Comments are full of gunpoint scenarios, but I think a far more likely scenario for most HN readers is law enforcement / customs agents asking you to unlock your device during travel or some other random checkpoint so they can scan it. In that case, I doubt the officer would even have a clue about the use of a duress password to selectively and silently delete some private data. I think the biggest risk would be that…
"You could even spawn a process to remove the pam_duress module so the threat actor won't be able to see if the duress module was available" This scenario was considered by the author
PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations
141–150 of 358 posts
Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations
#142Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know the legal implications, but if the duress password unlocks your device and simply deletes a directory or two, and the officer only asked you to unlock your device (without a warrant, by the way), how is that lying?
Even if it isn't lying, it's destruction of evidence. 18 U.S. Code 1519: > Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed u…
I mean, you’re not seeking to obstruct anything other than a federal agent looking at your personal pictures, which they explicitly do not need to fulfill their duty.
Now if you were removing evidence of your crimes.
Anyway, I know it doesn’t work that way, but I think it should.
Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations
#143Earlier quoted context omitted.
I worked at a place where the duress code was ROT5: 1234 was your normal access code, 6789 lerted security.
Could use the method in The Wire: press the key on the opposite side to the usual key (e.g. 8 instead of 2, 6 instead of 4, etc.)
Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations
#144Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations
#145Training is very important in duress systems. I once worked in a place with a keypad duress code on the security system. If you prefixed your security PIN with NN-, it was the duress version of the code and would trigger a silent alarm. This was setup long-ago, and not communicated. One night, the keypad was acting glitchy. Partially out of frustration (countdown is running), and partially to test, I ended up acciden…
I guess the system worked and I never forgot the correct prefix after that.
Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations
#146Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know the legal implications, but if the duress password unlocks your device and simply deletes a directory or two, and the officer only asked you to unlock your device (without a warrant, by the way), how is that lying?
Despite rumors to the contrary, the police aren’t stupid. They are trained to ask questions in ways that elicit a confession or falsehood. The simplest example is asking “Do you know why I pulled you over?”. Typically, people spontaneously confess to speeding, sometimes they break down and admit that someone is wrapped up in a rug in the trunk. The courts have consistently ruled that customs is different and you can…
Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations
#147Earlier quoted context omitted.
Even US Citizens are subject to search at the border without warrant or probable cause. Recently I had a CBP officer at SFO ask to search photo gallery when returning from vacation.
Does a US Citizen have to comply?
Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations
#148Earlier quoted context omitted.
Just do this in your script rm -rf /secret/files > /dev/null 2>&1 That pipes STDOUT to /dev/null and redirects STDERR to STDOUT.
Seems like this should be baked in to the module. There don't seem to be any circumstances where you would want stdout/stderr from duress.d scripts to appear.
Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations
#149I mean, that's pretty cool, but who enables password logins for SSH anymore? If I'm an attacker, I'm going to wonder why my target of duress is giving me a password and not a private key; most likely if I have access to my target of duress, then I have access to some kind of client / endpoint that my target uses to connect to the network, and that client will have the SSH private keys likely already loaded into ssh-a…
Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations
#150perhaps i could use that as a screensaver password to share with my girlfriend? it would close spreadsheets, emacs, un-mount journals and personal drives. PAM's used to reauth from the screen-saver, right?
Some partners expect to share passwords as a trust thing, but my work does not allow it (and most personal devices have access to work stuff).