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> By taking advantage of the birthday paradox, and a collision search algorithm that let me search in n(log n) time instead of the naive n^2 Someone got more details on that? How does the birthday paradox come into play here?
For example, a year ago I was trying to track down how some unscrupulous photos ended up in my photo library. I finally realized that Telegram had, without my knowing permission, been adding all photos I had received in a crypto discussion group to my Apple photo library.
There seem many ripe opportunities for targeting.
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That’s the same as what Apple is going to do - scan right before sending to iCloud
The same as what Apple is saying it's going to do , there's a difference.
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That is literally the status quo with every cloud service. Apple, unlike the others, has said that they will evaluate you on the basis of what’s included in the associated data of your safety voucher, and you can inspect those contents because they’re shipped in the client. Facebook, for all I know, might be calculating a child predator likelihood score on my account based on how often I look up my middle school ex-g…
I don't think we can just appeal to the status quo here and assume it's acceptable. There's a couple reasons. First, how many people really understood this previously? Did society at large actually knowingly accept the current state of things, or did it just happen without most people realizing it? Even here on HN where we'd expect to find people way more knowledgeable about it than in general I'm not sure how well k…
This literally only works once you willing send photos to iCloud.
> it's not obvious how we can trust that a rogue actor (like a foreign government) couldn't add non-CSAM hashes to the list to root out human rights advocates or political rivals. Apple has tried to mitigate this by requiring two countries to agree to add a file to the list, but the process for this seems opaque and ripe for abuse. If the CCP says "put these hashes in your database or we will halt all iPhone sales in…
Presumably Apple would be afraid that, say, the EU becomes suspicious, issues a court order to obtain the hashes, notices they cannot audit the CCP hashes, pointedly asks "what is this", becomes absolutely livid that their citizens are spied on by a country that is not them, fines Apple out the wazoo, then extradites whoever is responsible and puts them in prison. I mean, China's not the only player in this. Putting…
EU, China, Iran, US: everyone gets to spy on their own children and forbid whatever they want.
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This is already possible with PhotoDNA. When has it happened?
Your browser cache is not being synced to iCloud; Apple doesn't see it. So no, it is not currently possible.
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The OP mentions that two countries have to agree to add a file to the list, but your concern is definitely valid: > Perhaps the most concerning part of the whole scheme is the database itself. Since the original images are (understandably) not available for inspection, it's not obvious how we can trust that a rogue actor (like a foreign government) couldn't add non-CSAM hashes to the list to root out human rights adv…
What if those two countries can be Poland and Hungary? These two countries have been passing lots of laws to ostracize and criminalize pro-LGBT content and are friendly to each other.
It's not like China, or India, who not only have huge markets, but could easily hold a chunk of Apple's supply chain hostage.
It's very easy to uphold human rights if it doesn't actually cost you anything.
It doesn’t matter if there are collisions if the two images don’t actually look the same. Do people honestly believe a single CSAM flag from an “innocent” image is going to result in someone going to prison in America? PhotoDNA has existed for over a decade doing the same thing with no instances that I have heard of. If some corrupt government wants to get you they don’t need this. They can just unilaterally say you’…
At least part of the concern is that a hash collision is basically "cause" for Apple to then dump and begin manually (like, with humans) reviewing the contents of your device, all of which will be happening behind the closed doors of a private corporation, outside of any of the usual oversight or innocent-presumption mechanisms that come from it happening through the courts. That, combined with a (pretty reasonable)…
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I would expect Apple to say the same thing if the CCP proposed a system of scanning devices last month. I fail to see how this system changes the calculus for how Apple will deal with authoritarian governments. If Apple could stand up to them before this system, why can't they stand up to them with this system?
Apple doesn't stand up to authoritarian governments. They give direct access of their systems to the US and Chinese governments already.