Earlier quoted context omitted.
It is a completely reasonable requirement of a large organization to ensure an endpoint meets certain criteria before being allowed access to an internal network. I'm not arguing that Wireguard has an obligation to tackle that problem themselves. I'm arguing against your assertion that VPN access should be completely decoupled from ensuring endpoint security.
Lets be honest, any malicious endpoint can easily bypass those 'endpoint security' checks. All they're good for is checking that unpatched (but not yet exploited/evil) endpoints can't connect to the network, which is of marginal benefit compared to allowing them to connect but requiring they patch before accessing risky resources (like the internet or email).
Anyway. Like I said, I think Wireguard is amazing - I used PiVPN (which can be installed on any .deb distro) to set up a simple gateway for my laptop and phone to be always connected for DNS and local-network access. I'm very grateful for its architecture and simplicity in that regard.