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Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy – and press freedom

freedom.press

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Re: Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy – and press freedom

#61
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

1) The DB must be updated on both the server and the client. Apple's solution requires the DBs to match, essentially. So you can't update the DB without everyone knowing it was changed. 2) Apple has trillions of dollars to lose by selling out to a shitty change like that. Do those things mean nothing bad can come of it? Hell no. But, right now we have FISA courts and silent warrants sucking in data without anyone kno…

Apple can’t be selling out if they literally have no way of knowing what is in the database of illicit content. That is why they said that the content has to be in two separate nation’s databases. Of course, there is no information that I’ve seen about what other nation’s db they would use. And without another nation, there will be no content in the database? I doubt it. Regardless, it’s a moot issue, since we alread…

Five eyes already does whatever the heck they want, and this isn’t going to change that.

Re: Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy – and press freedom

#62
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Why does anyone even assume that a bad actor would need to apply pressure? These databases are unauditable by design -- all they'd need to do is hand Apple their own database of "CSAM fingerprints collected by our own local law enforcement that are more relevant in this region" (filled with political images of course), and ask Apple to apply their standard CSAM reporting rules. That's it... Tyranny complete.

1) The DB must be updated on both the server and the client. Apple's solution requires the DBs to match, essentially. So you can't update the DB without everyone knowing it was changed. 2) Apple has trillions of dollars to lose by selling out to a shitty change like that. Do those things mean nothing bad can come of it? Hell no. But, right now we have FISA courts and silent warrants sucking in data without anyone kno…

>1) The DB must be updated on both the server and the client. Apple's solution requires the DBs to match, essentially. So you can't update the DB without everyone knowing it was changed.

Yes... Because it is impossible for different servers to be configured as backends depending on where handsets are destined to be sold. It's not like it's possible to quickly whip up a geolocation aware API that can swap things out on the fly. C'mon. This isn't even hard. These are all trivially surmountable problems. The one thing standing in the way of already having done this, was there was no way in hell anyone would have been daft enough to even try doing something like this with a straight face. For heaven sake, even Hollywood lampshaded it with that "using cell phones as broadband sensors" shtick in the Dark Knight or whatever it was.

>This is a political fight, and if we all act like ideologues we're going to lose it all in the end.

The fight was lost the moment someone caved to "think of the children". Every last warning sign that has been left all over the intellectual landscape ignored, history, risk, human nature, any semblance of good sense ignored.

Honestly, I'm sitting here scratching my head wondering if I took a wrong turn or something 20 years ago. This isn't even close to the place I lived anymore.

Re: Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy – and press freedom

#63
Apple has lost the nerds and I can’t think of a time that has ever gone well for a company. We are the people advising other people what to get, what is cool. I can’t think of anything less cool than an iPhone right now.

I dumped mine and I don’t think I’m alone.

Re: Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy – and press freedom

#64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ten years from now we will read a leaked document stating that US authorities requested FISA Courts warrants (or similar) and made Apple scan for things other than csam. It already happened. Court orders are easier than hacks once you iron out the legal opinions.

Even if that's true, this method at least drops some part of the process on the client where it can be inspected, vs. all scanning happening in the cloud, entirely behind closed doors. Does that mean nothing bad can happen? No. But it does mean that when something changes, we at least know something changed.

The database will change every update. It’s not like the NCEMC db already has all possible CSAM. Every time they find more, they add it to the DB. Thus, it will probably change every time Apple pushes an OS update.

Re: Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy – and press freedom

#65
post #23

This technology will soon be out of Apple’s control. Higgins correctly highlights the immense pressure Apple will get from governments and other actors to bend the technology and use it for something else than csam. It will happen, people are probably already thinking how to apply such pressure. Sooner or later Apple will cave in and they will have only themselves to blame when freedom supports in Sudan or LGBTQ acti…

Since it’s speculation at this point, I’d say we deal with it if and when it happens. I also don’t see how this doesn’t apply even worse to doing cloud side scanning, like companies otherwise do. Is that out of control? Is there any evidence of that?

>I’d say we deal with it if and when it happens.

By the time we know that it is happening it will be far more difficult to do something about it (see Snowden and the Patriot Act).

Re: Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy – and press freedom

#66
post #4

Of course. Politicians and officials hate whistleblowers far more than pedophiles, and it's obvious this mechanism will be used to find future Chelsea Mannings and Reality Winners with better opsec to make examples out of them.

How? I'd love to be convinced that this mechanism could be easily extended to any content at any time without it being totally obvious to the rest of us that it's being used that way.

Not OP and not speaking with any authority on this more just curious:

If alongside this Apple rolled out the ability for them to initiate a scan on any phone for any thing (not a tool for mass surveillance but targeted surveillance) how would we know given Apples closed ecosystem?

This doesn't necessarily speak to the issue here but more to the Apple ethos in general, but I am curious.

Re: Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy – and press freedom

#67

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Sure, you're totally right. But right now all that data is available to Apple. If they wanted to they could just generate a set of keys, replicate one of your iCloud devices, and send all your iMessages to a 3rd party, etc. If CSAM scanning is coming, show me a better solution. I don't think there's a world ahead of us that doesn't include it for all platform-hosted photos.

I reject the premise that CSAM scanning is a solution to anything, especially if the goal is to E2EE encrypt the rest of the photos. My understanding from following this debacle is that law-enforcement don't have resources to investigate everyone who just have CSAM they focus on people who match and have other photos of novel abuse they can track down, and here they will only get an account name and a list of 30 CSAM…

I agree it’s not a real solution to a crime problem.

Still seems to be the direction the political winds are blowing.

Re: Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy – and press freedom

#68
post #24

This technology will soon be out of Apple’s control. Higgins correctly highlights the immense pressure Apple will get from governments and other actors to bend the technology and use it for something else than csam. It will happen, people are probably already thinking how to apply such pressure. Sooner or later Apple will cave in and they will have only themselves to blame when freedom supports in Sudan or LGBTQ acti…

Why does anyone even assume that a bad actor would need to apply pressure? These databases are unauditable by design -- all they'd need to do is hand Apple their own database of "CSAM fingerprints collected by our own local law enforcement that are more relevant in this region" (filled with political images of course), and ask Apple to apply their standard CSAM reporting rules. That's it... Tyranny complete.

Apple does not need to be able to audit the database to discover that it is not a CSAM database. Matches are reviewed by Apple before being reported to the authorities, so they would see that they are getting matches on non-CSAM material.

They wouldn't necessarily be able to tell if it was a false positive matching real CSAM material or a true positive matching illegitimate material in the databases put there by a government trying to misuse it, but they don't need to know whether it is or not. They just need to see that it isn't CSAM and so does not need to be reported.

Re: Apple’s device surveillance plan is a threat to user privacy – and press freedom

#69

Earlier quoted context omitted.

One possibility is that they'd like to go E2EE with all iCloud data, including photos, and this lets them do that without the politics (DC level) falling out against them.

I doubt it, considering they give up customers' data when the government requests it for 150,000 users/accounts a year[1]. Not only do they choose to give data when requested, they have to comply with court orders, as well. Also, governments care about much more than just CSAM. They care about terrorism, drug manufacturing, drug and human trafficking, organized crime, gangs, fraud etc. This speculation only makes sen…

I’ll take the other side of this and bet that Apple offers the ability to remove themselves from escrowing iCloud keys before they expand CSAM detection to other kinds of content. Nerd points are at stake.
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