Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’
211–220 of 465 posts
Re: Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’
#212Am I the only one who finds no issue with this? Personally I’d prefer this than no encryption and scanning in the cloud, which is already possible. All of the slippery slope arguments have already been possible for nearly a decade now with the cloud. Can someone illustrate something wrong with this that’s not already possible today. Fundamentally unless you audited the client and the server yourself either (client or…
That doesn't make it ok. The fact that you and my mom have normalized bad behavior doesn't make it any less offensive to my civil liberties.
> Am I the only one who finds no issue with this?
If you only think about the first order effects. This is great, we catch a bunch of kid sex pedos. The second order effects are much more dire. "slippery slope" sure... but false arrests, lives ruined based on mere investigations revealing nothing, expanding the role of government peering in to our personal lives, resulting suicides, corporations launching these programs - then defending them - then expanding them due to government pressure is *guaranteed*, additional PR and propaganda from corporations and government for further invasion in our personal lives due to the marketed/claimed success of these programs. The FBI has been putting massive pressure on Apple for years, due to the dominance and security measures of iOS.
Say what you want about the death penalty, but many many innocent people have dead in a truly horrific way, with some actually being tortured while being executed. That is a perfect example of second order effects on something most of us without any further information (ending murderous villains is a good thing) would agree on. So many Death Row inmates have been exonerated and vindicated.
edit: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_exonerated_death_row_i...
Re: Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’
#213Earlier quoted context omitted.
ON YOUR DEVICE (where it's encrypted in a way that Apple can't read until the 30 image threshold is crossed) is more private than doing the same scan on server where a single false positive can be misused by anyone who can get a subpoena.
what kind of encryption can't be decrypted until some threshold has been crossed? maybe you mean to say that apple says they won't read it until that threshold has been crossed.
>Apple is unable to process individual vouchers; instead, all the properties of our system mean that it’s only once an account has accumulated a collection of vouchers associated with illegal, known CSAM images that we are able to learn anything about the user’s account.
Now, why to do it is because, as you said, this is something that will provide that detection capability while preserving user privacy.
https://techcrunch.com/2021/08/10/interview-apples-head-of-p...
Meanwhile, a single false positive from an on server scan is open to malicious use by anyone who can get a subpeona.
Re: Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’
#214Earlier quoted context omitted.
Making it obviously and unquestionably more invasive.
I just don't get this. Say you're given two options when going through the TSA. 1. The TSA agent opens your luggage and searches everything for banned items. 2. The TSA agent hands you a scanner for you to wave over your luggage in private, it prints out a receipt of banned items it saw, and you present that receipt to the agent. Which one is more invasive?
The scanner technology can also be used for detecting dissident journalism, but they say it won't be, it is just for preventing terrorism, but still they say, they really need to install it in your house even though it is only for scanning when you intend on going to the airport.
Re: Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’
#215Earlier quoted context omitted.
No - the reporting is absolutely terrible here. 1) These are more share similar visual features than crypto hashes. 2) HN posters have been claiming that apple reviewing flagged photos is a felony -> because HN commentators are claiming flagged photos are somehow "known" CASM - this is also likely totally false. The images may not be CASM and the idea that a moderation queue results in felony charges is near ridiculo…
>> those opinions should have the name of a lawyer on them. Not going to happen. Lawyers in the US have issues with offering unsolicited advice, and other problems with issuing advice into states where they are not admitted. So likely none of the US lawyers (and the great many more law students) here will ever put their real name to a comment.
Re: Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’
#216Earlier quoted context omitted.
Making it obviously and unquestionably more invasive.
I just don't get this. Say you're given two options when going through the TSA. 1. The TSA agent opens your luggage and searches everything for banned items. 2. The TSA agent hands you a scanner for you to wave over your luggage in private, it prints out a receipt of banned items it saw, and you present that receipt to the agent. Which one is more invasive?
Re: Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’
#217Earlier quoted context omitted.
The issue is that as soon as you set that precedent, it’s only a matter of time before it extends beyond iCloud. That’s the problem with doing any device-level scanning. This is dystopian and scary. And yes I understand the technology in its current iteration. The current form has problems (weaponizing collisions etc) but the real issue comes with future developments.
Was scanning server side not a precedent?
But here appears to be beyond the pale such that people are saying "this far, no farther!"
Re: Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’
#218Earlier quoted context omitted.
Apple has declared in interviews that the slope shall not be slipped, but you're indicating that they chose this specifically because they can slip that slope. How did you determine that their intentions contradict their words? Please share the framework for your belief, so that we're able to understand how you arrived at that belief and to evaluate your evidence with an open mind. (Or, if your claim is unsupported c…
“IMHO” means “in my humble opinion”
Re: Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’
#219Earlier quoted context omitted.
Making it obviously and unquestionably more invasive.
I just don't get this. Say you're given two options when going through the TSA. 1. The TSA agent opens your luggage and searches everything for banned items. 2. The TSA agent hands you a scanner for you to wave over your luggage in private, it prints out a receipt of banned items it saw, and you present that receipt to the agent. Which one is more invasive?
Re: Apple defends anti-child abuse imagery tech after claims of ‘hash collisions’
#220Earlier quoted context omitted.
Apple controls the hardware, software, and cloud service. It was always a pinky promise that they wouldn't look at your files. I don't know why we should doubt that pinky promise less today than we did a month ago.
Should they even be doing that though? It seems like a matter of time before it's possible to SWAT somebody by sending them a series of hash colliding image files given how not cryptographically secure the hash algorithm is. I think I'm not the only one who'd rather not have my devices call the cops on me in a country where the cops are already way too violent.