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In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

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Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#171

Unfortunalty if our experience from the past with such events teaches us anything, it's that a minority of us will stop using apple products (or keep not doing it) but the rest of the world will quickly forget and carry on as usual. Worse, if your decision to not use an iphone makes others people life slightly anoying for 2 seconds a week, many will bash on you. As a FOSS user with no FB nor whatsapp account that ask…

There is no viable option if you want a quality smartphone.

Androids spy on you already.

Apple will be spying on you.

The dark side of economies of scale.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#172
post #156
post #149

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think asking ourselves if this is a slippery slope is a valid part of discussing what's actually happening right now.

Appealing to the slippery slope is itself a fallacy. "While this image may be insightful for understanding the character of the fallacy, it represents a misunderstanding of the nature of the causal relations between events. Every causal claim requires a separate argument. Hence, any "slipping" to be found is only in the clumsy thinking of the arguer, who has failed to provide sufficient evidence that one causally exp…

Arguing that someones point is false, simply because it contains a fallacy, is also a fallacy: https://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Fallacy_fallacy

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#173
post #144
post #114

Let’s not confuse the 2 parts that Apple is implementing; - one is parental control, it’s upon request, uses ML, it’s “local” (that is, it’s sent to the parent) - the other one is plain hash matching, which does not “save the children” but rather is “catch the viewer” — exclusively. This has no impact on the abuse of the CSAM subjects because it only matches publicly-known content. I don’t know why NCMEC is excited s…

'the other one is plain hash matching, which does not “save the children” but rather is “catch the viewer” — exclusively. This has no impact on the abuse of the CSAM subjects because it only matches publicly-known content.' Are you claiming victims of child sexual abuse wouldn't care if images of the abuse are circulating freely and being viewed with impunity by pedophiles?

Read the note:

> many thousands of sexually exploited victimized children will be rescued

This does not aid rescue.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#174
post #156
post #149

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think asking ourselves if this is a slippery slope is a valid part of discussing what's actually happening right now.

Appealing to the slippery slope is itself a fallacy. "While this image may be insightful for understanding the character of the fallacy, it represents a misunderstanding of the nature of the causal relations between events. Every causal claim requires a separate argument. Hence, any "slipping" to be found is only in the clumsy thinking of the arguer, who has failed to provide sufficient evidence that one causally exp…

ok first off that slippery slope referred to here is the domino theory - which is a faulty idea of the causality of events - we can say a slippery slope regarding events is likely faulty because unless the causal chain between any two events is very tightly linked our understanding of causality is not sufficient to understand it. That is to say we have a very tight link between a domino falling, hitting another domino and toppling it, but we do not have a very tight link between a country going communist and then another one later. Hence, every causal claim requires a separate argument.

The slippery slopes being discussed here are not about events and the causes that link them, but about the applications of technology and to a certain extent about laws being used beyond their original mandate. This kind of slippery slope is a logical one.

Thus the technology being used for this mean that it can be used for other things - what kinds of things can it be used for? Are there things that people would like to make illegal or that are illegal now that this technology can be used catch people infringing on these hypothetical laws. Thus - if we allow this technology in our devices now are we opening ourselves up for other potential uses for the technology in the future that will hurt us.

If this argument seems the same to you as the domino theory and that we must take every hypothetical problem when it actually occurs I wonder how you are ever able to plan for any eventuality?

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#175
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think the suggestion is that a hash of a police uniform will be used to convict of CP but rather the idea that a new law will be passed that - in order to protect the police from 'harassment' - will outlaw taking pictures of the police. So in that case in discovery the picture of a police officer would be evidence that you broke that hypothetical law. The technology deployed to protect the children opens up t…

> would be evidence that you broke that hypothetical law Hypothetical situations are not an argument to real world discussions. Sure, if that happened, it'd be terrible. But, that's not happening....

Does this mean you believe we should throw away all conspiracy[1] laws?

