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Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

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Re: Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

#121

Post by xenadu02 »

dls2016 wrote: post #36
throwanem wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Steve Jobs told employees a short story when they were promoted to vice president at Apple. Jobs would tell the VP that if the garbage in his office was not being emptied, Jobs would naturally demand an explanation from the janitor. "Well, the lock on the door was changed,' the janitor could reasonably respond. "And I couldn't get a key." > The janitor's response is reasonable. It's an understandable excuse. The ja…

Sounds like the mafia.

It means don't throw your people under the bus by blaming them and when something goes wrong take responsibility. When it goes wrong at the VP level it means an organizational failure and/or your failure to understand what your org was doing or your failure to train/hire good subordinates who could handle the details for you.

Re: Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

#122

Post by ummonk »

whoknowswhat11 wrote: post #103
ummonk wrote: post #56

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Ethiopian Airlines pilots followed the EAD to the letter. First, they attempted to adjust trim using electric stabilizer trim, and then upon realizing that the they were experiencing an uncommanded nose down stabilizer trim, they followed the runaway stabilizer procedure - namely, stab trim cutout and trim wheel grasp and hold. Afterwards, they attempted to adjust the stabilizer manually. There is a note in the E…

Is this a joke? ERROR: Literally the first paragraph of the EAD is about controlling airspeed. [Edit: This is not correct] They hit 700(!!) MPH. They literally commanded full take off power to accelerate the plane into the ground. You can add power if your pitch is high to arrest a sink rate (ie, during landing), but if you are pitched down, you pull power. There is also a 300 second limit on T/O power - I'd be inter…

The first paragraph of the EAD is:

"Disengage autopilot and control airplane pitch attitude with control column and main electric trim as required. If relaxing the column causes the trim to move, set stabilizer trim switches to CUTOUT. If runaway continues, hold the stabilizer trim wheel against rotation and trim the airplane manually."

Re: Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

#123

Post by quickthrower2 »

loeg wrote: post #97
topspin wrote: post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's not that simple. Sincere cooperation has value and is weighted by authorities, regardless of where it does or does not lead. Years served are based on such factors. Also, there are the civil suits. Standards of evidence are generally lower and a credible and cooperative peon has value to plaintiffs as they pursue the big targets.

How do the authorities distinguish sincere cooperation from fabricated deflection, in the absence of evidence?

I’m guessing it creates more probable cause for subpoenas and leverage in interviews and hopefully they find more evidence … or not.

Re: Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

#124

Post by roofwellhams »

user_7832 wrote: post #94
pdonis wrote: post #65

While I don't have any sympathy for this pilot, I also find the FAA's excuses here to be less than convincing. Basically, their position is "Well, we trusted this Boeing employee to tell us the truth about the new flight controls, and he didn't." But if the regulators had actually done their job and independently evaluated the new flight controls, they wouldn't have had to take the word of any Boeing employees. I rea…

What you talk about the FAA doing thier own testing and validation is (unfortunately) almost impossible. Back in the 90s, a senior FAA official (I think a Director) had said something along the lines of “The FAA does not and cannot check everything, we just see that companies are doing their tests.” The FAA would require several times more manpower to be able to actually audit or test everything, and that is assuming…

How can you be a regulator when you have no clue what are you doing?

Re: Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

#125

Post by ummonk »

atdrummond wrote: post #107
WalterBright wrote: post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That's not an instruction - it's a digression. The wording there is "can be used". Why do you think Boeing wrote an EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE and the FAA mandated it be sent to all MAX pilots? If you're a pilot, it is YOUR JOB to read, understand, and remember every EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE. Not to parse words. If you want to parse words, get a job as a lawyer, not a pilot. The "can be used" is the…

Please don’t flag replies like this; thankfully I was able to vouch for Walt. For some background, Walt and I are routinely brigaded with downvotes on 737 MAX threads. What he and I have in common, compared to those who engage in such behaviors, is that unlike those we typically are replying to, we both have extensive backgrounds in the aviation field, especially on the programming side. Back on topic, the takeaway t…

Why are you bringing up Lion Air pilots when the discussion is about the Ethiopian Airlines flight?

Re: Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

#126

Post by ImprovedSilence »

caf wrote: post #118
civilized wrote: post #18

Nailed for being the only guy stupid enough to write instant messages bragging about misleading the FAA. As a longtime corporate grunt, I can guess exactly how management leaned on him. He should have left and let the scumbags find another patsy to do their dirty work.

I don't think Chief Technical Pilot is a corporate grunt. It is a management position.

But without a doubt there would still be (even more) pressure on him from his bosses in that CTP position.

Re: Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

#127

Post by icecube123 »

rajrkrish wrote: post #104
bmitc wrote: post #102

Always seems like some person in the middle of these companies and regulators that always gets hit and not someone deeper in the companies or regulators. Not denying or affirming this person’s role, but it seems to be a pattern, whether it’s financial institutions, corporations, defense contractors, etc. and their associated regulatory bodies.

There is a term for it - Scapegoating.

