Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why would anyone bother with such an attack? The end result is that some peon at Apple has to look at the images and mark them as not CSAM. You've cost someone a bit of privacy, but that's it.
Okay, let's play peon. Here are three perfectly legal and work-safe thumbnails of a famous singer: https://imgur.com/a/j40fMex . The singer is underage in precisely one of the three photos. Can you decide which one? If your account has a large number of safety vouchers that trigger a CSAM match, then Apple will gather enough fragments to reassemble a secret key X (unique to your device) which they can use to decrypt…
> Given the ability to produce hash collisions, an adversary can easily generate photos that fail this visual inspection as well.
Apple could easily fix this by also showing a low-res version of the CSAM image that was collided with, but I'll grant that they may not be able to do that legally (and reviewers probably don't want to look at actual CSAM).