> As we’ve explained in Deeplinks blog posts, Apple’s planned phone-scanning system opens the door to broader abuses. It decreases privacy for all iCloud photo users, and the parental notification system is a shift away from strong end-to-end encryption. It will tempt liberal democratic regimes to increase surveillance, and likely bring even great pressures from regimes that already have online censorship ensconced i…
> It only weakens privacy for iCloud photos if you have CP or photos in a CP database Who controls what is in the database? What independent oversight ensures that it’s only CSAM images? The public certainly can’t audit it. What is stopping the CCP from putting pro-Uighur or Xi Winnie the Pooh images into the database? Or from the US using this to locate images that are interesting from an intelligence perspective (S…
...but they don't have to do anything that elaborate because Apple is using powerful cryptography against their users to protect themselves and their data sources from any accountability for the content of the database: The hashes in the database are hidden from everyone who isn't Apple or a state agent. There is no opportunity to learn, much less challenge the content of the database.
[1] https://github.com/AsuharietYgvar/AppleNeuralHash2ONNX/issue...