51–60 of 182 posts
The obvious, obvious thing is to simply pay the doctor a fix priced each month wether they diagnose you with something or not. Well above what they would earn elsewhere. Their incentive then becomes to keep a good relationship with you so you continue to pay them. The best way to do that is to keep you healthy and happy.
I’m starting to think most readers on HN don’t really read the articles and go straight into the comment section..
Doctors did due diligence on their clients and advised them preventive. They did not want sickly households.
Also the incentive is on keeping the whole house in good shape.
I learned the opposite once: never let a capitalist near your health care program. They make money when you are sick, and stop making money when you are healthy.
The obvious, obvious thing is to simply pay the doctor a fix priced each month wether they diagnose you with something or not. Well above what they would earn elsewhere. Their incentive then becomes to keep a good relationship with you so you continue to pay them. The best way to do that is to keep you healthy and happy.
>The obvious, obvious thing is to simply pay the doctor a fix priced each month wether they diagnose you with something or not. Easy fix... "Just be wealthy!" lol... :| I've paid for the absolute best insurance I could find this year and gone to doctors my entire life that simply don't care. I've had everything from colonoscopies to MRIs done and I haven't spent more than one day in my entire life in a hospital overn…
I leaned once that in ancient China they paid family doctors a monthly free, unless someone in the household got sick, then the fee was not paid until everyone was healthy again. Doctors did due diligence on their clients and advised them preventive. They did not want sickly households. Also the incentive is on keeping the whole house in good shape. I learned the opposite once: never let a capitalist near your health…
Wouldn't the same rule apply for IT Sysadmins?
The obvious, obvious thing is to simply pay the doctor a fix priced each month wether they diagnose you with something or not. Well above what they would earn elsewhere. Their incentive then becomes to keep a good relationship with you so you continue to pay them. The best way to do that is to keep you healthy and happy.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
For specifically the doctor version of the principle-agent problem, Robin Hanson published an incentive-compatible solution over 25 years ago: http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/buyhealth.html
> To cure health care, give your care-givers a clear incentive to keep you well. Make sure that when you lose, they lose, and just as much. Buy lots of life and disability insurance from your care-givers, and have a third party, unable to act against your life or health, pay you to be the beneficiary.
Someone uses “greedy doctor” as an example to talk about an easy to understand version of the Control Problem, and the comments make it into a discussion of healthcare systems. I’m starting to think most readers on HN don’t really read the articles and go straight into the comment section..
The obvious, obvious thing is to simply pay the doctor a fix priced each month wether they diagnose you with something or not. Well above what they would earn elsewhere. Their incentive then becomes to keep a good relationship with you so you continue to pay them. The best way to do that is to keep you healthy and happy.
I agree with the idea of paying the doctor a flat fee every month, but in my variant, the doctor has to repay you the entire sum you've paid to date, with 10% interest, if you succumb to any preventable illnesses; in other words, the doctor now has some real skin in the game. S/he becomes motivated not only to keep you well, but to keep the fees reasonable.
The price leverage of the doctor is proportional to how much information the doctor has about how much money you have. If you can't keep it secret, you can add noise proportional to how much information the doctor likely has to cancel it out. The resulting "fair" price will be a function of the net shared information each side if the noise were removed.
Negotiations theory was a pet interest of mine, and I came to believe that in zero sum adversarial bargaining situations like that, the domainant position was the side with the most information, so the best strategy was to use noise to diminish their information, and then use whatever information you retained as arbitrage. If you think of noise in terms of signal entropy, and low entropy as signal, you can figure out whether their gambit is signal or noise by repsonding with noise and gauging the entropy of their response. This is crazy armchair stuff that nobody articultes, but variations of it gets used in bureaucracy and politics all the time, it's basically the game theory of gaslighting.