If you piss off the wrong crowd they're going to drop a small bag with white powder in your photo gallery app if you know what I mean. Along with event logs and all.
Good luck!
Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model
91–100 of 725 posts
Re: Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model
#92Expectation : Political rivals and enemies of powerful people will be taken out because c-ild pornography will be found in their phone. Pegasus can already monitor and exfiltrate every ounce of data right now, it won't be that hard to insert compromising images on the infected device. Any news about "c-ild porn" being found on someone's phone is suspect now. This has been done before : 1) https://www.deccanchronicle.…
Isn't it weird how it is weaponized against political enemies but the one person everyone knows did engage in exploitation was protected for decades?
Selective prosecution.
Re: Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model
#93[deleted]
Re: Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model
#94How can you use it for targeted attacks? This is what would need to happen: 1. Attacker generates images that collide with known CSAM material in the database (the NeuralHashes of which, unless I'm mistaken, are not available) 2. Attacker sends that to innocent person 3. Innocent person accepts and stores the picture 4. Actually, need to run step 1-3 at least 30 times 5. Innocent person has iCloud syncing enabled 6.…
"How can you use it for targeted attacks?" Just insert a known CSAM image on target's device. Done. I presume this could be used against a rival political party to ruin their reputation - insert bunch of CSAM images on their devices. "Party X is revealed as an abuse ring". This goes oh-so-very-nicely with Qanon conspiracy theories which even don't require any evidence to propagate widely. Wait for Apple to find the i…
FL Rep Randy Fine filed a report with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement that the sheriff was going to plant CSAM on his computer and arrest him for it.
They are even in the same political party.
https://www.reddit.com/r/321/comments/jt32rs/fdle_report_bet...
Re: Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model
#95How can you use it for targeted attacks? This is what would need to happen: 1. Attacker generates images that collide with known CSAM material in the database (the NeuralHashes of which, unless I'm mistaken, are not available) 2. Attacker sends that to innocent person 3. Innocent person accepts and stores the picture 4. Actually, need to run step 1-3 at least 30 times 5. Innocent person has iCloud syncing enabled 6.…
> 4. Actually, need to run step 1-3 at least 30 times
Depending on how the secret sharing is used in Apple PSI, it may be possible that duplicating the same image 30 times would be enough.
Re: Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model
#96Apple's scheme includes operators manually verifying a low-res version of each image matching CSAM databases before any intervention. Of course, grey noise will never pass for CSAM and will fail that step. The fact that you can randomly manipulate random noise until it matches the hash of an arbitrary image is not surprising. The real challenge is generating a real image that could be mistaken for CSAM at low res + i…
> Apple's scheme includes operators manually verifying a low-res version of each image
The reviewer, likely on a minimum wage, will report images just in case. Nobody would like to be dragged through the mud because they didn't report something they thought it is innocent.
Re: Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model
#97How can you use it for targeted attacks? This is what would need to happen: 1. Attacker generates images that collide with known CSAM material in the database (the NeuralHashes of which, unless I'm mistaken, are not available) 2. Attacker sends that to innocent person 3. Innocent person accepts and stores the picture 4. Actually, need to run step 1-3 at least 30 times 5. Innocent person has iCloud syncing enabled 6.…
I'm sure the reviewers will definitely be able to give each reported image enough time and attention they need, much like the people youtube employs to review videos discussing and exposing animal abuse, holocaust denial and other controversial topics.
Difference in volume. Images that trip CSAM hash are a lot rarer than the content you just described.
Re: Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model
#98Yes, just like rape accusations. It doesn't matter that you prove it was false afterwards. Edit : well that was a hint to Assange of course. Probably not true in general. So yes, I mean false accusations.
Why is this getting downvoted? It’s very true, just the accusation of committing such a crime (regardless of whether the person was acquitted or not) can easily ruin many facets of a persons’ life.
Julian Assange and Jake Appelbaum being prime examples of this.
Re: Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model
#99Does this algorithm work for the reverse goal (i.e. can content that would trip the CSAM hash be perturbed enough to avoid it without compromising quality of the underlying image)?
To my mind, that's far more disquieting than the risk of someone staging and elaborate attack on an enemy's device.
Re: Hash collision in Apple NeuralHash model
#100Yes, just like rape accusations. It doesn't matter that you prove it was false afterwards. Edit : well that was a hint to Assange of course. Probably not true in general. So yes, I mean false accusations.
Vouched, because as I understand the comment, people must not be reading past 'rape' and just gut-flagging with completely the wrong impression.
> people must not be reading past 'rape' and just gut-flagging with completely the wrong impression.
Which is pretty ironic, considering that kind of reaction is exactly what the comment is about.