Earlier quoted context omitted.
If you truly want to "protect the children" you should have no issue for the police to visit and inspect your, and all of your neighbors houses. Every few days. Unannounced, of course. And if you were to resist, you MUST be a pedophile who is actively abusing children in their basement.
I'm actually more OK with unannounced inspections of my basement (within reason) than with some government agents reading through my files all the time.
Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow
711–720 of 757 posts
Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow
#712Earlier quoted context omitted.
That seems like a real problem, and of course it could be misused, however nothing so far revealed actually tells us whether it is possible. E.g. how the hashes are computed, where they come from, and what happens when a positive match is detected. Until we have a clear understanding of these things, the rest is just speculation.
The hashes will of course be provided by local governments, who have the ultimate authority (because they can forbid Apple to sell there, and Tim Cook never says no to money).
Money citizens of those countries want to give him.
Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow
#713Earlier quoted context omitted.
>I would add that people have generated legal images that match the hashes. That seems like a realistic attack. Since the hash list is public (has to be for client side scanning), you could likely set your computer to grind out a matching image hash but of some meme which you then distribute.
The NCMEC hash list is private, and adversarial attacks require running gradient descent and being able to generate a hash value for arbitrary input.
Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow
#714Earlier quoted context omitted.
Not an American, but shouldn't you be able to FOIA this?
The NCMEC, who manages the CSAM database, is a private organization.
It's kind of like the PCAOB... private 501.3(c) with congressional oversight and funding.
I think the strategy is that the organization is able to do more for helping children internationally if they're not seen as part of the Justice department and the executive, which after the debacle with CBP and "kids in cages", was probably the right call.
Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow
#715Earlier quoted context omitted.
I believe both you and the other poster, but I still haven't seen anyone give an example of a false positive match they've observed. Was it an actual image of a person? Were they clothed? etc. It's very concerning if the fuzzy hash is too fuzzy, but I'm curious to know just how fuzzy it is.
There are examples (from the OP, but in reply tweets) in the submission.
So, it's theoretical, it's a different algorithm, and it's a case where someone is specifically trying to find collisions via machine learning. (Perhaps by "reversing" the hash back to something similar to the original content.)
The two above posters claim that they saw cases where there was a false positive match from the actual official CSAM hash algorithm on some benign files that happened to be on a hard drive; not something deliberately crafted to collide with any hashes.
Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow
#716Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Simple nudity does not count inherently. That’s not entirely true. If a police officer finds you in possession of a quantity of CP, especially of multiple different children, you’ll at least be brought in for questioning if not arrested/tried/convicted, whether the images were sexualized or not. > nor would it ever end up in a database That’s a bold blanket statement coming from someone who correctly argued that NC…
I believe both you and the other poster, but I still haven't seen anyone give an example of a false positive match they've observed. Was it an actual image of a person? Were they clothed? etc. It's very concerning if the fuzzy hash is too fuzzy, but I'm curious to know just how fuzzy it is.
Some of the false positives were of people, others weren’t. It’s not that the hashing function itself was problematic, but that the database of hashes had hashes which weren’t of CP content, as the chance of a collision was way lower than the false positive rate (my guess is it was “data entry” type mistakes by NCMEC, but I have no proof to back up that theory). I made it a point to never personally see any content which matched against NCMEC’s database until it was deemed “safe” as I didn’t want anything to do with it (both from a disgusted perspective and also from a legal risk perspective), but I had coworkers who had to investigate every match and I felt so bad for them.
In the case of PhotoDNA, the hash is conceptually similar to an MD5 or a SHA1 hash of the file. The difference between PhotoDNA and your normal hash functions is that it’s not an exact hash of the raw bytes, but rather more like the “visual representation” of the image. When we were doing the initial implementation / rollout (I think late 2013ish), I did a bunch of testing to see how much I could vary a test image and have the hash be the same as I was curious. Resizes or crops (unless drastic) would almost always come back within the fuzziness window we were using. Overlaying some text or a basic shape (like a frame) would also often match. I then used photoshop to tweak color/contrast/white balance/brightness/etc and that’s where it started getting hit or miss.
Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow
#717Earlier quoted context omitted.
Imagine things like: - A kitchen with nobody in frame. - A couch with nobody in frame. - Outdoor scenery with nobody in frame. - A bathroom with nobody in frame. Is it hard to believe you wouldn't download something like this without knowing where it came from? I'm not talking about borderline stuff. I'm talking about content that has not even a hint of pornography or illegality.
So why is it in there and why do they care?
A person who creates CSAM likely doesn't just create CSAM all the time, right? Those innocuous pictures get lumped together with illegal content and make it into the database.
The database is a mess, basically. Of course it is. It's gigantic beyond your wildest estimates.
Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow
#718Earlier quoted context omitted.
Samsung is one of the companies I trust the least with regards to security, privacy, and overall competence in software.
Why though? How are they worse than Google for example? Were there any recent examples where they failed in those?
They'll happily do evil shit, and execute it poorly. Samsung are _way_ more likely to leak the unnecessarily and possibly illegally collected personal data they hoover up than Google are.
Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow
#719Earlier quoted context omitted.
We also saw the police query "check-in" databases which were pitched to the public as "for contact-tracing purposes only". Scope creep is inevitable.
Do you have sources for this ?
Australia, WA, border pass data: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-06-17/g2g-app-data-accessed...
Australia, VIC, check-in data: https://www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/police-sought-ac...
Australia, QLD, check-in data: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-06-29/queensland-coronaviru...
Re: Apple enabling client-side CSAM scanning on iPhone tomorrow
#720I'm really conflicted about this. For context, I deeply hate the abuse of children and I've worked on a contract before that landed 12 human traffickers in custody that were smuggling sex slaves across boarders. I didn't need to know details about the victims in question, but it's understood that they're often teenagers or children. So my initial reaction when reading this Twitter thread was "let's get these bastards…
Since they are only searching for _known_ abusive content, by definition they can only detect data that has been shared, which I think is the important point here.