I agree that we can’t reject the hypothesis that reality is continuous (and, even if spacetime turns out to be discrete, it seems hard to imagine that the amplitudes of the wavefunction(s) have finitely many possible complex values, though I suppose we can’t rule it out)
I disagree that this necessarily implies any difficulty for the possibility of brain scanning and AI.
Just as things sampled faster than the nyquist frequency (or twice it or whatever) of a uh, band limited thing, can be perfectly recovered, (I mean there’s still discritization of the amplitudes but I hear this can also be handled), I don’t see why uh, arbitrarily high frequency (in space and time) should be necessary in order to model the behavior of a brain to the point of long-term indistinguishability.
(That being said, I don’t particularly expect whole brain emulation to ever be achieved, I just don’t see “spacetime is continuous (or well approximated as continuous)” as being a strong argument for it being impossible.)
I’m not sure what you mean by computationalism.
If you mean the idea that the way the world works is computable in the abstract sense (not requiring any practical bounds on the computational resources needed), then the idea that the world is discrete and finite, merely with extremely fine grains, then this poses no issue for computation in that abstract sense (just make the imaginary computer even bigger).
If you mean like, an accurate simulation of the past of the world being run within the world, yeah that doesn’t work.