[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conspiracy_(criminal)

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#176

Apple's mistake is that they seemingly believe there is pushback because people misunderstand how it works. The reality is more nuanced: People understand exactly how it works, and how it works is that it is turn-key onboard spyware, that Apple pinky-swears isn't being used wrong today . For example if the scope/mission expands (e.g. foreign governments), suddenly you've created a drag-net for whatever "badness" is o…

A good way to think about any potential law like this is to imagine your worst enemy or most hated politician was given power to abuse said law, and then think about all the ways they could use it to make your life miserable

always think about the worst case scenario when it comes to privacy, because that will be the end result

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#177

Take a close look at the way this works. If there are enough hash matches, Apple apparently gets to look at all the pictures on the phone. The description says "threshold reached, all content visible and unlocked". "All", not "Matched". Matches can be forced from the outside, by sending pictures to the phone. They don't even have to be from the known-bad image set. Using an adversarial system to try to create hash ma…

Anyone can already do that by sending a iOS user an incriminating message via airdrop or sharing an album. Unless this search is limited to only photos saved to the personal Photos Album, all apps on the iOS device become an evidence plant attack vector including the built in mail app, third party apps that can accept image messages or have planted illegal images, and even iMessage.

This is especially important given that NSO Group's Pegasus' works through sending multimedia iMessages/WhatsApps with exploits. The former auto-uploads to iCloud, and the latter can be configured to auto-upload all received media to iCloud.

It almost sounds like a feature Apple is building to explicitly support the imprisonment of dissents through tje false planting of child pornography.

What the actual f--k?

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#178
post #162

Take a close look at the way this works. If there are enough hash matches, Apple apparently gets to look at all the pictures on the phone. The description says "threshold reached, all content visible and unlocked". "All", not "Matched". Matches can be forced from the outside, by sending pictures to the phone. They don't even have to be from the known-bad image set. Using an adversarial system to try to create hash ma…

Even regardless of whether it's all photos or all matched photos, the issue is that Apple is actively and publicly building adversarial black boxes that run on your device, on a OS level (on iOS AND macs!), with the sole and explicit goal of snitching on you to the government for possessing information that is deemed wrong. The actual specifics of what material is currently deemed wrong is irrelevant, because it will…

I don't see why this is surprising at all. Apple has never cared about the privacy of their Chinese users. Privacy was never a principle for them, merely a marketing feature for technically illiterate westerners.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#179
post #134

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think the suggestion is that a hash of a police uniform will be used to convict of CP but rather the idea that a new law will be passed that - in order to protect the police from 'harassment' - will outlaw taking pictures of the police. So in that case in discovery the picture of a police officer would be evidence that you broke that hypothetical law. The technology deployed to protect the children opens up t…

> would be evidence that you broke that hypothetical law Hypothetical situations are not an argument to real world discussions. Sure, if that happened, it'd be terrible. But, that's not happening....

Yes, they are. The point is that this change make this hypothetical too close to being true so the change should be abandoned. It skews the power balance too much into the hands of a small number of unknown people so the rest are protesting.

Re: In internal memo, Apple addresses concerns around new Photo scanning features

#180
post #144
post #114

Let’s not confuse the 2 parts that Apple is implementing; - one is parental control, it’s upon request, uses ML, it’s “local” (that is, it’s sent to the parent) - the other one is plain hash matching, which does not “save the children” but rather is “catch the viewer” — exclusively. This has no impact on the abuse of the CSAM subjects because it only matches publicly-known content. I don’t know why NCMEC is excited s…

'the other one is plain hash matching, which does not “save the children” but rather is “catch the viewer” — exclusively. This has no impact on the abuse of the CSAM subjects because it only matches publicly-known content.' Are you claiming victims of child sexual abuse wouldn't care if images of the abuse are circulating freely and being viewed with impunity by pedophiles?

So stop the circulating. This is like trying to stop people from using drugs by searching EVERYONE’S homes and reporting suspicious looking substances.
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