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We Are Beast Machines

nautil.us

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Re: We Are Beast Machines

#91

Post by chmsky00 »

nickelpro wrote: post #64
chmsky00 wrote: post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The hard problem will be solved in time. My reasoning is that the people that defined it did so in a time when our science was less developed, so of course the problem seemed much harder. Information theory makes even the hard problem a matter of understanding interaction fields of physics, with the chemistry of biology. Relativity and sensory network effects explain relative experience elegantly enough. A lot of the…

The hard problem has technological progress built into its definition. It defines problems of consciousness that can be solved by progress as the "soft" problems, and the problem that cannot be solved by progress as the "hard" problem. The hard problem doesn't say that a mechanism _hasn't_ been found, it says a mechanism _cannot_ be found. Like Gödel's incompleteness theorems or Heisenberg's uncertainty principle it…

Yep it’s not an interesting idea, the hard problem. We can never see outside our universe. We can’t know all states of matter ever. We can’t peek beyond the speed of light. We can solve a lot of problems we actually have without an answer (42, but what…)

Humans have a willingness to see truth in metaphor and analogy, and invent them to avoid accepting we’re just meat bags.

That’s what the hard problem of consciousness is to me; biological ideation run amok.

It has useful political effects, it can be used to disabuse the self righteous because it’s a purposeful thought ending monolith, nothing more.

We’ll keep iterating on our theories of the interaction of fields and matter and stop caring about the hard problem like we quit discussing luminiferous aether. We’ll stop seeing the literal edge of reality as a boundary on experience in the first place.

Re: We Are Beast Machines

#92

Post by chmsky00 »

PKop wrote: post #84
chmsky00 wrote: post #61

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The hard problem will be solved in time. My reasoning is that the people that defined it did so in a time when our science was less developed, so of course the problem seemed much harder. Information theory makes even the hard problem a matter of understanding interaction fields of physics, with the chemistry of biology. Relativity and sensory network effects explain relative experience elegantly enough. A lot of the…

>a matter of understanding There is also the possibility that our cognitive limits will prevent us from creating artificial intelligence and consciousness, even if it is materially possible.

Good, we don’t need AI.

I’d be more interested in augmented human intelligence. Growing neuron structures to speed the acquisition of skill and knowledge.

AI as we know it now is for empowering aristocrats. Here’s Googles data center empowering Google to make business choices that involve extracting effort from us.

I’d rather science and technology empower individuals uniquely and not be ground down to the fiscally prudent efforts.

Re: We Are Beast Machines

#93

Post by civilized »

Al-Khwarizmi wrote: post #25
bondarchuk wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you are going to demand a precise, non-handwavey answer to the hard problem, then you must first give the hard problem in a precise, non-handwavey way, or at the very least prove in a precise, non-handwavey way that there even is such a thing as the hard problem. As far as I've seen nobody has really done this, it's always just "what breathes fire into the equations?" "what is it like to be a bat?" "I just feel it…

I find the classical argument with color qualia very convincing (in fact, I thought about it before even knowing what qualia were...). Nothing you can find out about wavelengths, cones, rods, neurons and so on will tell you why you see red the specific way you do, and whether my perception of red corresponds to yours or my "red" is actually your "green". So there is a gap there, something that doesn't follow from the…

> Nothing you can find out about wavelengths, cones, rods, neurons and so on will tell you why you see red the specific way you do, and whether my perception of red corresponds to yours or my "red" is actually your "green".

This is begging the question. You're assuming that color qualia exist in the way that objects do. That "my red" and "your green" are not just properties of personal experience, but refer to objects that could be identified, drawn out, moved around and compared like the ordinary objects in our world.

The basic mistake of qualia theory is to assume that qualia share any of the properties of physical objects or even abstract concepts. That qualia are entities distinct and stable enough to be placed side by side, compared and contrasted, the way you could compare rocks or different software architectures.

I suspect that this makes about as much sense as asserting that square circles exist. You can say it, you can even kinda-sorta imagine it, but you can do that with a lot of things that fall apart on closer inspection.

For all we know, p-zombies are square circles. We think that they're a coherent concept because we can kinda-sorta imagine them, but we're nowhere near knowing that they're a coherent concept.

There is such a thing as trusting feelings and intuitions and imaginations too much, especially in the incredibly abstract context of somehow reifying your experiences and attempting to understand what they "are".

There are a lot of things that people used to feel strongly about, like "heavier objects fall faster". Many people still didn't believe Galileo was right when he proved it false with his experiments. Even when he did the experiment right before their eyes. The feelings and intuitions were too strong.

