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The Problem with Perceptual Hashes

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Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes

#361
post #302

Earlier quoted context omitted.

https://reason.com/2021/05/13/the-police-dog-who-cried-drugs... > Similar patterns abound nationwide, suggesting that Karma's career was not unusual. Lex, a drug detection dog in Illinois, alerted for narcotics 93 percent of the time during roadside sniffs, but was wrong in more than 40 percent of cases. Sella, a drug detection dog in Florida, gave false alerts 53 percent of the time. Bono, a drug detection dog in Vi…

I've had my bag sniffed at airports at least 50 times, and they've never stopped me. So there must be something else going on as well

Airport dogs (at least in the baggage claim area) are not sniffing for drugs. They alert on food products that aren’t allowed.

Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes

#362
Given that Apple technology uses NN and triplet embedding loss, the exact same techniques used by neural networks for face recognition, so maybe the same shortcomings would apply here. For example a team of researchers found a 'Master Faces' that can bypass over 40% of Facial ID. Now suppose that you have such an image in your photo library, it would generate so many false positives …

Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes

#364
post #359

Earlier quoted context omitted.

https://reason.com/2021/05/13/the-police-dog-who-cried-drugs... > Similar patterns abound nationwide, suggesting that Karma's career was not unusual. Lex, a drug detection dog in Illinois, alerted for narcotics 93 percent of the time during roadside sniffs, but was wrong in more than 40 percent of cases. Sella, a drug detection dog in Florida, gave false alerts 53 percent of the time. Bono, a drug detection dog in Vi…

I was pulled over in West Baton Rouge in 2009, we were driving east in an empty rental box truck after helping a friend move back to Tx. It was 1am, we were pulled over on a BS pretense (weaving across lanes when we signaled a lane change because they had someone else pulled over, so we obeyed the law of pulling over a lane to give them room). I denied their request to search the truck, they had no reason. They calle…

Yikes. Seems like the biggest group of people making a mockery of the south is the southerners like this guy who insist on acting like cartoonish southern stereotypes.

I should also add that dogs and many other animals really like pleasing people. So one doesn't even have to consciously train for outcomes like this. A famous example is Clever Hans, the horse that supposedly could read, do math, and answer questions like "If the eighth day of the month comes on a Tuesday, what is the date of the following Friday?" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clever_Hans

Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes

#365
post #234
post #123

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Solve it the old way. In fairness, in the "old way" it was impossible for two random people to communicate in real-time between continents without the ability of authorities to observe/break it. Privacy and security is quite important, but let's not lose track of the fact that there are many tools authorities have lost in the past few decades. In WWII major powers weren't able to have the same security of military…

The difference is that previously you had to be targeted and intercepted. Thinking that someone is listening was something that paranoid people would do. Now your device is actually watching you and reporting you. Today only for child porn but there’s no technical reason of it not being extended to anything.

> The difference is that previously you had to be targeted and intercepted

This is also true, to some degree. I believe all calls to the USSR were monitored, for instance. But the dragnet is thrown much further these days.

Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes

#366

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Genuinely curious, why? This scanning was already happening server-side in your iCloud photos, just like Google Photos, etc. Now they are removing it from server-side to client-side (which still require this photo to be hosted in iCloud) What changed, really?

You answered your own question and still don’t get it.

Then perhaps you could explain it? I also don't understand why server-side versus client-side CSAM inspection makes a big difference.

Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes

#367
post #172
post #156

Earlier quoted context omitted.

With you up to here, but this is jumping the shark > I bet you, after the next election in the US your device will be reporting you for spreading far right or deep state lies, depending on who wins. The US is becoming less stable, sure [1], but there is still a very strong culture of free speech, particularly political speech. I put the odds that your device will be reporting on that within 4 years as approximately 0…

Did you literally not see a former president effectively get silenced in the public sphere by 3 corporations? How can you seriously believe that these corporations (who are not subject to the first amendment, and cannot be challenged in court) won't extend and abuse this technology to tackle "domestic extremism" but broadly covering political views?

Those companies can definitely be challenged in courts. But they also have rights, including things like freedom of speech and freedom of association, which is why they win when challenged on this. Why do you think a former president and claimed billionaire should have special rights to their property?

Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes

#368

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They look at content that people actively and explicitly chose to share with wider audiences.

While that's a snappy response, it doesn't seem to have much to do with the concern about perverts getting jobs specifically to view child abuse footage, which is what I thought this thread was about.

I didn't think that was what it's about... Because that didn't even occur to me. Thanks for pointing it out.

Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes

#369

I've also implemented perceptual hashing algorithms for use in the real world. Article is correct, there really is no way to eliminate false positives while still catching minor changes (say, resizing, cropping, or watermarking). I'm sure I'm not the only person with naked pictures of my wife. Do you really want a false positive to result in your intimate moments getting shared around some outsourced boiler room for…

I, too, have worked on similar detection technology using state of the art neural networks. There is no way there won't be false positives, I suspect many, many more than true positives. It is very likely that as a result of this, thousands of innocent people will have their most private of images viewed by unaccountable strangers, will be wrongly suspected or even tried and sentenced. This includes children, teenage…

Microsoft, Facebook, Google and Apple have scanned data stored on their servers for CSAM for over a decade already. The difference is that Apple is moving the scan on-device. Has there been any report of even a single person who's been a victim of a PhotoDNA false positive in those ten years? I'm not trying to wave away the concerns about on-device privacy, but I'd want evidence that a such significant scale of wrongful conviction is plausible as a result of Apple's change.

I can believe that a couple of false positives would inevitably occur assuming Apple has good intentions (which is not a given), but I'm not seeing how thousands could be wrongfully prosecuted unless Apple weren't using the system like they state they will. At least in the US, I'm not seeing how a conviction can be made on the basis of a perceptual hash alone without the actual CSAM. The courts would still need the actual evidence to prosecute people. Getting people arrested on a doctored meme that causes a hash collision would at most waste the court's time, and it would only damage the credibility of perceptual hashing systems in future cases. Also, thousands of PhotoDNA false positives being reported in public court cases would only cause Apple's reputation to collapse. They seem to have enough confidence that such an extreme false positive rate is not possible to the point of implementing this change. And I don't see how just moving the hashing workload to the device fundamentally changes the actual hashing mechanism and increases the chance of wrongful conviction over the current status quo of serverside scanning (assuming that it only applies to images uploaded to iCloud, which could change of course). The proper time to be outraged at the wrongful conviction problem was ten years ago, when the major tech companies started to adopt PhotoDNA.

On the other hand, if we're talking about what the CCP might do, I would completely agree.

Re: The Problem with Perceptual Hashes

#370

Given all the zero day exploits on iOS I wonder if it's now going to be viable to hack someone's phone and upload child porn to their account. Apple with happily flag the photos and then, likely, get those people arrested. Now they have to, in practice, prove they were hacked which might be impossible. Will either ruin their reputation or put them in jail for a long time. Given past witch hunts it could be decades be…

You don't even need hacking for this to be abused by malevolent actors. A wife in a bad marriage could simply take nude pictures of their child to falsely accuse her husband. This tech is just ripe for all kind of abuses.

That picture wouldn't already be in the CSAM database...
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