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Apple plans to scan US iPhones for child abuse imagery

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211–220 of 390 posts

Re: Apple plans to scan US iPhones for child abuse imagery

#211
> the screening is done on the phone.

Where is my right to refuse to dedicate my devices cpu, battery time and network bandwidth for this activity?

Did I agree to this already?

(Sorry for asking a question! I'll try to simply trust Apple at all times from now on...)

Re: Apple plans to scan US iPhones for child abuse imagery

#212
post #161

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is painful to read with the arrogant undertone while you don't actually know how CSAM scanning works. It's fuzzy hash, not ""AI"", based. Cloudflare uses it too, and last time i checked the web is still functional. https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/36004610611... How about we turn the tables and have the complainers suggest a solution. Because every single time an approach to targeted child porn t…

>"have the complainers suggest a solution" Being worried about privacy, establishing a precedent for scanning my data against a government database, and the risk of false positives with such an insanely emotionally charged crime is more than mere complaining . The onus should not be on me to justify why this shouldn't be done. This is something new and it is perfectly fine to argue against it without needing to provi…

>That being said, my solution is to continue to follow the process that law enforcement is currently using.

If you knew how they approach this you wouldn't be satisfied either

Re: Apple plans to scan US iPhones for child abuse imagery

#213
post #161

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is painful to read with the arrogant undertone while you don't actually know how CSAM scanning works. It's fuzzy hash, not ""AI"", based. Cloudflare uses it too, and last time i checked the web is still functional. https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/36004610611... How about we turn the tables and have the complainers suggest a solution. Because every single time an approach to targeted child porn t…

> Child abusers evolve and are very happy if law enforcement doesn't. Yes. And now they will evolve by developing a simple system to modify pixels in images when they copy and transmit that will easily defeat this hashing system. The only effect this will have is that moral panickers like you will have got everybody's privacy invaded over your moral panic of the day.

Again, you don't appear to know how this works. Look up fuzzy hash, i even mentioned it in the comment.

Re: Apple plans to scan US iPhones for child abuse imagery

#214
post #93

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Like a kid running butt naked around the house... Thought it was buck naked — but that works too. :-)

https://brians.wsu.edu/2016/05/19/butt/

I would suggest that if it is widely used, it isn't an error, regardless of what Professor Brians thinks.

Re: Apple plans to scan US iPhones for child abuse imagery

#215
post #3

https://towardsdatascience.com/black-box-attacks-on-perceptu... I mean, who's to say that my hash is actually what they think it is... ...and if it's not uploaded to iCloud for someone to manually review what the image is, is that going to be enough to get a search warrant for my phone? "AUSA SOMEONE: But, Your Honor, The Defendant's phone has an image that matched a hash of a CSAM picture!" "DEFENDANT: I'm not going…

Fifth amendment holds that the state can't compel someone to give up their password.

But you can be jailed for 18 months for not giving it up

Re: Apple plans to scan US iPhones for child abuse imagery

#217
post #176

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not that I am qualified to hold a legal debate, but as far as I know, if Apple implements this under the pressure from the state, and that it reports what it findings to the state, it is effectively an agent of the state and it should apply.

As far as I’m aware, the laws which require cloud service operators to scan for CSAM have been on the books for a long time, and none of the usual orgs have raised a constitutional challenge to them. I’m not a legal expert either, though.

But that's the big difference, cloud providers are scanning the data they hold on their device. Your iphone is not Apple's device. Cloud providers have a liability if they knowingly store illegal content, the data is stored on their property, Apple does not, it is your property. It's like if Ford was going to scan what you store in the trunk of your car.

Re: Apple plans to scan US iPhones for child abuse imagery

#218
On one hand, I applaud this - CASM is a massive issue, and the internet community has never taken it as seriously as it should have.

As many others have noted - the potential for misuse is rife. Also, realize that Apple has a single set of infrastructure for their phones and macs, especially now that M1 exists. I've read accounts in the person where disaffected people "planted" porn on other peoples system, then called the police.

Imagine a web server with a page and a hash map matching image, with a frame-size of 1px. It's now in your cache.

Also, it's almost inevitable that this is a slippery slope. Today is may be pre-hashed images. Tommorow it may be AI detection. The day after it may be vaccine falsehoods. The day after it may be other bad government speach.

This is needed. This is a major major problem. But I hope someone is thinking of how to mitigate the potential for abuse.

Re: Apple plans to scan US iPhones for child abuse imagery

#220
post #172
post #124

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Don't worry, AI is very good at these things and never makes mistakes. It is so advanced it even understands nuance and complex communication mechanisms like sarcasm in text, even if it's only a single sentence to contrast! It will be able to know exactly the context of each image and it will affect only the sickos. We're also working on watching your face through the camera to see your true expression when viewing t…

There is zero AI classification involved, it’s a lookup vs hashes of known child porn images. You would need a hash collision, misidentified photo in the dataset, or legitimate use case to end up with a false positive.

And they aren't going to act on a single hash collision. People who have these images likely aren't going to have one or two.

People can argue against this approach for privacy reasons, but I think the false positive argument is a relatively weak one.

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