will be created by a different miner.
In addition, the right to include any transaction or to control the ordering of transactions depends on the miner winning the right to build the block via the consensus process (for instance, by being first to calculate the PoW). In a sufficiently decentralized network, it is unlikely that any one miner will have any certainty at all with regards to when they will actually be able to build a new block. Depending on the level of centralization, it is also the case that a particular miner will get to mine a new block infrequently at best.
So the worst that a particular miner can do will be to delay the inclusion of a transaction, because any other miner can choose to include the same transaction in a subsequent block. Excluding transactions is outright impossible without buying out the entire capacity of the network by paying massive gas fees to other miners.
And because there is no predicting when the power to choose the ordering or inclusion of transactions will be granted to a particular miner, any miner intervention strategy will need to be both opportunistic and somehow viable within the scope of only one block.
Keep in mind as well that Ethereum blocks occur less than once every 15 seconds.