Or CYA. Management is experts at "Covering Your Ass".

Re: Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

#128

Post by WalterBright »

atdrummond wrote: post #107
WalterBright wrote: post #67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> That's not an instruction - it's a digression. The wording there is "can be used". Why do you think Boeing wrote an EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE and the FAA mandated it be sent to all MAX pilots? If you're a pilot, it is YOUR JOB to read, understand, and remember every EMERGENCY AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE. Not to parse words. If you want to parse words, get a job as a lawyer, not a pilot. The "can be used" is the…

Please don’t flag replies like this; thankfully I was able to vouch for Walt. For some background, Walt and I are routinely brigaded with downvotes on 737 MAX threads. What he and I have in common, compared to those who engage in such behaviors, is that unlike those we typically are replying to, we both have extensive backgrounds in the aviation field, especially on the programming side. Back on topic, the takeaway t…

A clarification - my computing experience at Boeing was writing Fortran programs to solve design problems, not aviation software.

However, at Boeing I spent 3 years working on the stabilizer trim gearbox on the 757. The 757 system is a newer design than the 737, in that it uses a dual drive system connected via a differential gear system rather than having the manual wheels in the cockpit. Nevertheless, the difference is in detail, not concept. Both systems have cutoff switches within easy reach of the pilot, for a damn good reason - to stop uncontrolled stabilizer trim action. While the 757 did not have MCAS, it did have a computer autopilot that could move the stabilizer.

I did some searching online of the MAX trim system, and indeed the electric trim switches override MCAS commands. In all three incidents the pilots did override it and return the trim to normal.

In the first incident, after a couple times, the crew trimmed it to normal and then cutoff the stab trim. Continued the flight and landed without further incident.

In the second, the pilots brought it back to normal 25 times before the final plunge. For whatever reason, they never switched off the trim system.

I haven't got a solid reference to the EA one, but it appears they restored trim twice before the final plunge. They then turned off the trim system in the plunge. They could not turn the manual trim wheels due to the aerodynamic forces. So they turned the trim back on, the MCAS came on again making things worse. Why they did not counter again with the electric trim I do not know. Why they did not turn off the trim when it was in the normal position I do not know. Those are excellent questions for the NTSB to answer.

But what they didn't do was follow the directions in the EAD.

Re: Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

#129

Post by ErikVandeWater »

user_7832 wrote: post #94
pdonis wrote: post #65

While I don't have any sympathy for this pilot, I also find the FAA's excuses here to be less than convincing. Basically, their position is "Well, we trusted this Boeing employee to tell us the truth about the new flight controls, and he didn't." But if the regulators had actually done their job and independently evaluated the new flight controls, they wouldn't have had to take the word of any Boeing employees. I rea…

What you talk about the FAA doing thier own testing and validation is (unfortunately) almost impossible. Back in the 90s, a senior FAA official (I think a Director) had said something along the lines of “The FAA does not and cannot check everything, we just see that companies are doing their tests.” The FAA would require several times more manpower to be able to actually audit or test everything, and that is assuming…

> would require several times more manpower

Or they could be several times more efficient. $17.5 billion/yr can do a lot.

Re: Former Boeing 737 Max Chief Technical Pilot Indicted for Fraud

#130

Post by dhx »

Internal Boeing e-mails between various Chief Technical Pilots and other Boeing staff are available at [1]. It shows that there was an overarching requirement for the program to to ensure that 737 pilots could fly the 737 MAX with minimal "Level B" training (e.g. no need for hours of simulator training).

Per [2], MCAS was poorly designed and exhibited a failure mode (e.g. AOA sensor failure) that required immediate pilot action to avert disaster. For pilots that were aware of the MCAS failure mode and how to respond, simulation showed they could respond and avert disaster within typically 4 seconds. A delay of 10 seconds from a pilot to respond correctly to the failure event would be catastrophic.

A Boeing staffer wrote to the Chief Technical Pilot now indicted[^][1] regarding the pilot action required in those critical few seconds:

  "I fear that skill is not very intuitive any more with the younger pilots and those who have become too reliant on automation"
The Chief Technical Pilot now indicted[^] responds:

  "This is the path with least risk to Level B. We need to sell this as very intuitive basic pilot skill".
Boeing it appears then opted for updating Non-Normal Checklists (NNCs) for pilots instead of:

* Fixing the MCAS flaw to remove the failure mode altogether

* Ensuring pilots were trained to handle an MCAS failure in a simulator

* Otherwise ensuring that pilots were aware of the non-intuitive nature of MCAS and the particular failure mode requiring immediate If the failure mode with MCAS did occur, pilots didn't even have 10 seconds to find the NNC and go through the checklist steps before catastrophe was set to occur. They were not aware of MCAS being present on the aircraft and per the Boeing staffer raising the concern, "that skill is not very intuitive" in relation to acting on the failure mode should it have occurred.

[1] https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/Compressed%20...

[2] https://www.incose.org/docs/default-source/enchantment/21031...

[^] Assumed from job titles in the e-mails, as names are redacted.

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