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Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

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71–80 of 363 posts

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#71

Ok so now all we have to do is get a phone, load it with adversarial images that have hashes from the CSAM database and we wait and see what happens. Basically a honeypot. Get some top civil rights attorneys involved. Take the case to the Supreme Court. Get precedence set right. Lawfare

Where would you get the CSAM hashes?

The client has to be able to check for them in some way - just run that algorithm against every image you can scrape from Tor/Freenet and I suspect you'll have results rather quickly.

Or you can probably just wait a minute and pay an... enterprising individual to sell you such a list on a darknet market though, or perhaps even find one posted on the clearnet soon enough.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I posted another comment that was misunderstood as well. Folks, no one is proposing to download actual CSAM images to your photo lib. You could be duped thinking you downloaded an image of a beautiful sunset which was carefully manipulated to match the hash of an actual CSAM image.

The parent was proposing to “just send known CSAM”. But OK, say someone sends you a sunset that fools the hasher. Then what? Of course one match won’t do anything, so you’d need to download however many matching sunsets. Then what? The Apple reviewer would see they’re sunsets and you’d challenge the flag saying they’re sunsets. And if somehow NCMEC got involved, they’d see they’re just sunsets. And if law enforcement…

The point isn't to trick NCMEC, but rather create a DoS attack so no actual triggers can get through the noise.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#73

This is just getting wilder and wilder by the day, how spectacularly this move has backfired. As others have commented, at this point all you need is someone willing to sell you the CSAM hashes on the darknet, and this system is transparently broken. Until that day, just send known CSAM to any person you'd like to get in trouble (make sure they have icloud sync enabled), be it your neighbour or a political figure, an…

Why wait? Just send them the pictures on Facebook Messenger or Gmail or Dropbox today.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#74

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Also as dannyw pointed out, you don't even have to send CSAM to trigger the system. If they found you you would still be charged, but not with possession of CSAM.

What exactly would you be charged with? Why would law enforcement even be involved in a case of false positives?

The sender would of course be charged with wasting police efforts, defamation attempts+++. In the case of false positives the receiver of course wouldn't be charged, it's more about the fact that this system can be manipulated with too much ease. Even if you're not charged, an investigation takes time away from already limited law enforcement resources. I'm also not interested in buying products from a company that blatantly spies on me. Today it's CSAM, but as others have pointed out, the hashes can be changed to look for anything.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#75

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I meant * could *. My point is that social engineering is a clear weak link in this system. They can also be sent regular photos whose hash matches the database, or use this repo to transform a regular pornographic photo's hash, making it hard for manual confirmation on Apple's part.

What kind of social engineering would lead an innocent person to save known CSAM to their photo library?

None needed. You could just send a photo to the target through WhatsApp, and the photo would be automatically synced with iCloud.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#76

This is just getting wilder and wilder by the day, how spectacularly this move has backfired. As others have commented, at this point all you need is someone willing to sell you the CSAM hashes on the darknet, and this system is transparently broken. Until that day, just send known CSAM to any person you'd like to get in trouble (make sure they have icloud sync enabled), be it your neighbour or a political figure, an…

Why wait? Just send them the pictures on Facebook Messenger or Gmail or Dropbox today.

Nah that's so 2020, 2021 is all about low resolution legitimate porn being transformed to match CSAM. Get with the times!

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#78

Some people seem to be confused why a hash collision of a cat and a dog matters. Here's a potential attack: share (legal) NSFW pictures that are engineered to have a hash collision with CSAM to get someone else in trouble. The pictures are flagged as CSAM, and they also look suspicious to a human reviewer (maybe not enough context in the image to identify the subject's age). To show that this can be done with real NS…

Does anyone save porn to their personal photo libraries? Especially porn as suspicious as the image you posted?

Going by what some people on Reddit say, it seems to be the case. https://old.reddit.com/r/datahoarder/search?q=porn&restrict_...

Probably not the weird image I posted, which looks obviously suspicious. But maybe someone will make a program to find "cleaner" hash collisions that don't look suspicious.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#79

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I meant * could *. My point is that social engineering is a clear weak link in this system. They can also be sent regular photos whose hash matches the database, or use this repo to transform a regular pornographic photo's hash, making it hard for manual confirmation on Apple's part.

What kind of social engineering would lead an innocent person to save known CSAM to their photo library?

If some commenters can be believed about their experience with the database, there are a bunch of completely innocuous images in it because they're from the same photosets or distributed alongside CSAM.

Is that enough to cause an investigation? Maybe, maybe not, but I wouldn't want it to be a risk.

Re: Show HN: Neural-hash-collider – Find target hash collisions for NeuralHash

#80
post #35

So, what does Apple get out of all this, except negative attention, erosion of their image, possible privacy lawsuits, etc? I just don't understand what Apple's motivation would have been here. Surely this fallout could have been anticipated?

Is it like other stories I hear on HN where one guy or team is trying to get a promotion so keeps pushing their project? And people were afraid to oppose it? I’m baffled how this kept going up to implementation even in the birthplace of the reality distortion field.
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