I came across this twitter thread during the last Facebook outage. Apparently something very wrong is happening there with their backups. I would definitely check similar cases. Confirmed by multiple people :/ I quote the author: This is really weird. In #WhatsApp, I started to see messages that I know 100% that I deleted 2 days ago?! WTF is happening there? I think this is a really big violation of privacy! I see th…
WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups security assessment
41–50 of 121 posts
Re: WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups security assessment
#42I can tell you first hand, anytime a company pays a third party to do a security assessment, the result is purely what the company wants you to see. Independent does not mean that it wasn't influenced, just that it wasn't done by the company itself.
Re: WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups security assessment
#43I came across this twitter thread during the last Facebook outage. Apparently something very wrong is happening there with their backups. I would definitely check similar cases. Confirmed by multiple people :/ I quote the author: This is really weird. In #WhatsApp, I started to see messages that I know 100% that I deleted 2 days ago?! WTF is happening there? I think this is a really big violation of privacy! I see th…
I completely forgot about this issue :) I'm glad someone was interested in looking at how those backups work. Perhaps my complaints also contributed to this investigation :)))
This is not surprising - when you ask someone else to route messages for you, even encrypted messages, you are giving them the (encrpyted) payload and asking them to route it for you.
If you have a large network with billions of users, it's reasonable that some of the users' phones may be offline some of the time.
Should the service just drop messages on the floor when that happens, or buffer them in some queue (recall, they're E2EE) that gets emptied every so often?
Now assume all your infra has a hiccup (outage) and goes offline, and then comes online again.
Probably the retry logic didn't synch correctly and attempted to retransmit encrypted messages that had already been delivered.
Re: WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups security assessment
#44I can tell you first hand, anytime a company pays a third party to do a security assessment, the result is purely what the company wants you to see. Independent does not mean that it wasn't influenced, just that it wasn't done by the company itself.
NCC Group is a legit outfit, a public company in fact, so this comment is not warranted.
Re: WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups security assessment
#45I came across this twitter thread during the last Facebook outage. Apparently something very wrong is happening there with their backups. I would definitely check similar cases. Confirmed by multiple people :/ I quote the author: This is really weird. In #WhatsApp, I started to see messages that I know 100% that I deleted 2 days ago?! WTF is happening there? I think this is a really big violation of privacy! I see th…
Re: WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups security assessment
#46Why on earth do people trust a closed source messenger owned by Facebook, which backs up to Google? Signal and Matrix are open source and full-featured.
> Why on earth do people trust a closed source messenger owned by Facebook, which backs up to Google? Those are some of the few companies that are large enough to oppose governments. > Signal and Matrix are open source The main advantage of which is to enable audits like this, which WhatsApp is doing. Of course you can't actually build WhatsApp from the audited source or pin it to the audited version... but you can't…
They're more likely to cooperate with governments because they have so much to lose. All the big guys are caving in to China for example because they don't want to lose that sweet 1+ billion consumer market. Yes even Google. Check maps.google.cn and see the border around the South China Sea.
And also their interests are much more aligned with the governments, being entities similar in size and controlled by huge shareholder interest groups.
Oh and finally most of them don't even pretend to oppose government interests. Even Apple.
The best thing about Matrix is that both the software and the network is open and decentralised. This is why I prefer it over Signal (which even frowns on third party clients)
Re: WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups security assessment
#47WhatsApps security used to rely on the signal protocol, a (fairly) open source protocol that you could implement and verify yourself (and I did). It now has backups which rely on 'trusted' hardware security modules in Facebook's data centers. That seems like a serious downgrade to me.
Wrong. 1. Backups are opt-in - just as they have always been. 2. The E2EE backups do not rely on HSM's - they rely on a client-side only key derived by the WhatsApp client, on the user's phone. 3. The client-side key backup does not rely solely on HSM's - naturally, the client-side key must be backed up in case the user loses their phone. This key is itself encrypted and stored remotely (whether this is on third-part…
Of course we still have to take their word from it that the app doesn't secretly store this key somewhere. But I suppose this audit will validate that. I have to do a deep dive into it. The problem remains of course that this app can be modified at any time through the update mechanism.
Re: WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups security assessment
#48Why on earth do people trust a closed source messenger owned by Facebook, which backs up to Google? Signal and Matrix are open source and full-featured.
Signal doesn't get credit for being open source.
Signal may be open source at times, but that alone is not a reliable factor for the platform/company to be considered as trustworthy.
Re: WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups security assessment
#49Earlier quoted context omitted.
I completely forgot about this issue :) I'm glad someone was interested in looking at how those backups work. Perhaps my complaints also contributed to this investigation :)))
These look like messages being re-sent from the service to the client. This is not surprising - when you ask someone else to route messages for you, even encrypted messages, you are giving them the (encrpyted) payload and asking them to route it for you. If you have a large network with billions of users, it's reasonable that some of the users' phones may be offline some of the time. Should the service just drop mess…
Re: WhatsApp end-to-end encrypted backups security assessment
#50Earlier quoted context omitted.
Signal doesn't get credit for being open source.
Are you saying it’s not getting enough credit or that it shouldn’t? The Signal code was closed source for longer than a year (from April 2020) when no commits were done in the public repo because . Some months ago the public repo got a barrage of commits after that long gap. It wasn’t that the Signal platform and client had no updates during this time. There were many, but the code wasn’t released. Signal may be open…
Agreed - I've moved ~80 of my friends from Messenger to the free Matrix server, and I host my own server. It's a wonderful experience.