Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'm not sure if you're aware but Tor has a specific mode for OP's situation, where it disguises traffic by using standard TLS on standard ports which looks no different to any other HTTPS traffic for example, among other things.
> which looks no different to any other HTTPS traffic Last I heard Tor split all data up into 512 byte chunks. So the statistical distribution of packet sizes could still give you away. In general, Tor does not hide the fact that you are using Tor.
Tor Browser 11.0
61–70 of 100 posts
Re: Tor Browser 11.0
#62> Final deprecation of v2 onion services
Final removal, not deprecation.
> v2 onion services would be deprecated in late 2021
No, removed in late 2021, after being deprecated for over a year (from July or September, depending on how you count it).
Re: Tor Browser 11.0
#63Re: Tor Browser 11.0
#64Earlier quoted context omitted.
What mode is that? Also, the traffic still goes to a Tor node. Finally, the Tor Project works very hard, but they are outgunned. Security is significantly a matter of resources. Tor's small team has a hard time competing with well-funded state security actors (who can also buy exploits).
FWIW, Tor is maintained by the US Navy as a means of secure communication. If it's outgunned, it becomes a national security risk.
Military researchers invent a lot of cool stuff, much of which theoretically could be useful to the military in some way, but you shouldn't take the military research pedigree as proof that something is necessarily useful for a particular application or threat model today, any more than being invented by people from a famous university means that a technology is good or is the best choice for some application.
A better case for the kind of considerations you mention might be found in infosec guidance that government agencies offer to other government agencies and contractors. For example, NSA has recommended that government agencies use AES to protect sensitive data, which doesn't mean that they think it's perfect (or would necessarily tell us if they knew of problems with it), but presumably puts some kind of cap on how bad it can be. I'm not aware of any government infosec authority that has publicly recommended that people inside the government use Tor.
Re: Tor Browser 11.0
#65TOR has been an invaluable tool for me for its ability to circumvent state censorship in an undetectable way. At some point in my career I was involved in some journalistic reporting in Saudi Arabia; had I used a regular VPN, it could have been easily detected, and in best case defeated, worst case put me in serious legal trouble, which in Saudi Arabia can easily end in corporal punishment and/or death. TOR allowed m…
I don't know the parent or their situation, but if you need similar security I would be very cautious about taking the parent literally. Sorry if I sound like a jerk; it sounds like the parent has taken great risks for the public good, but I don't want people to be hurt: I'm almost certain that Tor use is easily detected; that is what I've always (100%) read from security experts and it makes sense to me: Traffic pat…
To be clear, the threat models of the obfuscating transports can vary, so what I've described is just a trend in emphasis, not necessarily a suggestion that nobody ever cares about obfuscation-in-retrospect. But the history of that work is around censorship circumvention, which is often a slightly different goal (with slightly different priorities) than confidentiality.
For example, I've heard people who work on obfuscation talk about how it would be good if something required an expensive calculation in order to distinguish from other traffic types. They care about this because a national firewall may not have sufficient capacity to do this in real time.
Depending a lot on your threat model, Tor might still be a benefit even if people do know you are using it, supposing that they don't know for what.
Re: Tor Browser 11.0
#66Earlier quoted context omitted.
TOR bridges aren't publicly listed and support various obfuscation methods: https://tb-manual.torproject.org/bridges/
Look at the language of that page. All the statements are without certainty, eg it's not "an adversary cannot identify them" but "an adversary cannot identify them easily."
The linked article tries to imply that Ross Ulbricht's arrest was somehow the result of deanonymized tor traffic, but in reality many (most?) large DNM [1,2] and malware/hacking arrests seem to be the result of poor opsec [3].
[1] https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides/online-privacy-through-o...
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AlphaBay#Seizure_and_shutdown
Re: Tor Browser 11.0
#67Earlier quoted context omitted.
Chromium
What advantages would that bring?
Firefox is only now catching up in regard to site isolation.
Re: Tor Browser 11.0
#68I've wondered about the fact that (AFAIK) Tor routes only TCP: 1. Is that (still) correct? 2. Can't web pages include non-TCP traffic, and if so, is it routed via Tor? For example, doesn't some some streaming media use UDP? 3. QUIC doesn't use TCP (deliberately, I think). Won't that affect Tor's long-term viability if everyone eventually moves to QUIC?
Re: Tor Browser 11.0
#69Some of these issues seem like pretty big issues:
> Bug 40671: Fonts don't render > Bug 40695: JS enabled on Safest in Windows (new)
Re: Tor Browser 11.0
#70TOR has been an invaluable tool for me for its ability to circumvent state censorship in an undetectable way. At some point in my career I was involved in some journalistic reporting in Saudi Arabia; had I used a regular VPN, it could have been easily detected, and in best case defeated, worst case put me in serious legal trouble, which in Saudi Arabia can easily end in corporal punishment and/or death. TOR allowed m…
Or. Well. It is same easily detected, but you can reasonably say you have VPN "just to watch US netflix" or something like that.
You cannot say that about Tor.