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PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

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Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#51

Post by nudpiedo »

jeroenhd wrote: post #28
intellix wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

So you're saying if I'm held at gunpoint or forced to surrender my password at the US airport that a password to clear my account of anything would be useless? Neither of them know anything about me. It reminds me of the Trezor hardware wallet that allows you to have multiple passwords into your account. If your forced to give access you can log into the version with little in it. Nobody knows that you have secondary…

If you're held under gunpoint, that script that wipes your entire hard drive will only make your day worse. AFAIK if you actually get detained and questioned at airports, your drive will already get imaged before any password is even tried. You may be able to get away with this on a mobile device where this feature isn't generally expected (because who uses Linux on a smartphone in the first place). I always wonder a…

Why not honeypot into a docker with fake data? Everyone would be happy (during a first moment). Sure if the attacks t is well informed then they will double check whether the target they got in is real or not.

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#52

Post by dredmorbius »

anigbrowl wrote: post #37
ChrisMarshallNY wrote: post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It would need to be baked into the OS. With FaceID, I guess I could use eyes crossed, as a queue.

I do not understand why any security concerned person would use biometric identification for anything, ever.

If that's what's mandated, you may have little choice.

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#53

Post by dredmorbius »

akerl_ wrote: post #34
jrockway wrote: post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Depends on the crime, I guess. If you face execution for murder or treason because of the data on your hard drive, life in prison is an upgrade.

This is why I don’t keep evidence of committing murder/treason on my computer.

Evidentiary tests may change.

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#54

Post by nudpiedo »

shawnz wrote: post #40
jeroenhd wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If you're held under gunpoint, that script that wipes your entire hard drive will only make your day worse. AFAIK if you actually get detained and questioned at airports, your drive will already get imaged before any password is even tried. You may be able to get away with this on a mobile device where this feature isn't generally expected (because who uses Linux on a smartphone in the first place). I always wonder a…

What does it matter if your drive is imaged if you are using full disk encryption?

If the attack is in hot the data is unencrypted, so getting the login password will (usually) also give access to the unencrypted disk (already mounted)

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#55

Post by [deleted] »

nudpiedo wrote: post #54
shawnz wrote: post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What does it matter if your drive is imaged if you are using full disk encryption?

If the attack is in hot the data is unencrypted, so getting the login password will (usually) also give access to the unencrypted disk (already mounted)

[deleted]

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#56

Post by shawnz »

dredmorbius wrote: post #49
shawnz wrote: post #40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What does it matter if your drive is imaged if you are using full disk encryption?

https://xkcd.com/538/

The duress credentials are exactly how you avoid the "pipe wrench" scenario. The point of the FDE in that case is simply to prevent them from looking on the disk without your supervision.

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#57

Post by EamonnMR »

f1refly wrote: post #8

There's always a big issue with systems like this: Any sophisticated attacker will have an image of the machine he's trying to get into at hand to stop exactly what this pam module is trying to achieve from happening. All this would do is make you appear in a worse light to the deciding judge when it comes to trial or get your other kneecap shattered in a not so civil situation.

If your attacker has a full image of your system why are they bothering with duress?

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#58

Post by f1refly »

t0mas88 wrote: post #12
f1refly wrote: post #8

There's always a big issue with systems like this: Any sophisticated attacker will have an image of the machine he's trying to get into at hand to stop exactly what this pam module is trying to achieve from happening. All this would do is make you appear in a worse light to the deciding judge when it comes to trial or get your other kneecap shattered in a not so civil situation.

Lawenforcement yes, but I'm not sure most criminals are digital enough. Especially if it all looks just normal logged in, but in the background deletes some hidden files.

People who would want the data of someone knowledgable enough to install a custom pam module and write a script to utilize it are most likely also sophisticated and informed enough to know what to look for. This is not some street thug, it's most likely either law enforcement or organized crime who know very well what they want and that it's supposed to be on your machine.

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#59

Post by bartvk »

ChrisMarshallNY wrote: post #26
luismedel wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Exactly. It would be great to have a secondary pin (or my middle finger fingerprint, for example) in my phone to enter in a dummy environment with a few games, some family pics and so.

It would need to be baked into the OS. With FaceID, I guess I could use eyes crossed, as a queue.

That'd be neat. With Touch ID, it would be very intuitive to configure the middle finger as the trigger to run a duress script.

Re: PAM Duress – Alternate passwords for panic situations

#60

Post by [deleted] »

EamonnMR wrote: post #57
f1refly wrote: post #8

There's always a big issue with systems like this: Any sophisticated attacker will have an image of the machine he's trying to get into at hand to stop exactly what this pam module is trying to achieve from happening. All this would do is make you appear in a worse light to the deciding judge when it comes to trial or get your other kneecap shattered in a not so civil situation.

If your attacker has a full image of your system why are they bothering with duress?

[deleted]
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