Such is the case with qualia, I think. I don't know if we'll ever be able to prove the intuitions wrong and illuminate the true nature of consciousness, like Galileo, but that doesn't mean our prescientific intuitions are correct by default. P-zombies and qualia are embellishments of our prescientific intuitions, not rigorous or scientific versions of them.

Re: We Are Beast Machines

#95

Post by eli_gottlieb »

unyttigfjelltol wrote: post #74
bondarchuk wrote: post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you are going to demand a precise, non-handwavey answer to the hard problem, then you must first give the hard problem in a precise, non-handwavey way, or at the very least prove in a precise, non-handwavey way that there even is such a thing as the hard problem. As far as I've seen nobody has really done this, it's always just "what breathes fire into the equations?" "what is it like to be a bat?" "I just feel it…

My question is simply " why am I me?" Why and how is my personal point of view fixed to this particular lump of meat and I never wake up one day as you ?

Because if you woke up as me, you'd be me.

Let's assume that consciousness works in roughly the way implied by your question: it exists, but it exists entirely separately from both the body and from mental contents.

Now, let's further assume that the scenario you're proposing actually happened. Last night, in our sleep, you and I switched souls. Yesterday's me is actually you now, and yesterday's you is actually me now.

How can either of us tell the difference? Clearly the contents of our consciousness - our memories, knowledge, skills, perceptions, emotions, etc. - are attached to the body, particularly the brain. This is just the assumption we started with. What, then, makes you you and me me? Clearly our souls aren't doing a very good job at telling the difference!

Re: We Are Beast Machines

#96

Post by ganzuul »

Robotbeat wrote: post #69
ganzuul wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Generally it is understood that qualia are not quantifiable.

Isn’t that begging the question?

I don't think so... I thought GP was explaining how they would be quantifying qualia, and pointed out that this is kind of against the definition of the word.

Maybe I missed something.

Re: We Are Beast Machines

#97

Post by hnthrway »

callesgg wrote: post #87
StuntPope wrote: post #29

Another materialist who has it exactly backwards. Consciousness is not an epiphenomenon of the brain. It is the base layer of reality.

Of subjective reality yes.

Which is all any of us have access to, and which all science is couched within

Objective reality is just consensus reality

Re: We Are Beast Machines

#98

Post by ganzuul »

joeberon wrote: post #41
ganzuul wrote: post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What Westerners need to be taught is different from the needs of other cultures. Seekers here are seldom lacking in their discernment, but very lacking in their empathy.

I haven't experienced that the teachings need to change personally, but yes the emphasis needs to. Unfortunately westerners are being fed teachings that are more like "this meditation will make you experience a sober LSD trip" and "this one will cure your depression" and "this will give you insight into the nature of reality", because that's what westerners want. But what they actually need is teachings on compassion…

AFAIK the ads don't really correspond to the content. Regardless if you are looking for weight loss, business success, or liberation, you come into contact with the same teachings because it does all of the above. It brings people in with concepts they are familiar with.

Re: We Are Beast Machines

#99

Post by rhn_mk1 »

adriand wrote: post #89
CuriouslyC wrote: post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You think your computer isn't conscious? How do you know? Just because it's not demonstrating free will? How many layers of error correction are built into computers to stifle the "randomness" of electronic equipment? Do you think you could still exercise free will locked in a padded room and strapped to a bed with a straightjacket?

There's a difference between knowing, and knowing how you know. I know my computer is not conscious even if I'm not entirely certain how I know. I chalk this up to the fact that, as a conscious animal with millions of years of evolutionary history, it is both beneficial and entirely natural for me to be able to recognize conscious beings when I encounter them. (It also helps that I know how to program computers and d…

That breaks down for anything that is not your kin though. "How do you know the computer is not conscious?" does not allow the answer "Because we are not kin". Best you can say is "Because we are not kin, I don't know". The dog example is illustrative of only half of the question.

Re: We Are Beast Machines

#100

Post by mtberatwork »

53r3PB9769ba wrote: post #34
joeberon wrote: post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So far the only answer I've seen people give to the question is "what problem? There's no problem". Basically, there are many people who don't (or also have convinced themselves that they don't) perceive an incongruity between their personal subjective experience and the idea that consciousness is just an emergent phenomena of a physical system. I haven't found a good way to explain it, I just know that there's somet…

I’m quite firmly in the “do not feel the incongruity” camp. What I'm about to say might make no sense at all, but I seem to remember (or at least think I do, it might be a false memory arising from thinking too much about it) slowly gaining consciousness in early childhood. I have a birthmark on the back of my hand and some of my earliest memories are triggered by noticing it and realizing I’m a separate being from o…

I think a lot discussion around consciousness focuses too much on the binary (e.g. either you have it or you don't), but I like to think of consciousness as a spectrum, with organisms falling into various points along that spectrum. Your take fits nicely into that picture I think.
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