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Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view

blog.quintarelli.it

201–210 of 318 posts

Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view

#201
post #113

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Problem is that this scanning is necessarily fuzzy and there is going to be a false positive rate to it. And the way that you'll find out that you've tripped a false positive is that the SWAT team will knock your door down and kill your dog (at a minimum). Not true. Hash matches are to be human reviewed. So no, people won't get "swatted" accidentally as you allege. The other concerns people have been voicing are ce…

>Hash matches are to be human reviewed. Until it proves too expensive, then a different AI system will do it instead. I have zero faith that it'll be a fully competent, well trained, well rested, well paid person will actually be doing these reviews in the long run.

Or Mechanical Turked.

Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view

#202
post #131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The government controls the hash list.

No. A registered charity called The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children controls the hash list. Yes, they are partly government funded, but I highly doubt they'd let their mission be compromised by allowing the government to inject non-CP hashes. Doing so would compromise all the work they've performed over the last four decades. These people are (rightfully) very passionate about their work and can't…

> No. A registered charity called The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children controls the hash list.

Are you aware of the ties to them and the Clinton foundation? I mean, the joke right there that Bill was flying to Epstein’s private island 26 times or so, Maxwell was a guest at Chelsea’s wedding, and their foundation is setting up the NCMEC. Classic Clintons.

Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view

#203
post #148
post #131

Earlier quoted context omitted.

No. A registered charity called The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children controls the hash list. Yes, they are partly government funded, but I highly doubt they'd let their mission be compromised by allowing the government to inject non-CP hashes. Doing so would compromise all the work they've performed over the last four decades. These people are (rightfully) very passionate about their work and can't…

> by allowing the government to inject non-CP hashes I don't think "allowing" is the concern here, because I highly doubt they get to generate the hashes themselves.

Why not? How can we know this isn’t the case? What technical or practical prevention would there be?

Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view

#205
post #191
post #184

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The law doesn't require them to actively go around scanning for it.

They’re scanning for it as it enters their system. It’s only scanned if it’s set to go to iCloud.

Yes, but then there's a way to upload it in plaintext. That's the backdoor. That can, and will, eventually be used to exfiltrate any file, anytime, whether it would be going to the cloud or not.

Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view

#206

Can I just say that I'm fascinated that this is happening under Tim Apple - an openly gay man in his 60s? I mean this is someone who would know what being on the wrong side of law means - not only federally, but probably quite intimately since Alabama was not exactly known for its acceptance of homosexual people. Now just imagine if the US still had anti-homosexuality laws (like the majority of the world still does)…

His name is Tim Cook. Good points though

Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view

#207

Earlier quoted context omitted.

commenting here as I share the same exact sentiment. I guess I am going to look into LineageOS which falls in the de-googled category but im not sure I am in love with that idea. edit: Whoa, 2K for that purism phone. fuckin' a.

The standard ( https://shop.puri.sm/shop/librem-5/ ) is cheaper - i guess the USA one comes with a large uptick for locally sourcing?

Yep, having spec’d a few boards for assembly in the usa and China, the manufacturing costs seems to always be about double for USA fabrication.

Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view

#208

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Alternatively, and just as likely, is that the Republicans do the same evil things that you say the Democrats would do. Misusing tech isn't just for the "other" side, my friend.

Yeah that was particularly weird comment for GP to make just 6 months after Republicans stormed the Capitol on the command of a Republican President to hang government officials and overturn an election.

What's more galling is that an anti-authoritarian stance should be non-partisan in a country that sells itself on democracy and liberty

Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view

#209
post #143

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Remember that it only scans against a known database of already found content, and does not try to find new content.

Is this true? The message triggers try to identify nudity within the accounts of minors. Is the notification only going to the parent? Is it stored for possible later use? Are those photos ever reviewed?

Excellent point. The messaging triggers for nudity in child accounts would imply that there is a separate, on-device scanning capability that has nothing to do with hash matching. Taken together with the backdoor for data exfiltration, and considering these come in the same announcement, there's no reason not to consider them part of the same spyware framework.

Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view

#210
post #145

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes but my understanding is that the hashes are perceptual, as opposed to cryptographic. If the system was matching against known cryptographic hashes the collision / false positive rate would be small, but the fuzzy matching involved with perceptual hashing necessarily has a greater false positive rate. And that doesn’t even begin to address the detection of sent and received “explicit images” which are detected on…

I suspect that's why they have some threshold that moves the false positive rate to one in one trillion. The iMessage bit is different - it's only on device, only on child accounts, and only alerts parents. It's more akin to a parental control feature than anything else.

It was pretty dumb of Apple to announce both of these things at the same time.

They have nothing to do with each other, and I've seen a dozen people on HN confuse them. If the message is getting muddled here, it will be hopelessly conflated in less technical circles.

I'm concerned and upset about the CSAM filter for all the reasons that keep hitting the front page, but don't care about the opt-in parental controls at all, and if I had kids, I might want them.

But if I thought the CSAM filter worked like the nudie-detector filter, I'd be wigging out.

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