I assume this is some sort of machine learning algorithm. How did they get the data set to train it on? That seems really strange. How did they test it? Seems like any engineers involved on this would come out with PTSD. Whatever they used to test it and train it with is illegal to possess and could only be used with some sort of massive government cooperation.
Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
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Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#342Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#343Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because if (willBeUploaded) { scanPhoto(); } can become if (true) { scanPhoto(); } Obviously, this is stupidly oversimplified, I have no idea how Apple has structured their code. But the fact of the matter is, if the scanning routine is already on the phone, and the photos are on the phone, all anyone has to do is change which photos get scanned by the routine...
Right, but the CSAM scanning routine is absurdly narrow and difficult to use for detecting anything but CSAM, whereas a general purpose hash matching algorithm really is just a few lines of code. This whole ‘now that they have a scanner it’s easier’ reasoning doesn’t make sense. iOS already had numerous better matching algorithms if your goal is to do general spying.
It can target a pride flag just as easily as CP.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#344NCMEC is a private charity. Why isn’t this being handled by law enforcement? Is this the beginning of the age of vigilante justice?
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#345Earlier quoted context omitted.
No. It’s way more complex than that, and has been engineered to prevent exactly that scenario. I recommend you actually check out some of Apple’s material on this. The idea that it’s just a list or fingerprints or hashes that can easily be repurposed is simply wrong, but is the root of almost all of the complaints.
I've looked through Apple's paper, what are you referring to?
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#346This CSAM Prevention initiative by Apple is a 180 degress change of their general message around privacy. Imagine investing hundreds of millions of dollars in pro-privacy programs, privacy features, privacy marketing, etc... just to pull this reverse card. Of course this is going to spark concern within their own ranks. It's like working for a food company that claims to use organic, non-processed, fair-trade ingredi…
I actually think something else happened, and to be honest I think many at Apple behind this decision are likely pretty surprised by the blowback. That is, it seems like Apple really wanted to preserve "end-to-end" encryption, but they needed to do something to address the CSAM issue lest governments come down on them hard. Thus, my guess is, at least at the beginning, they saw this as a strong win for privacy. As th…
For content that is pirated Apple would receive a slap on the wrist, but for content that shows the exploitation of children? And that Apple is hosting on their owned servers? There is no doubt every government will throw their full legal weight behind that case.
Now they are stuck between a rock and a hard place. Do they or do they not look at iCloud Photos? Well, not in the cloud i guess, but right before you upload them. Is that any better? I don't know? Probably not. They really have no choice though. They either scan in the cloud of scan on the device. Scanning in the cloud would at least let people know where their content truly stands, but then they can't advertise end-to-end encryption and on paper it may have felt like a bigger reversal.
I think the long and short answer is. Apple cannot really legally protect your privacy when it comes to data stored on their servers. The end.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#347Can someone explain how Apple being coaxed or coerced into searching all of our personal devices for illegal files by federal law enforcement is not an unconstitutional warrantless search?
My money is this is secretly about nuclear, bio, chemical or other WMD or “dangerous” material. I can’t imagine that Apple would be so stupid to open such a Pandora’s box to an Orwellian state and crimes against all children in the name of making no statistical difference in the porn problem. There has got to be a hidden story here and severe pressure on top executives, otherwise I can’t see how the math makes sense.…
Is the pornography the problem, or is the the abuse of children?
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#348Can someone explain how Apple being coaxed or coerced into searching all of our personal devices for illegal files by federal law enforcement is not an unconstitutional warrantless search?
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#349Earlier quoted context omitted.
Can you expand upon what you mean by "feels different because you supposedly own the device"? Just want to get a clearer idea of what you're saying. How does it feel?
I just mean that there's an intuitive sense of ownership over a physical device that you don't have over data stored in the cloud. My point is that this distinction is artificial. You don't really own the (software on the) device, but you should own the data the company is processing on your behalf. Whether this processing happens on the physical device or in the cloud seems like an irrelevant distinction.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#350Apple's track record on user protection compared to Google or Samsung has been very good. For example, resisting wide net Federal "because terrorism" warrants as much as they legally can. There's a reason why Apple 0 day exploits sell for way more on the black market than Android exploits. Trust is hard to earn, easy to lose and even harder to regain. User trust is such a huge part of Apple's business and success, it…
The fire was spreading, and Apple went along to announce it publicly. It was too late to argue for reading their materials properly. In-device scanning was on everyone’s head.
Some have argued, that leak was even intentional to lower pressures on new regulations. Or it was just whistleblowing.
But there is a lot of evidence, that Apple is going closer to full E2EE with this PSI system, and original goal might have been announce everything in incoming iPhone event. That might have ended even into the positive light.