Earlier quoted context omitted.
> I really wish people would stop griping about losing security features when you flip the one switch that ensures the security of the system. Unlocking the bootloader means it is now possible to modify system files. Of course Safetynet is going to fail. The point of Safetynet is to ensure the system hasn't been tampered with. That's pretty much drinking the DRM koolaid. You can have both, verified boot and freedom.…
It is no longer a security theater when the user gets a malicious app installed, that takes over their bank management app.
Google shifting to “upstream first” Linux kernel approach for Android features
31–40 of 116 posts
Re: Google shifting to “upstream first” Linux kernel approach for Android features
#32I am afraid it does not matter any more, at least not for practical software freedom. Most Android devices these days have bootloaders that cannot be unlocked, preventing device owners from installing custom kernel images onto their devices. And even if you have a phone where that isn't true, Google's SafetyNet will prevent you from using many crucial applications, like your bank's Android app, on that handset. It's…
> Most Android devices these days have bootloaders that cannot be unlocked, preventing device owners from installing custom kernel images onto their devices. And even if you have a phone where that isn't true, Google's SafetyNet will prevent you from using many crucial applications, like your bank's Android app, on that handset. Googles own devices not only allow you to unlock the bootloader, but to relock it with yo…
This isn't always possible or realistic. The cheapest Pixel phone is worth 2+ median monthly salaries in my location.
Re: Google shifting to “upstream first” Linux kernel approach for Android features
#33Earlier quoted context omitted.
It is no longer a security theater when the user gets a malicious app installed, that takes over their bank management app.
Changing the root of trust doesn't mean applications can suddenly take over other applications. It also requires granting the malicious app sufficiently elevated permissions for that takeover. The user made several choices along the way. If your argument is that there's the possibility that they could make the wrong choice then this is in my opinion security theater because it posits that a thing can only be secured…
Not the user with a CS degree that knows what they are doing.
Re: Google shifting to “upstream first” Linux kernel approach for Android features
#34Earlier quoted context omitted.
> With Google's eventual transition to Fuschia OS I still have yet to see even the most remotely reliable source that indicates Fuschia is actually going to replace Android. Reminds me of when people were so absolutely sure that Android and ChromeOS were going to be merged. Never happened. I really wish people would stop repeating hare brained tech blog gossip and speculation as confirmed roadmaps.
Maybe some Gerrit commits will help, https://android-review.googlesource.com/q/fuchsia Also in case you missed, Android apps now run on ChromeOS.
In case you had problems comprehending it the first time, ChromeOS and Android were not *merged.*
The rumor has been around since 2015.
https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/29/9639950/google-combining...
Running ones' apps on another OS is not merging the two.
The ChromeOS/Android merger claims are still unsubstantiated. Pretty sure you'd find a fair number of AOSP/Android commits in the ChromeOS repos.
Still not convinced there's any actual evidence of Fuchsia replacing Android here.
Re: Google shifting to “upstream first” Linux kernel approach for Android features
#35With Google's eventual transition to Fuschia OS, the skeptic in me sees this as little more than an easy PR win before they begin to wind down new Android development.
> With Google's eventual transition to Fuschia OS I still have yet to see even the most remotely reliable source that indicates Fuschia is actually going to replace Android. Reminds me of when people were so absolutely sure that Android and ChromeOS were going to be merged. Never happened. I really wish people would stop repeating hare brained tech blog gossip and speculation as confirmed roadmaps.
Let’s come back in at least 8 years or a decade and we will see if ‘Fuchsia’ actually replaces Android and even ChromeOS then.
I won’t be surprised if they do, given that is where they are heading.
Re: Google shifting to “upstream first” Linux kernel approach for Android features
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
Changing the root of trust doesn't mean applications can suddenly take over other applications. It also requires granting the malicious app sufficiently elevated permissions for that takeover. The user made several choices along the way. If your argument is that there's the possibility that they could make the wrong choice then this is in my opinion security theater because it posits that a thing can only be secured…
On this kind of devices the security chain of trust needs to take into consideration the same kind of users that fill their Internet Explorer with random toolbars from website popups. Not the user with a CS degree that knows what they are doing.
And even if everyone were to install malware. There are other ways to secure banking. E.g. by providing an external token with a display. This is how hardware crypto wallets and some PIN generators for in-browser banking work. Or they could ask the owner to upload the attestation pubkey to their website, then the bank could still check if it's really their app that's running (as confirmed by the boot trust chain). I'm not sure how fingerprint scanners are tied into secure boot, maybe they could be used to verify user intent too.
Re: Google shifting to “upstream first” Linux kernel approach for Android features
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Most Android devices these days have bootloaders that cannot be unlocked, preventing device owners from installing custom kernel images onto their devices. And even if you have a phone where that isn't true, Google's SafetyNet will prevent you from using many crucial applications, like your bank's Android app, on that handset. Googles own devices not only allow you to unlock the bootloader, but to relock it with yo…
> Googles own devices not only allow you to unlock the bootloader, but to relock it with your own signing keys. And does it let you pass SafetyNet and run most of the apps. AFAIK it's not so re-lockable bootloader is useless.
Re: Google shifting to “upstream first” Linux kernel approach for Android features
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Most Android devices these days have bootloaders that cannot be unlocked, preventing device owners from installing custom kernel images onto their devices. And even if you have a phone where that isn't true, Google's SafetyNet will prevent you from using many crucial applications, like your bank's Android app, on that handset. Googles own devices not only allow you to unlock the bootloader, but to relock it with yo…
>vote with your wallet and don't complain how "most devices" don't give you feature you're not ready to pay for This isn't always possible or realistic. The cheapest Pixel phone is worth 2+ median monthly salaries in my location.
Re: Google shifting to “upstream first” Linux kernel approach for Android features
#39With Google's eventual transition to Fuschia OS, the skeptic in me sees this as little more than an easy PR win before they begin to wind down new Android development.
Why is it that nobody seems to be able to spell the word "fuchsia"?
I checked the other day and it's still true.
Re: Google shifting to “upstream first” Linux kernel approach for Android features
#40I am afraid it does not matter any more, at least not for practical software freedom. Most Android devices these days have bootloaders that cannot be unlocked, preventing device owners from installing custom kernel images onto their devices. And even if you have a phone where that isn't true, Google's SafetyNet will prevent you from using many crucial applications, like your bank's Android app, on that handset. It's…
Replacing OEM Android is only one part of the equation. There are many components that run with full privileges (EL2/EL3?) outside of Android and never subject to Android's sandbox. Well, at least until Google can force OEMs to stricter standards with their effort to KVMize those privileged executables [0]. If you do not trust the OEM, replacing its ROM with GrapheneOS / CalyxOS / LineageOS isn't going to help much a…