Earlier quoted context omitted.
> like smartphones or phones in total, Apple just does not have a monopoly. A monopoly is not needed for anti-competitive behavior to be illegal. All that is needed is significant market power. Apple has 50% of the smartphone market. Which is around where courts have stated that anti-trust laws start to apply. 50% of a highly concentrated market is not a slam dunk anti-trust case, by any means, but it is within the r…
> A monopoly is not needed for anti-competitive behavior to be illegal. All that is needed is significant market power. Have any references where someone was sued for antitrust while having <50% marketshare (of course, using the market determined by the court at the time)? If what you say is true, is the cutoff for antitrust action just "when media outlets report on it long enough to actually be put in sight of regul…
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/370/294/
"In 1955, the date of this merger, Brown was the fourth largest manufacturer in the shoe industry, with sales of approximately 26 million pairs of shoes and assets of over $72,000,000 while Kinney had sales of about 8 million pairs of shoes and assets of about $18,000,000."
And even more relevant:
"Another important factor to consider is the trend toward concentration in the industry. It is true, of course, that the statute prohibits a given merger only if the effect of that merger may be substantially to lessen competition. But the very wording of § 7 requires a prognosis of the probable future effect of the merger.
The existence of a trend toward vertical integration, which the District Court found, is well substantiated by the record. Moreover, the court found a tendency of the acquiring manufacturers to become increasingly important sources of supply for their acquired outlets. The necessary corollary of these trends is the foreclosure of independent manufacturers from markets otherwise open to them. And because these trends are not the product of accident, but are rather the result of deliberate policies of Brown and other leading shoe manufacturers, account must be taken of these facts in order to predict the probable future consequences of this merger. It is against this background of continuing concentration that the present merger must be viewed."