Earlier quoted context omitted.
There's a huge tangle of things with "Apple owns your computer" but I don't think most of it applies to the icloud question. If you wanted to store photos in icloud on a Windows machine, you'd be using the Apple icloud client. Apple has at least some control over what software they write and ship does[1]. They can break 3rd party clients almost at will, so if they choose to be hostile to 3rd party clients that contro…
It seems to me that Apple does their best to ensure you end up using icloud against your will through a a series of very confusing opt-out prompts and defaults. Maybe it would be nice to have a tool that would allow you to see exactly what data the client side scanner is “allowed” to “see”?
Bugs in our pockets: the risks of client-side scanning
91–100 of 138 posts
Re: Bugs in our pockets: the risks of client-side scanning
#92Earlier quoted context omitted.
Also Whitfield Diffie, of Diffie-Hellman fame.
His partner went on to make some pretty good mayonnaise, too!
Richard Hellman started selling jars in 1912. No remote relation apparent. (Specifying just in case of doubt, especially for those unfamiliar with the brand.)
Re: Bugs in our pockets: the risks of client-side scanning
#93Earlier quoted context omitted.
But none of these conundrums could exist if Apple had no access to the user's device, nor control over the software running on it. "Who owns your computer" is still the central question; we're just Sapir-Whorfing ourselves around it within the implicit language of walled gardens. "Apple owns your computer" is the unspoken premise, and it's not axiomatic. Stallman was very, very right.
Apple develops a phone operating system and sells phones that run that operating system. What does it even mean to say “if Apple had no access to the user’s device”?
So somebody else has to do housekeeping and hand-holding. That's where apple comes in again, or better, stays for convenience sake.
And to not complicate their own day, Apple just does it the same for all.
Re: Bugs in our pockets: the risks of client-side scanning
#94Earlier quoted context omitted.
So long as you are secure in your own systems, you don’t care if they come for the Jews? What about when they come for the gays? How long until you do care? Will there be anyone left to care when they come for you?
There wasn't anyone to care when they came for Assange, the gays and the jews were particularly would in condemning him.
Re: Bugs in our pockets: the risks of client-side scanning
#95I'm in the libertarian lion's den . . . and I only read the abstract. What I see from a historical standpoint, pre-cloud, mobile phone/computer, personal encryption etc is that anything stored be it something on paper, something in your house, safety deposit box, whatever was available to law enforcement with controls via the courts or other mechanism. It was available when there was a legal matter. Is there disagree…
Re: Bugs in our pockets: the risks of client-side scanning
#96I'm in the libertarian lion's den . . . and I only read the abstract. What I see from a historical standpoint, pre-cloud, mobile phone/computer, personal encryption etc is that anything stored be it something on paper, something in your house, safety deposit box, whatever was available to law enforcement with controls via the courts or other mechanism. It was available when there was a legal matter. Is there disagree…
To expand on your comment, I can go in my file cabinet and flip through papers I have chosen to keep with data that I chose to write down, and then drop it in the trash can. It's physical and tangible and it doesn't have a record of who I called, where I went for breakfast, or what I ordered.
Our founding fathers were very clear on their intent with regards to how they viewed governments imposing on the private lives of citizens.
Re: Bugs in our pockets: the risks of client-side scanning
#97I just disabled Google Play Services on my Android phone to increase privacy... then I started to get spammed with about 10 notifications every 10 seconds (not a joke) to tell me that those 10 apps would not work properly without Google Play Services enabled even if they did work properly... Google and/or LG allowed me to disable 7 of these apps, but the others could not be uninstalled or disabled using the GUI... I…
Re: Bugs in our pockets: the risks of client-side scanning
#98On the other hand, CSS might -- eventually, anyway -- offer the best compromise for facilitating reliable, responsible lawful access to mass consumer information technology. Develop CSS in a manner that minimizes the noted risks. Such mechanisms are a fundamental compromise, philosophically. I am skeptical that those on opposing ends of the privacy debate will find sufficient common ground to achieve responsible impl…
Looking forward to the day that people publicly argue for client-side scanning on NeuralinkOS for thought-crime.
Re: Bugs in our pockets: the risks of client-side scanning
#99I'm in the libertarian lion's den . . . and I only read the abstract. What I see from a historical standpoint, pre-cloud, mobile phone/computer, personal encryption etc is that anything stored be it something on paper, something in your house, safety deposit box, whatever was available to law enforcement with controls via the courts or other mechanism. It was available when there was a legal matter. Is there disagree…
In theory yes a court could get access to your papers but for the average person because person to person interaction produces no permanent record and what limited record is created by correspondence isn't nearly as permanent because it requires one to take the time to file it and manage a very finite space nothing anything like your present digital life would ever come to exist to be requested.
As important is the cost of such a request. Compare the risk and expense of actually spying on a large population, to the cost of tapping their phones and paying someone to listen to a million boring conversations to the cost of bugging everyone's communications at once with a box installed for that purpose.
If you consider how feasible it would be to obtain that much privacy invading mostly useless intelligence it wouldn't historically have been hard it would have been impossible. They could have flown to Mars easier than doing that much physical surveillance unless every third citizen was spying on the other 2.
Historically I suspect such requests to logically be rare outside of settling business matters where receipts and contracts would be common or wills/trusts.
If you want to justify some sort of key escrow system you shall not find justification in returning to some hypothetical state of nature that never was.
Neither mass use of unbreakable encryption nor mass surveillance enabled by court order, nor your suggestion bear any resemblance to historical reality.
Furthermore if we can't trust the government not to break its own laws what would keep them from simply ordering your keys confiscated and ordering whomever holds them not to tell you?
Re: Bugs in our pockets: the risks of client-side scanning
#100IMO that boils down to "who owns what you use". And "there is no free lunch". Applies both to services and devices.