181–190 of 430 posts
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And HN's mistake is thinking any of this will matter. Apple only cares about money, always has, always will. And I'm willing to bet they are going to continue beating their revenue and profit record quarter after quarter. When their actions do not affect the one thing they care about, why should they care what anyone says?
Ah ok, so as long as it is profitable ethics don't matter. Got it.
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Pictures is just a pretense. Step #2 will be URLs of pictures that users send each other using the phone's keyboard. Step #3 will quietly expand the definition of a URL to any keyboard input. At that point, Apple will have a god's eye view into all communications of their users, be it over WhatsApp, Signal, SMS or an online forum. Imagine having a dashboard that shows in realtime with gps coordinates how many text me…
I started writing an explanation of how you're mistaken, and then I realised just how quickly you went from Apple using a very common method for identifying CSAM (which Facebook already uses, yet I've not really heard much in the way of complaints about that) to Apple wanting to listen for keywords in phone calls, and just how unlikely it is you'd reasonably think through my response.
Does Facebook scan local files?
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> Once a hash matches, law enforcement would need a subpoena to access the raw image. Not if Apple provides it to them without a subpoena.
That still doesn't change how discovery or the courts work.
I really don’t understand why apple is doing this. What point are they trying to score and from whom ? Do they think implementing a spyware in iPhone would boost sales? Or does it bring revenue from charging government agency to use this feature? I just don’t get it.
New legislation in a given country could be passed forcing a Apple to do this. Someone who cares about such things would self store their own data IMO
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This client side scanning of local files can be easily extended to scan the whole device. That's why the eff was calling it a backdoor. All it takes is for the right govt to put the right preassure on apple. In a way it's kinda worse than a backdoor since your phone is actively reporting any suspicious looking files to the authority all the time on its own. The govt dosent need to actively look for it. Just add the a…
> This client side scanning of local files can be easily extended to scan the whole device Correct, Apple can access unencrypted files stored on your device. > That's why the eff was calling it a backdoor Accessing unencrypted files on a device is not a backdoor > actively reporting any suspicious looking files to the authority all the time on its own Yep, that's a problem. Not a backdoor, though.
In what weird universe is this even remotely true?
If we pretend for a minute, which may not be hard, that Apple isn't trying to "think of the children" - this feature seems like a good step to protect themselves from the legal implications of having CP on their servers. I don't know what all the ramifications would be, but I imagine that if a CP ring was discovered using iCloud as a storage medium, Apple could get in a some big trouble.
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Pictures is just a pretense. Step #2 will be URLs of pictures that users send each other using the phone's keyboard. Step #3 will quietly expand the definition of a URL to any keyboard input. At that point, Apple will have a god's eye view into all communications of their users, be it over WhatsApp, Signal, SMS or an online forum. Imagine having a dashboard that shows in realtime with gps coordinates how many text me…
I started writing an explanation of how you're mistaken, and then I realised just how quickly you went from Apple using a very common method for identifying CSAM (which Facebook already uses, yet I've not really heard much in the way of complaints about that) to Apple wanting to listen for keywords in phone calls, and just how unlikely it is you'd reasonably think through my response.
A company looking at content uploaded to servers they own is quite different from a company spying on the contents of a device they don’t own.
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Sometimes the slippery slope is not a fallacy, but the natural consequence of seeking more control. This feature can be horribly misused in the future, for example, to find people who have sent/received/downloaded Tiannanmen pictures, because instant messaging pictures can be automatically added to your albums. You can't trust a feature whose only impediment from being abused in the future is such pinky promise.
Pictures is just a pretense. Step #2 will be URLs of pictures that users send each other using the phone's keyboard. Step #3 will quietly expand the definition of a URL to any keyboard input. At that point, Apple will have a god's eye view into all communications of their users, be it over WhatsApp, Signal, SMS or an online forum. Imagine having a dashboard that shows in realtime with gps coordinates how many text me…
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Now that a fully built system for breaking end-to-end encryption is shipped directly in the OS, we're one configuration change away from massive scope creep. First terrorist content, then "misinformation", then political speech. Apple will be unable to resist government demands to use this preexisting backdoor with a different set of perceptual hashes.
Disabling end to end encryption is always “one configuration change” away, presumably by substituting keys. How closely do you keep track of which keys are used to encrypt Health data - which is end to end encrypted - versus photos - which are not?
This is Apple explicitly announcing they are actively backdooring all iOS and Mac devices, and using your CPU cycles to determine whether you should be reported to the government.