Student tracks Bluetooth headset wearers by wardriving around Oslo on a bicycle
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Re: Student tracks Bluetooth headset wearers by wardriving around Oslo on a bicycle
#2In Houston, TX, USA, I noticed antennas placed over individual highway lanes. It turns out they track the Bluetooth signals from cars to determine traffic. They even have a message on their website saying people should be more worried about license plate tracking.
https://www.houstontranstar.org/faq/traffictech.aspx
On the OEM infotainment center in my vehicle, I can't even find a way to turn off Bluetooth.
Re: Student tracks Bluetooth headset wearers by wardriving around Oslo on a bicycle
#3In Houston, TX, USA, I noticed antennas placed over individual highway lanes. It turns out they track the Bluetooth signals from cars to determine traffic. They even have a message on their website saying people should be more worried about license plate tracking. https://www.houstontranstar.org/faq/traffictech.aspx On the OEM infotainment center in my vehicle, I can't even find a way to turn off Bluetooth.
Similarly in NSW Australia they had installed similar antannas on traffic lights/traffic light boxes. Iirc they would also track Bluetooth signals. Not sure they tracked the OEM infotainment stuff or just the drivers phone Bluetooth IDs
Re: Student tracks Bluetooth headset wearers by wardriving around Oslo on a bicycle
#4I considered building a tool to have running that would capture WiFi/Bluetooth addresses of those around in case of a burglary, but I figured most devices anonymize their addresses nowadays.
Re: Student tracks Bluetooth headset wearers by wardriving around Oslo on a bicycle
#5I considered building a tool to have running that would capture WiFi/Bluetooth addresses of those around in case of a burglary, but I figured most devices anonymize their addresses nowadays.
You could have use a stingray to capture their IMSI
Re: Student tracks Bluetooth headset wearers by wardriving around Oslo on a bicycle
#6I considered building a tool to have running that would capture WiFi/Bluetooth addresses of those around in case of a burglary, but I figured most devices anonymize their addresses nowadays.
You could have use a stingray to capture their IMSI
It really annoys me that changing an IMEI is a crime in many countries. The mobile stack has tracing built in a low level, and is genuinely impossible to use anonymously.
Re: Student tracks Bluetooth headset wearers by wardriving around Oslo on a bicycle
#7Earlier quoted context omitted.
You could have use a stingray to capture their IMSI
It really annoys me that changing an IMEI is a crime in many countries. The mobile stack has tracing built in a low level, and is genuinely impossible to use anonymously.
Does it matter that you can't change the IMEI? Your IMSI identifies you anyway.
Re: Student tracks Bluetooth headset wearers by wardriving around Oslo on a bicycle
#8I considered building a tool to have running that would capture WiFi/Bluetooth addresses of those around in case of a burglary, but I figured most devices anonymize their addresses nowadays.
As far as I know the way Bluetooth is implemented in many devices prevents it from working if you change the MAC address all the time.
I've experienced this reliance on MAC addresses by trying to use Bluetooth headphones in a dual boot system. Every time I switch operating systems, I need to repair. Same with phones that have been factory reset. Peripherals seem to assume that a device (MAC address) uuniquely identifies the other end of the connection (which it actually is supposed to, so fair enough). You can probably use random addresses for scanning for new devices, but for any active use of the protocol you're going to need to stick to a given address. As long as you only use one device at a time, that address can probably be randomised for each device, but that's a hard sell that strongly limits how Bluetooth can be used.
Re: Student tracks Bluetooth headset wearers by wardriving around Oslo on a bicycle
#9I considered building a tool to have running that would capture WiFi/Bluetooth addresses of those around in case of a burglary, but I figured most devices anonymize their addresses nowadays.
As far as I know the way Bluetooth is implemented in many devices prevents it from working if you change the MAC address all the time. I've experienced this reliance on MAC addresses by trying to use Bluetooth headphones in a dual boot system. Every time I switch operating systems, I need to repair. Same with phones that have been factory reset. Peripherals seem to assume that a device (MAC address) uuniquely identif…
The Bluetooth classic, the variant which is typically used for audio and handsfree use cases, does not support address randomization. However, Bluetooth classic device does not necessarily need to be in discoverable mode for paired device to be able to connect. Typically they are discoverable only when they are set to some kind of pairing mode.
Bluetooth LE, which is used for wearables like smart watches etc, supports address randomization and it has mechanism for finding paired devices even though the address changes. Bluetooth LE devices must advertise for other devices to be able to connect. Many headsets nowadays use classic Bluetooth for audio streaming and handsfree but in addition they use Bluetooth LE for configuring the headset through their app. That is why the headsets are often advertising all the time.
As a side note, contact tracing apps are making our phones also to advertise. Fortunately they are using address randomization properly to ensure phones can't be tracked.
Re: Student tracks Bluetooth headset wearers by wardriving around Oslo on a bicycle
#10What's his gdpr policy?